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Preface
Preface from Original Author: Charles Stangor
When I first started teaching social psychology, I had trouble figuring out how the various topics in this expansive
field fit together. I felt like I was presenting a laundry list of ideas, research studies, and phenomena, rather than an
integrated set of principles and knowledge. Of course, what was difficult for me was harder still for my students.
How could they be expected to understand and remember all of the many topics that we social psychologists
study? And how could they tell what was most important? Something was needed to structure and integrate their
learning.
It took me some time, but eventually, I realized that the missing piece in my lectures was a consistent focus on
the basic principles of social psychology. Once I started thinking and talking about principles, then it all fell into
place. I knew that when I got to my lecture on altruism, most of my students already knew what I was about to
tell them. They understood that, although there were always some tweaks to keep things interesting, altruism was
going to be understood using the same ideas that conformity and person perception had been in earlier lectures—in
terms of the underlying fundamentals—they were truly thinking like social psychologists!
I wrote this book to help students organize their thinking about social psychology at a conceptual level. Five or
ten years from now, I do not expect my students to remember the details of a study published in 2011, or even to
remember most of the definitions in this book. I do hope, however, that they will remember some basic ideas, for
it is these principles that will allow them to critically analyze new situations and really put their knowledge to use.
My text is therefore based on a critical thinking approach—its aim is to get students thinking actively and
conceptually—with more of a focus on the forest than on the trees. Although there are right and wrong answers,
the answers are not the only thing. What is perhaps even more important is how we get to those answers—the
thinking process itself. My efforts are successful when my students have that “aha” moment, in which they find
new ideas fitting snugly into the basic concepts of social psychology.
To help students better grasp the big picture of social psychology and to provide you with a theme that you can
use to organize your lectures, my text has a consistent pedagogy across the chapters. I organize my presentation
around two underlying principles that are essential to social psychology:
1. Person and situation (the classic treatment)
2. The ABCs of social psychology (affect, behavior, and cognition)
I also frame much of my discussion around the two human motivations of self-concern and other-concern. I use
these fundamental motivations to frame discussions on a variety of dimensions including altruism, aggression,
prejudice, gender differences, and cultural differences. You can incorporate these dimensions into your teaching
as you see fit.
My years of teaching have convinced me that these dimensions are fundamental, that they are extremely heuristic,
and that they are what I hope my students will learn and remember. I think that you may find that this organization
represents a more explicit representation of what you’re already doing in your lectures. Although my pedagogy
is consistent, it is not constraining. You will use these dimensions more in some lectures than in others, and you
will find them more useful for some topics than others. But they will always work for you when you are ready for
them. Use them to reinforce your presentation as you see fit.
Perhaps most important, a focus on these dimensions helps us bridge the gap between the textbook, the real-life
experiences of our students, and our class presentations. We can’t cover every phenomenon in our lectures—we
naturally let the textbook fill in the details. The goal of my book is to allow you to rest assured that the text has
provided your students with the foundations—the fundamental language of social psychology—from which you
can build as you see fit. And when you turn to ask students to apply their learning to real life, you can know that
they will be doing this as social psychologists do—using a basic underlying framework.
Organization
The text moves systematically from lower to higher levels of analysis—a method that I have found makes
sense to students. On the other hand, the chapter order should not constrain you—choose a different order if
you wish. Chapter 1 “Introducing Social Psychology” presents an introduction to social psychology and the
research methods in social psychology, Chapter 2 “Social Cognition” presents the fundamental principles of
social cognition. The remainder of the text is organized around three levels of analysis, moving systematically
from the individual level (Chapter 3 “The Self” through Chapter 5 “Perceiving Others”), to the level of social
interaction (Chapter 6 “Influencing and Conforming” through Chapter 9 “Aggression”), to the group and cultural
level (Chapter 10 “Working Groups: Performance and Decision Making” through Chapter 12 “Competition and
Cooperation in Our Social Worlds”).
Rather than relying on “modules” or “appendices” of applied materials, my text integrates applied concepts into
the text itself. This approach is consistent with my underlying belief that if students learn to think like social
psychologists they will easily and naturally apply that knowledge to any and all applications. The following
applications are woven throughout the text:
• Business and consumer behavior (see, for instance, Chapter 4 “Attitudes, Behavior, and Persuasion” on
marketing and persuasion and Chapter 10 “Working Groups: Performance and Decision Making” on
group decision making)
• Health and Behavior (see, for instance, Chapter 5 “Perceiving Others” on attributional styles)
• Law (see, for instance, Chapter 2 “Social Cognition” on eyewitness testimony and Chapter 9
“Aggression” on Terrorism)
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Pedagogy
Principles of Social Psychology contains a number of pedagogical features designed to help students develop an
active, integrative understanding of the many topics of social psychology and to think like social psychologists.
Research Foci
Research is of course the heart of social psychology, and the research foci provide detailed information about a
study or research program. I’ve chosen a mix of classic and contemporary research, with a focus on both what’s
interesting and what’s pedagogical. The findings are part of the running text—simply highlighted with a heading
and light shading.
Social Psychology in the Public Interest
Social psychological findings interest students in large part because they relate so directly to everyday experience.
The Social Psychology in the Public Interest Feature reinforces these links. Topics include Does High Self-Esteem
Cause Happiness or Other Positive Outcomes? (Chapter 3 “Self”), Detecting Deception (Chapter 5 “Perceiving
Others”), Terrorism as Instrumental Aggression (Chapter 9 “Aggression”), and Stereotype Threat in Schools
(Chapter 11 “Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination”). The goal here is to include these applied topics within
the relevant conceptual discussions to provide students with a richer understanding within the context of the
presentation.
Thinking Like a Social Psychologist
Each chapter ends with a section that summarizes how the material presented in the chapter can help the student
think about contemporary issues using social psychological principles. This section is designed to work with the
chapter summary to allow a better integration of fundamental concepts.
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About the Book
Principles of Social Psychology-1st International Edition was adapted by Rajiv Jhangiani and Hammond Tarry
from Charles Stagnor’s textbook Principles of Social Psychology. For information about what was changed in this
adaptation, refer to the Copyright statement at the bottom of the home page. The adaptation is a part of the B.C.
Open Textbook project.
The B.C. Open Textbook Project began in 2012 with the goal of making post-secondary education in British
Columbia more accessible by reducing student cost through the use of openly licensed textbooks. The BC Open
Textbook Project is administered by BCcampus and funded by the British Columbia Ministry of Advanced
Education.
Open textbooks are open educational resources (OER); they are instructional resources created and shared in
ways so that more people have access to them. This is a different model than traditionally copyrighted materials.
OER are defined as teaching, learning, and research resources that reside in the public domain or have been
released under an intellectual property license that permits their free use and re-purposing by others (Hewlett
Foundation). Our open textbooks are openly licensed using a Creative Commons license, and are offered in
various e-book formats free of charge, or as printed books that are available at cost. For more information
about this project, please contact opentext@bccampus.ca. If you are an instructor who is using this book for a
course, please let us know.
Adapting Authors’ Notes:
Although the original edition of this textbook was favourably reviewed by BC faculty, the reviewers noted
several areas and issues that needed to be addressed before it was ready for adoption. These included incorporating
new research and theoretical developments, updating the chapter opening anecdotes and real world examples
to make them more relevant for contemporary students, changing examples, references, and statistics to
reflect a more international context, and merging the separate chapters on “Social Learning” and “Social Affect”
to create a single “Social Cognition” chapter. Over the course of our adaptation we attempted to address all of
these issues (with the exception of American spelling, which was retained in order to focus on more substantive
issues), while making other changes and additions we thought necessary, such as writing overviews of some
concepts, theories, and key studies not included in the original edition. Finally, we added a list of learning
objectives at the start of each chapter and a glossary of key terms at the end of the textbook as a quick-reference
for students.
We hope that our work enables more instructors to adopt this open textbook for their Social Psychology or related
courses and we further invite you to build upon our work by modifying this textbook to suit your course and
pedagogical goals.
Rajiv Jhangiani and Hammond Tarry
August 2014
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1. Introducing Social Psychology
Chapter Learning Objectives
1. Defining Social Psychology: History and Principles
• Define social psychology.
• Review the history of the field of social psychology and the topics that social psychologists
study.
• Summarize the principles of evolutionary psychology.
• Describe and provide examples of the person-situation interaction.
• Review the concepts of (a) social norms and (b) cultures.
2. Affect, Behavior, and Cognition
• Define and differentiate affect, behavior, and cognition as considered by social psychologists.
• Summarize the principles of social cognition.
3. Conducting Research in Social Psychology
• Explain why social psychologists rely on empirical methods to study social behavior.
• Provide examples of how social psychologists measure the variables they are interested in.
• Review the three types of research designs, and evaluate the strengths and limitations of each
type.
• Consider the role of validity in research, and describe how research programs should be
evaluated.
The Story of Raoul Wallenberg
Born into a prominent and wealthy family in Sweden, Raoul Wallenberg grew up especially close to
his mother and grandfather (his father had earlier died from cancer). Early in life he demonstrated a
flair for languages and became fluent in English, French, German, and Russian. Raoul pursued a college
education in the United States, where he distinguished himself academically en route to completing a B.A.
in architecture from the University of Michigan in 1935. Following a period during which he lived and
worked in South Africa and then Palestine, he returned to his native Sweden, where he became increasingly
concerned about the treatment of the Jews in Nazi Germany. His work in the import-export business took
him to Budapest, Hungary, where by 1944 the Nazis were sending between 10,000 and 12,000 Jews to
their deaths in the gas chambers every day. It was around this time that Wallenberg accepted a position
with the Swedish embassy in Budapest.
Figure 1.1 Raoul Wallenberg. Raoul
Wallenberg sculpture, Great Cumberland
Place, London (https://flic.kr/p/a3CoRG) by
Mira 66 (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
21804434@N02/) under CC BY NC SA
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-sa/2.0/)
What took place over the next six months is an extraordinary and miraculous story of courage and
caring. Deciding that he had to do everything in his power to help save the Jews of Hungary, Wallenberg
began by establishing an office and “hired” 400 Jewish volunteers to run it so that they could receive
diplomatic protection. Next, without his government’s authorization, he invented an official-looking
Swedish passport, the “Schutzpass,” that he distributed to as many Jews as he could. This fake passport
alone helped save the lives of approximately 20,000 Jews. He even set up 32 “safe houses” that became
attached to the Swedish embassy and used them to protect 35,000 Jews. He worked long hours, sleeping
barely four hours each night. He bribed, manipulated, confronted, and harassed officials in order to achieve
his goal of saving the Jews of Hungary.
As the Soviet army invaded from the east, the Nazis began to escalate their annihilation of the Hungarian
Jewish population. Wallenberg promptly threatened the Nazi commander, indicating that he would
personally see the commander hanged for crimes against humanity. The commander backed down and
called off the assault, thereby saving the lives of another 70,000 Jews.
Unfortunately, Wallenberg was arrested by the Soviets and never heard from again. Some reports indicate
that he remained in a Soviet prison for years and eventually died there.
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Raoul Wallenberg has been made an honorary citizen of Australia, Canada, Hungary, Israel, and the
United States, and there are memorials and awards in his name around the world. In 1985, speaking on
the 40th anniversary of his arrest, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations said that Wallenberg “has
become more than a man, more even than a hero. He symbolizes a central conflict of our age, which is
the determination to remain human and caring and free in the face of tyranny. What Raoul Wallenberg
represented in Budapest was nothing less than the conscience of the civilized world.”
Schreiber, P. (2014). The Story of Raoul Wallenberg. Retrieved from http://www.wallenberg.umich.edu/
story.html.
Social psychology is the scientific study of how we feel about, think about, and behave toward the people around
us and how our feelings, thoughts, and behaviors are influenced by those people. As this definition suggests, the
subject matter of social psychology is very broad and can be found in just about everything that we do every day.
Social psychologists study why we are often helpful to other people and why we may at other times be unfriendly
or aggressive. Social psychologists study both the benefits of having good relationships with other people and
the costs of being lonely. Social psychologists study what factors lead people to purchase one product rather than
another, how men and women behave differently in social settings, how juries work together to make important
group decisions, and what makes some people more likely to recycle and engage in other environmentally friendly
behaviors than others. And social psychologists also study more unusual events, such as how someone might
choose to risk their life to save that of a complete stranger.
The goal of this book is to help you learn to think about social behaviors in the same way that social psychologists
do. We believe you will find this approach useful because it will allow you to think about human behavior
more critically and more objectively and to gain insight into your own relationships with other people. Social
psychologists study everyday behavior scientifically, and their research creates a useful body of knowledge about
our everyday social interactions.
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Defining Social Psychology: History and Principles
Learning Objectives
1. Define social psychology.
2. Review the history of the field of social psychology and the topics that social psychologists
study.
3. Summarize the principles of evolutionary psychology.
4. Describe and provide examples of the person-situation interaction.
5. Review the concepts of (a) social norms and (b) cultures.
The field of social psychology is growing rapidly and is having an increasingly important influence on how we
think about human behavior. Newspapers, magazines, websites, and other media frequently report the findings of
social psychologists, and the results of social psychological research are influencing decisions in a wide variety
of areas. Let’s begin with a short history of the field of social psychology and then turn to a review of the basic
principles of the science of social psychology.
The History of Social Psychology
The science of social psychology began when scientists first started to systematically and formally measure the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of human beings (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2011). The earliest social psychology
experiments on group behavior were conducted before 1900 (Triplett, 1898), and the first social psychology
textbooks were published in 1908 (McDougall, 1908/2003; Ross, 1908/1974). During the 1940s and 1950s, the
social psychologists Kurt Lewin and Leon Festinger refined the experimental approach to studying behavior,
creating social psychology as a rigorous scientific discipline. Lewin is sometimes known as “the father of social
psychology” because he initially developed many of the important ideas of the discipline, including a focus on
the dynamic interactions among people. In 1954, Festinger edited an influential book called Research Methods in
the Behavioral Sciences, in which he and other social psychologists stressed the need to measure variables and to
use laboratory experiments to systematically test research hypotheses about social behavior. He also noted that it
might be necessary in these experiments to deceive the participants about the true nature of the research.
Social psychology was energized by researchers who attempted to understand how the German dictator Adolf
Hitler could have produced such extreme obedience and horrendous behaviors in his followers during the World
War II. The studies on conformity conducted by Muzafir Sherif (1936) and Solomon Asch (1952), as well as
those on obedience by Stanley Milgram (1974), showed the importance of conformity pressures in social groups
and how people in authority could create obedience, even to the extent of leading people to cause severe harm
to others. Philip Zimbardo, in his well-known “prison study” (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), found that the
interactions of male college students who were recruited to play the roles of guards and prisoners in a simulated
prison became so violent that the study had to be terminated early.
Social psychology quickly expanded to study other topics. John Darley and Bibb Latané (1968) developed
a model that helped explain when people do and do not help others in need, and Leonard Berkowitz
(1974) pioneered the study of human aggression. Meanwhile, other social psychologists, including Irving Janis
(1972), focused on group behavior, studying why intelligent people sometimes made decisions that led to
disastrous results when they worked together. Still other social psychologists, including Gordon Allport and
Muzafir Sherif, focused on intergroup relations, with the goal of understanding and potentially reducing the
occurrence of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Social psychologists gave their opinions in the 1954
Brown v. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court case that helped end racial segregation in American public
schools, and social psychologists still frequently serve as expert witnesses on these and other topics (Fiske,
Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991). In recent years insights from social psychology have even been used
to design anti-violence programs in societies that have experienced genocide (Staub, Pearlman, & Bilali, 2010).
The latter part of the 20th century saw an expansion of social psychology into the field of attitudes, with a
particular emphasis on cognitive processes. During this time, social psychologists developed the first formal
models of persuasion, with the goal of understanding how advertisers and other people could present their
messages to make them most effective (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1963). These
approaches to attitudes focused on the cognitive processes that people use when evaluating messages and on
the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Leon Festinger’s important cognitive dissonance theory was
developed during this time and became a model for later research (Festinger, 1957).
In the 1970s and 1980s, social psychology became even more cognitive in orientation as social psychologists used
advances in cognitive psychology, which were themselves based largely on advances in computer technology,
to inform the field (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). The focus of these researchers, including Alice Eagly, Susan Fiske,
E. Tory Higgins, Richard Nisbett, Lee Ross, Shelley Taylor, and many others, was on social cognition—an
understanding of how our knowledge about our social worlds develops through experience and the influence
of these knowledge structures on memory, information processing, attitudes, and judgment. Furthermore, the
extent to which humans’ decision making could be flawed due to both cognitive and motivational processes was
documented (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
In the 21st century, the field of social psychology has been expanding into still other areas. Examples that we
consider in this book include an interest in how social situations influence our health and happiness, the important
roles of evolutionary experiences and cultures on our behavior, and the field of social neuroscience—the study of
how our social behavior both influences and is influenced by the activities of our brain (Lieberman, 2010). Social
psychologists continue to seek new ways to measure and understand social behavior, and the field continues to
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evolve. We cannot predict where social psychology will be directed in the future, but we have no doubt that it will
still be alive and vibrant.
The Person and the Social Situation
Social psychology is the study of the dynamic relationship between individuals and the people around them. Each
of us is different, and our individual characteristics, including our personality traits, desires, motivations, and
emotions, have an important impact on our social behavior. But our behavior is also profoundly influenced by the
social situation—the people with whom we interact every day. These people include our friends and family, our
classmates, our religious groups, the people we see on TV or read about or interact with online, as well as people
we think about, remember, or even imagine.
Social psychologists believe that human behavior is determined by both a person’s characteristics and the social
situation. They also believe that the social situation is frequently a stronger influence on behavior than are a
person’s characteristics.
Social psychology is largely the study of the social situation. Our social situations create social influence—the
process through which other people change our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors and through which we change
theirs. Maybe you can already see how social influence affected Raoul Wallenberg’s choices and how he in turn
influenced others around him.
Kurt Lewin formalized the joint influence of person variables and situational variables, which is known as the
person-situation interaction, in an important equation:
Behavior = f (person, social situation).
Lewin’s equation indicates that the behavior of a given person at any given time is a function of (depends on) both
the characteristics of the person and the influence of the social situation.
Evolutionary Adaptation and Human Characteristics
In Lewin’s equation, person refers to the characteristics of the individual human being. People are born with
skills that allow them to successfully interact with others in their social world. Newborns are able to recognize
faces and to respond to human voices, young children learn language and develop friendships with other children,
adolescents become interested in sex and are destined to fall in love, most adults marry and have children, and
most people usually get along with others.
People have these particular characteristics because we have all been similarly shaped through human evolution.
The genetic code that defines human beings has provided us with specialized social skills that are important to
survival. Just as keen eyesight, physical strength, and resistance to disease helped our ancestors survive, so too did
the tendency to engage in social behaviors. We quickly make judgments about other people, help other people who
are in need, and enjoy working together in social groups because these behaviors helped our ancestors to adapt and
were passed along on their genes to the next generation (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006;
Pinker, 2002). Our extraordinary social skills are primarily due to our large brains and the social intelligence that
they provide us with (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007).
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The assumption that human nature, including much of our social behavior, is determined largely by our
evolutionary past is known as evolutionary adaptation (Buss & Kenrick, 1998; Workman & Reader, 2008). In
evolutionary theory, fitness refers to the extent to which having a given characteristic helps the individual
organism to survive and to reproduce at a higher rate than do other members of the species who do not
have the characteristic. Fitter organisms pass on their genes more successfully to later generations, making the
characteristics that produce fitness more likely to become part of the organisms’ nature than are characteristics that
do not produce fitness. For example, it has been argued that the emotion of jealousy has survived over time in men
because men who experience jealousy are more fit than men who do not. According to this idea, the experience
of jealousy leads men to protect their mates and guard against rivals, which increases their reproductive success
(Buss, 2000).
Although our biological makeup prepares us to be human beings, it is important to remember that our genes do not
really determine who we are. Rather, genes provide us with our human characteristics, and these characteristics
give us the tendency to behave in a “human” way. And yet each human being is different from every other human
being.
Evolutionary adaption has provided us with two fundamental motivations that guide us and help us lead
productive and effective lives. One of these motivations relates to the self—the motivation to protect and enhance
the self and the people who are psychologically close to us; the other relates to the social situation—the motivation
to affiliate with, accept, and be accepted by others. We will refer to these two motivations as self-concern and
other-concern, respectively.
Self-Concern
The most basic tendency of all living organisms, and the focus of the first human motivation, is the desire to
protect and enhance our own life and the lives of the people who are close to us. Humans are motivated to find
food and water, to obtain adequate shelter, and to protect themselves from danger. Doing so is necessary because
we can survive only if we are able to meet these fundamental goals.
The desire to maintain and enhance the self also leads us to do the same for our relatives—those people who
are genetically related to us. Human beings, like other animals, exhibit kin selection—strategies that favor the
reproductive success of one’s relatives, sometimes even at a cost to the individual’s own survival. According to
evolutionary principles, kin selection occurs because behaviors that enhance the fitness of relatives, even if they
lower the fitness of the individual himself or herself, may nevertheless increase the survival of the group as a
whole.
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Figure 1.2 The evolutionary principle of kin selection leads us to be particularly caring of and helpful to those who share our genes.
Source: “Happy family”(http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Happy_family_%281%29.jpg) by Catherine Scott used under the
CC-BY-SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en)
In addition to our kin, we desire to protect, improve, and enhance the well-being of our ingroup— those we view
as being similar and important to us and with whom we share close social connections, even if those people do
not actually share our genes. Perhaps you remember a time when you helped friends move all their furniture into
a new home, even though you would have preferred to be doing something more beneficial for yourself, such as
studying or relaxing. You wouldn’t have helped strangers in this way, but you did it for your friends because you
felt close to and cared about them. The tendency to help the people we feel close to, even if they are not related
to us, is probably due in part to our evolutionary past: the people we were closest to were usually those we were
related to.
Other-Concern
Although we are primarily concerned with the survival of ourselves, our kin, and those who we feel are similar
and important to us, we also desire to connect with and be accepted by other people more generally—the
goal of other-concern. We live together in communities, we work together in work groups, we may worship
together in religious groups, and we may play together on sports teams and through clubs. Affiliating with other
people—even strangers—helps us meet a fundamental goal: that of finding a romantic partner with whom we can
have children. Our connections with others also provide us with opportunities that we would not have on our own.
We can go to the grocery store to buy milk or eggs, and we can hire a carpenter to build a house for us. And we
ourselves do work that provides goods and services for others. This mutual cooperation is beneficial both for us
and for the people around us. We also affiliate because we enjoy being with others, being part of social groups,
and contributing to social discourse (Leary & Cox, 2008).
What the other-concern motive means is that we do not always put ourselves first. Being human also involves
caring about, helping, and cooperating with other people. Although our genes are themselves “selfish” (Dawkins,
2006), this does not mean that individuals always are. The survival of our own genes may be improved by helping
others, even those who are not related to us (Krebs, 2008; Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008). Just as birds and
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other animals may give out alarm calls to other animals to indicate that a predator is nearby, humans engage in
altruistic behaviors in which they help others, sometimes at a potential cost to themselves.
In short, human beings behave morally toward others—they understand that it is wrong to harm other people
without a strong reason for doing so, and they display compassion and even altruism toward others (Goetz,
Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Turiel, 1983). As a result, negative behaviors toward others, such as bullying,
cheating, stealing, and aggression, are unusual, unexpected, and socially disapproved. Of course this does not
mean that people are always friendly, helpful, and nice to each other—powerful social situations can and do create
negative behaviors. But the fundamental human motivation of other-concern does mean that hostility and violence
are the exception rather than the rule of human behavior.
Sometimes the goals of self-concern and other-concern go hand in hand. When we fall in love with another person,
it is in part about a concern for connecting with someone else but is also about self-concern—falling in love makes
us feel good about ourselves. And when we volunteer to help others who are in need, it is in part for their benefit
but also for us. We feel good when we help others. At other times, however, the goals of self-concern and other-
concern conflict. Imagine that you are walking across campus and you see a man with a knife threatening another
person. Do you intervene, or do you turn away? In this case, your desire to help the other person (other-concern)
is in direct conflict with your desire to protect yourself from the danger posed by the situation (self-concern), and
you must decide which goal to put first. We will see many more examples of the motives of self-concern and
other-concern, both working together and working against each other, throughout this book.
Figure 1.3 Other-concern is a fundamental part of the behavior of humans and many animals.
Source: “Formosan macaque” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Formosan_macaque.jpg) by KaurJmeb used under the CC-BY-SA 2.0
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en). “Old couple in a busy street” (https://www.flickr.com/photos/damiel/19475138/) by
Geir Halvorsen used under the CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0 Generic (a href=”https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/). “Elderly Care”
(http://www.flickr.com/photos/76039842@N07/7645318536/in/photostream/) by Mark Adkins used under the CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/). “Piggy Back” (https://www.flickr.com/photos/cazatoma/4928209598/) by Tricia J used
under the CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/).
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The Social Situation Creates Powerful Social Influence
When people are asked to indicate the things they value the most, they usually mention their social situation—that
is, their relationships with other people (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske & Haslam, 1996). When we work
together on a class project, volunteer at a homeless shelter, or serve on a jury in a courtroom trial, we count on
others to work with us to get the job done. We develop social bonds with those people, and we expect that they will
come through to help us meet our goals. The importance of others shows up in every aspect of our lives—other
people teach us what we should and shouldn’t do, what we should and shouldn’t think, and even what we should
and shouldn’t like and dislike.
In addition to the people with whom we are currently interacting, we are influenced by people who are not
physically present but who are nevertheless part of our thoughts and feelings. Imagine that you are driving home
on a deserted country road late at night. No cars are visible in any direction, and you can see for miles. You come
to a stop sign. What do you do? Most likely, you stop at the sign, or at least slow down. You do so because the
behavior has been internalized: even though no one is there to watch you, others are still influencing you—you’ve
learned about the rules and laws of society, what’s right and what’s wrong, and you tend to obey them. We
carry our own personal social situations—our experiences with our parents, teachers, leaders, authorities, and
friends—around with us every day.
An important principle of social psychology, one that will be with us throughout this book, is that although
individuals’ characteristics do matter, the social situation is often a stronger determinant of behavior than is
personality. When social psychologists analyze an event such as the Holocaust, they are likely to focus more on
the characteristics of the situation (e.g., the strong leader and the group pressure provided by the other group
members) than on the characteristics of the perpetrators themselves. As an example, we will see that even ordinary
people who are neither bad nor evil in any way can nevertheless be placed in situations in which an authority
figure is able to lead them to engage in evil behaviors, such as applying potentially lethal levels of electrical shock
(Milgram, 1974).
In addition to discovering the remarkable extent to which our behavior is influenced by our social situation,
social psychologists have discovered that we often do not recognize how important the social situation is in
determining behavior. We often wrongly think that we and others act entirely on our own accord, without any
external influences. It is tempting to assume that the people who commit extreme acts, such as terrorists or
members of suicide cults, are unusual or extreme people. And yet much research suggests that these behaviors are
caused more by the social situation than they are by the characteristics of the individuals and that it is wrong to
focus so strongly on explanations of individuals’ characteristics (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
There is perhaps no clearer example of the powerful influence of the social situation than that found in research
showing the enormous role that others play in our physical and mental health. ƒC (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith,
1999; Diener, Tamir, & Scollon, 2006).
Social Psychology in the Public Interest
How the Social Situation Influences Our Mental and Physical Health
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In comparison with those who do not feel that they have a network of others they can rely on, people who
feel that they have adequate social support report being happier and have also been found to have fewer
psychological problems, including eating disorders and mental illness (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999;
Diener, Tamir, & Scollon, 2006).
People with social support are less depressed overall, recover faster from negative events, and are less
likely to commit suicide (Au, Lau, & Lee, 2009; Bertera, 2007; Compton, Thompson, & Kaslow, 2005;
Skärsäter, Langius, Ågren, Häagström, & Dencker, 2005). Married people report being happier than
unmarried people (Pew, 2006), and overall, a happy marriage is an excellent form of social support. One
of the goals of effective psychotherapy is to help people generate better social support networks because
such relationships have such a positive effect on mental health.
In addition to having better mental health, people who have adequate social support are more physically
healthy. They have fewer diseases (such as tuberculosis, heart attacks, and cancer), live longer, have
lower blood pressure, and have fewer deaths at all ages (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Stroebe & Stroebe,
1996). Sports psychologists have even found that individuals with higher levels of social support are
less likely to be injured playing sports and recover more quickly from injuries they do receive (Hardy,
Richman, & Rosenfeld, 1991). These differences appear to be due to the positive effects of social support
on physiological functioning, including the immune system.
The opposite of social support is the feeling of being excluded or ostracized. Feeling that others are
excluding us is painful, and the pain of rejection may linger even longer than physical pain. People who
were asked to recall an event that caused them social pain (e.g., betrayal by a person very close to them)
rated the pain as more intense than they rated their memories of intense physical pain (Chen, Williams,
Fitness, & Newton, 2008). When people are threatened with social exclusion, they subsequently express
greater interest in making new friends, increase their desire to work cooperatively with others, form more
positive first impressions of new potential interaction partners, and even become more able to discriminate
between real smiles and fake smiles (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008; Maner, DeWall,
Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007).
Because connecting with others is such an important part of human experience, we may sometimes
withhold affiliation from or ostracize other people in order to attempt to force them to conform to our
wishes. When individuals of the Amish religion violate the rulings of an elder, they are placed under a
Meidung. During this time, and until they make amends, they are not spoken to by community members.
And people frequently use the “silent treatment” to express their disapproval of a friend’s or partner’s
behavior. The pain of ostracism is particularly strong in adolescents (Sebastian, Viding, Williams, &
Blakemore, 2010).
The use of ostracism has also been observed in parents and children, and even in Internet games and chat
rooms (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000).The silent treatment and other forms of ostracism are popular
because they work. Withholding social communication and interaction is a powerful weapon for punishing
individuals and forcing them to change their behaviors. Individuals who are ostracized report feeling alone,
frustrated, sad, and unworthy and having lower self-esteem (Bastian & Haslam, 2010).
Taken together, then, social psychological research results suggest that one of the most important things
you can do for yourself is to develop a stable support network. Reaching out to other people benefits those
who become your friends (because you are in their support network) and has substantial benefits for you.
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Social Influence Creates Social Norms
In some cases, social influence occurs rather passively, without any obvious intent of one person to influence
another, such as when we learn about and adopt the beliefs and behaviors of the people around us, often without
really being aware that we are doing so. Social influence occurs when a young child adopts the beliefs and
values of his or her parents, or when someone starts to like jazz music, without really being aware of it, because
a roommate plays a lot of it. In other cases, social influence is anything but subtle; it involves one or more
individuals actively attempting to change the beliefs or behaviors of others, as is evident in the attempts of the
members of a jury to get a dissenting member to change his or her opinion, the use of a popular sports figure to
encourage children to buy certain products, or the messages that cult leaders give to their followers to encourage
them to engage in the behaviors required of the group.
One outcome of social influence is the development of social norms—the ways of thinking, feeling, or behaving
that are shared by group members and perceived by them as appropriate (Asch, 1955; Cialdini, 1993). Norms
include customs, traditions, standards, and rules, as well as the general values of the group. Through norms, we
learn what people actually do (“people in the United States are more likely to eat scrambled eggs in the morning
and spaghetti in the evening, rather than vice versa”) and also what we should do (“do unto others as you would
have them do unto you”) and shouldn’t do (“do not make racist jokes”). There are norms about almost every
possible social behavior, and these norms have a big influence on our actions.
Different Cultures Have Different Norms
The social norms that guide our everyday behaviors and that create social influence derive in large part from our
culture. A culture represents a group of people, normally living within a given geographical region, who share a
common set of social norms, including religious and family values and moral beliefs (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus,
& Nisbett, 1998; Matsumoto, 2001). The culture in which we live affects our thoughts, feelings, and behavior
through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission (Mesoudi, 2009). It is not inappropriate to say
that our culture defines our lives just as much as our evolutionary experience does.
Cultures differ in terms of the particular norms that they find important and that guide the behavior of the
group members. Social psychologists have found that there is a fundamental difference in social norms between
Western cultures (including the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand) and East
Asian cultures (including China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, India, and Southeast Asia). Norms in Western cultures
are primarily oriented toward individualism—cultural norms, common in Western societies, that focus primarily
on self-enhancement and independence. Children in Western cultures are taught to develop and value a sense of
their personal self and to see themselves as largely separate from the people around them. Children in Western
cultures feel special about themselves—they enjoy getting gold stars on their projects and the best grade in the
class (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). Adults in Western cultures are oriented toward promoting their own
individual success, frequently in comparison with (or even at the expense of) others. When asked to describe
themselves, individuals in Western cultures generally tend to indicate that they like to “do their own thing,” prefer
to live their lives independently, and base their happiness and self-worth on their own personal achievements. In
short, in Western cultures the emphasis is on self-concern.
Norms in the East Asian cultures, on the other hand, are more focused on other-concern. These norms indicate that
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people should be more fundamentally connected with others and thus are more oriented toward interdependence,
or collectivism. In East Asian cultures, children are taught to focus on developing harmonious social relationships
with others, and the predominant norms relate to group togetherness, connectedness, and duty and responsibility
to their family. The members of East Asian cultures, when asked to describe themselves, indicate that they are
particularly concerned about the interests of others, including their close friends and their colleagues. As one
example of these cultural differences, research conducted by Shinobu Kitayama and his colleagues (Uchida,
Norasakkunkit, & Kitayama, 2004) found that East Asians were more likely than Westerners to experience
happiness as a result of their connections with other people, whereas Westerners were more likely to experience
happiness as a result of their own personal accomplishments.
Figure 1.4 People from Western cultures are, on average, more individualistic than people from Eastern cultures, who are, on average, more
collectivistic.
Sources: “Family playing a board game” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Family_playing_a_board_game_%283%29.jpg) by Bill
Branson in the public domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain). “West Wittering Wonderful As Always”
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/gareth1953/7976359044/sizes/l/) by Gareth Williams used under CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/2.0/).
Other researchers have studied other cultural differences, such as variations in orientations toward time. Some
cultures are more concerned with arriving and departing according to a fixed schedule, whereas others consider
time in a more flexible manner (Levine & Norenzayan, 1999). Levine and colleagues (1999) found that “the pace
of life,” as assessed by average walking speed in downtown locations and the speed with which postal clerks
completed a simple request, was fastest in Western countries (but also in Japan) and slowest in economically
undeveloped countries. It has also been argued that there are differences in the extent to which people in different
cultures are bound by social norms and customs, rather than being free to express their own individuality without
regard to considering social norms (Gelfand et al., 1996). And there are also cultural differences regarding
personal space, such as how close individuals stand to each other when talking, as well as differences in the
communication styles individuals employ.
It is important to be aware of cultures and cultural differences, at least in part because people with different
cultural backgrounds are increasingly coming into contact with each other as a result of increased travel and
immigration, and the development of the Internet and other forms of communication. In Canada, for instance,
there are many different ethnic groups, and the proportion of the population that comes from minority (non-White)
groups is increasing from year to year. Minorities will account for a much larger proportion of the total new entries
into the Canadian workforce over the next decades. Roughly 21% of the Canadian population is foreign-born,
which is easily the highest among G8 countries. By 2031, visible minorities are projected to make up 63% of
the population of Toronto and 59% of Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 2011). Although these changes create the
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potential for greater cultural understanding and productive interaction, they may also produce unwanted social
conflict. Being aware of cultural differences and considering their influence on how we behave toward others is
an important part of a basic understanding of social psychology and a topic that we will return to frequently in this
book.
Key Takeaways
• The history of social psychology includes the study of attitudes, group behavior, altruism and
aggression, culture, prejudice, and many other topics.
• Social psychologists study real-world problems using a scientific approach.
• Thinking about your own interpersonal interactions from the point of view of social
psychology can help you better understand and respond to them.
• Social psychologists study the person-situation interaction: how characteristics of the person
and characteristics of the social situation interact to determine behavior.
• Many human social behaviors have been selected by evolutionary adaptation.
• The social situation creates social norms—shared ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving.
• Cultural differences—for instance, in individualistic versus collectivistic orientations—guide
our everyday behavior.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Go to the website http://www.socialpsychology.org and click on two of the “psychology
headlines from around the world” presented on the right-hand side of the page. Read through
the two articles and write a short (120 words) summary of each.
2. Consider a recent situation from your personal experience in which you focused on an
individual and a cause of his or her behaviour. Could you reinterpret their behavior using a
situational explanation?
3. Go to the website http://www.socialpsychology.org/social-figures.htm and choose one of the
important figures in social psychology listed there. Prepare a brief (250 word) report about
how this person contributed to the field of social psychology.
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Affect, Behavior, and Cognition
Learning Objectives
1. Define and differentiate affect, behavior, and cognition as considered by social psychologists.
2. Summarize the principles of social cognition.
Social psychology is based on the ABCs of affect, behavior, and cognition. In order to effectively maintain and
enhance our own lives through successful interaction with others, we rely on these three basic and interrelated
human capacities:
1. Affect (feelings)
2. Behavior (interactions)
3. Cognition (thought)
Figure 1.5 Human beings rely on the three capacities of affect, behavior, and cognition, which work together to help them create successful
social interactions.
Source: “icy*kiss” (https://www.flickr.com/photos/smcgee/2170220318/) by Sarah used under CC BY-NC 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/2.0/); “Work man sitting” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Work_man-sitting.jpg#file) by Pilatesball used under CC
BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en); “weight lifting” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Weight_lifting_black_and_white.jpg) by imagesbywestfall used under CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en)
You can see that these three aspects directly reflect the idea in our definition of social psychology—the study of
the feelings, behaviors, and thoughts of individuals in the social situation. Although we will frequently discuss
each of the capacities separately, keep in mind that all three work together to produce human experience. Now
let’s consider separately the roles of cognition, affect, and behavior.
Social Cognition: Thinking and Learning about Others
The human brain contains about 86 billion neurons, each of which can make contact with tens of thousands of
other neurons. The distinguishing brain feature in mammals, including humans, is the more recently evolved
cerebral cortex—the part of the brain that is involved in thinking. Humans are highly intelligent, and they use
cognition in every part of their social lives. Psychologists refer to cognition as the mental activity of processing
information and using that information in judgment. Social cognition is cognition that relates to social activities
and that helps us understand and predict the behavior of ourselves and others.
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Figure 1.6 The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that is involved in thinking. A big part of its job is social cognition—thinking about and
understanding other people.
Source: “A husband and wife reunite” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:A_husband_and_wife_reunite_after_a_six-month_war_deployment_in_the_Middle_East_as_pilots_and_air_crewmen_from_Helicopter
_Anti_Submarine_Squadron_Light_Five_One_return_
to_their_home_at_Naval_Air_Facility_Atsugi_030725-N-HX866-002.jpg) by PHC(SW/NAC) SPIKE CALL in the public domain. “Panel
Discussion” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Panel_Discussion_Close-up,_Science,_Faith,_and_Technology.jpg) by David Bruce
used under CC BY-SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en). “laughing mom friends” (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
lolololori/2581438627/) by Lori used under CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/); “Black Icon Cloud Food
Outline Symbol People Man” (http://pixabay.com/en/black-icon-cloud-food-outline-24152/) in public domain (http://creativecommons.org/
publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en); “Outer surface of the human brain” in public domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain); “Head
profile” (http://openclipart.org/detail/166375/head-profile-by-printerkiller) in public domain (http://openclipart.org/share).
Over time, people develop a set of social knowledge that contains information about the self, other people, social
relationships, and social groups. Two types of knowledge are particularly important in social psychology: schemas
and attitudes. A schema is a knowledge representation that includes information about a person or group (e.g.,
our knowledge that Joe is a friendly guy or that Italians are romantic). An attitude is a knowledge representation
that includes primarily our liking or disliking of a person, thing, or group (“I really like Julie”; “I dislike my
new apartment”). Once we have formed them, both schemas and attitudes allow us to judge quickly and without
much thought whether someone or something we encounter is good or bad, helpful or hurtful, to be sought out or
avoided. Thus schemas and attitudes have an important influence on our social information processing and social
behavior.
Social cognition involves the active interpretation of events. As a result, different people may draw different
conclusions about the same events. When Indira smiles at Robert, he might think that she is romantically attracted
to him, whereas she might think that she’s just being friendly. When Mike tells a joke about Polish people,
he might think it’s funny, but Wanda might think he is being prejudiced. The 12 members of a jury who are
deliberating about the outcome in a trial have all heard the same evidence, but each juror’s own schemas and
attitudes may lead him or her to interpret the evidence differently. The fact that different people interpret the
same events differently makes life interesting, but it can sometimes lead to disagreement and conflict. Social
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psychologists study how people interpret and understand their worlds and, particularly, how they make judgments
about the causes of other people’s behavior.
Social Affect: Feelings about Ourselves and Others
Affect refers to the feelings we experience as part of our everyday lives. As our day progresses, we may find
ourselves feeling happy or sad, jealous or grateful, proud or embarrassed. Although affect can be harmful if it
is unregulated or unchecked, our affective experiences normally help us to function efficiently and in a way that
increases our chances of survival. Affect signals us that things are going all right (e.g., because we are in a good
mood or are experiencing joy or serenity) or that things are not going so well (we are in a bad mood, anxious,
upset, or angry). Affect can also lead us to engage in behaviors that are appropriate to our perceptions of a given
situation. When we are happy, we may seek out and socialize with others; when we are angry, we may attack;
when we are fearful, we may run away.
We experience affect in the form of mood and emotions. Mood refers to the positive or negative feelings that are
in the background of our everyday experiences. Most of the time, we are in a relatively good mood, and positive
mood has some positive consequences—it encourages us to do what needs to be done and to make the most of the
situations we are in (Isen, 2003). When we are in a good mood, our thought processes open up and we are more
likely to approach others. We are more friendly and helpful to others when we are in a good mood than when we
are in a bad mood, and we may think more creatively (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). On the other hand, when
we are in a bad mood, we are more likely to prefer to remain by ourselves rather than interact with others, and our
creativity suffers.
Emotions are brief, but often intense, mental and physiological feeling states. In comparison with moods,
emotions are shorter lived, stronger, and more specific forms of affect. Emotions are caused by specific events
(things that make us, for instance, jealous or angry), and they are accompanied by high levels of arousal. Whereas
we experience moods in normal, everyday situations, we experience emotions only when things are out of the
ordinary or unusual. Emotions serve an adaptive role in helping us guide our social behaviors. Just as we run from
a snake because the snake elicits fear, we may try to make amends with other people when we feel guilty.
Social Behavior: Interacting with Others
Because we interact with and influence each other every day, we have developed the ability to make these
interactions proceed efficiently and effectively. We cooperate with other people to gain outcomes that we could
not obtain on our own, and we exchange goods, services, and other benefits with other people. These behaviors
are essential for survival in any society (Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie, 2003; Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, &
Smith, 2002).
The sharing of goods, services, emotions, and other social outcomes is known as social exchange. Social rewards
(the positive outcomes that we give and receive when we interact with others) include such benefits as attention,
praise, affection, love, and financial support. Social costs (the negative outcomes that we give and receive when
we interact with others), on the other hand, include, for instance, the frustrations that accrue when disagreements
with others develop, the guilt that results if we perceive that we have acted inappropriately, and the effort involved
in developing and maintaining harmonious interpersonal relationships.
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Imagine a first-year student at college or university who is trying to decide whether or not to join a student club.
Joining the club has costs, in terms of the dues that have to be paid, the need to make friends with each of the
other club members and to attend club meetings, and so forth. On the other hand, there are the potential benefits
of group membership, including having a group of friends with similar interests and a social network to help find
activities to participate in. To determine whether or not to join, the student has to weigh both the social and the
material costs and benefits before coming to a conclusion (Moreland & Levine, 2006).
People generally prefer to maximize their own outcomes by attempting to gain as many social rewards as possible
and by attempting to minimize their social costs. Such behavior is consistent with the goal of protecting and
enhancing the self. But although people do behave according to the goals of self-concern, these goals are tempered
by other-concern: the goals of respecting, accepting, and cooperating with others. As a result, social exchange is
generally fair and equitable, at least in the long run. Imagine, for example, that someone asks you to do a favor for
them, and you do it. If they were only concerned about their own self-enhancement, they might simply accept the
favor without any thought of paying you back. Yet both you and they would realize that you would most certainly
expect them to be willing to do the same type of favor for you, should you ask them at some later time.
One of the outcomes of humans living together in small groups over thousands of years is that people have learned
to cooperate by giving benefits to those who are in need, with the expectation of a return of benefits at a future
time. This mutual, and generally equitable, exchange of benefits is known as reciprocal altruism. An individual
who is temporarily sick or injured will benefit from the help that he or she might get from others during this time.
And according to the principle of reciprocal altruism, other group members will be willing to give that help to
the needy individual because they expect that similar help will be given to them should they need it. However,
in order for reciprocal altruism to work, people have to keep track of how benefits are exchanged, to be sure
that everyone plays by the rules. If one person starts to take benefits without paying them back, this violates the
principle of reciprocity and should not be allowed to continue for very long. In fact, research has shown that
people seem to be particularly good at detecting “cheaters”—those who do not live up to their obligations in
reciprocal altruism—and that these individuals are judged extremely negatively (Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996;
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Key Takeaways
• We use affect, behavior, and cognition to help us successfully interact with others.
• Social cognition refers to our thoughts about and interpretations of ourselves and other
people. Over time, we develop schemas and attitudes to help us better understand and more
successfully interact with others.
• Affect refers to the feelings that we experience as part of life and includes both moods and
emotions.
• Social behavior is influenced by principles of reciprocal altruism and social exchange.
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Exercise and Critical Thinking
1. Consider a time when you had an important social interaction or made an important decision.
Analyze your responses to the situation in terms of affect, behaviour, and cognition.
2. Think about when you last engaged in a case of reciprocal altruism and describe what took
place.
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Conducting Research in Social Psychology
Learning Objectives
1. Explain why social psychologists rely on empirical methods to study social behavior.
2. Provide examples of how social psychologists measure the variables they are interested in.
3. Review the three types of research designs, and evaluate the strengths and limitations of each
type.
4. Consider the role of validity in research, and describe how research programs should be
evaluated.
Social psychologists are not the only people interested in understanding and predicting social behavior or the only
people who study it. Social behavior is also considered by religious leaders, philosophers, politicians, novelists,
and others, and it is a common topic on TV shows. But the social psychological approach to understanding
social behavior goes beyond the mere observation of human actions. Social psychologists believe that a true
understanding of the causes of social behavior can only be obtained through a systematic scientific approach, and
that is why they conduct scientific research. Social psychologists believe that the study of social behavior should
be empirical—that is, based on the collection and systematic analysis of observable data.
The Importance of Scientific Research
Because social psychology concerns the relationships among people, and because we can frequently find answers
to questions about human behavior by using our own common sense or intuition, many people think that it is not
necessary to study it empirically (Lilienfeld, 2011). But although we do learn about people by observing others
and therefore social psychology is in fact partly common sense, social psychology is not entirely common sense.
To test for yourself whether or not social psychology is just common sense, try taking the short quiz in Table 1.1,
“Is Social Psychology Just Common Sense?” and respond to each statement with either “True” or “False.” Based
on your past observations of people’s behavior, along with your own common sense, you will likely have answers
to each of the questions on the quiz. But how sure are you? Would you be willing to bet that all, or even most, of your
answers have been shown to be correct by scientific research? If you are like most people, you will get at least some
of these answers wrong. (To see the answers and a brief description of the scientific research supporting each of these
topics, please go to the Chapter Summary at the end of this chapter.)
Table 1.1 “Is Social Psychology Just Common Sense?”
Answer each of the following questions, using your own intuition, as either true or false.
Opposites attract.
An athlete who wins the bronze medal (third place) in an event is happier about his or her performance than the athlete
who wins the silver medal (second place).
Having good friends you can count on can keep you from catching colds.
Subliminal advertising (i.e., persuasive messages that are displayed out of our awareness on TV or movie screens) is very
effective in getting us to buy products.
The greater the reward promised for an activity, the more one will come to enjoy engaging in that activity.
Physically attractive people are seen as less intelligent than less attractive people.
Punching a pillow or screaming out loud is a good way to reduce frustration and aggressive tendencies.
People pull harder in a tug-of-war when they’re pulling alone than when pulling in a group.
One of the reasons we might think that social psychology is common sense is that once we learn about the outcome
of a given event (e.g., when we read about the results of a research project), we frequently believe that we would
have been able to predict the outcome ahead of time. For instance, if half of a class of students is told that research
concerning attraction between people has demonstrated that “opposites attract,” and if the other half is told that
research has demonstrated that “birds of a feather flock together,” most of the students in both groups will report
believing that the outcome is true and that they would have predicted the outcome before they had heard about it.
Of course, both of these contradictory outcomes cannot be true. The problem is that just reading a description of
research findings leads us to think of the many cases that we know that support the findings and thus makes them
seem believable. The tendency to think that we could have predicted something that we probably would not have
been able to predict is called the hindsight bias.
Our common sense also leads us to believe that we know why we engage in the behaviors that we engage in, when
in fact we may not. Social psychologist Daniel Wegner and his colleagues have conducted a variety of studies
showing that we do not always understand the causes of our own actions. When we think about a behavior before
we engage in it, we believe that the thinking guided our behavior, even when it did not (Morewedge, Gray, &
Wegner, 2010). People also report that they contribute more to solving a problem when they are led to believe
that they have been working harder on it, even though the effort did not increase their contribution to the outcome
(Preston & Wegner, 2007). These findings, and many others like them, demonstrate that our beliefs about the
causes of social events, and even of our own actions, do not always match the true causes of those events.
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Social psychologists conduct research because it often uncovers results that could not have been predicted ahead
of time. Putting our hunches to the test exposes our ideas to scrutiny. The scientific approach brings a lot of
surprises, but it also helps us test our explanations about behavior in a rigorous manner. It is important for you to
understand the research methods used in psychology so that you can evaluate the validity of the research that you
read about here, in other courses, and in your everyday life.
Social psychologists publish their research in scientific journals, and your instructor may require you to read
some of these research articles. The most important social psychology journals are listed in “Social Psychology
Journals.” If you are asked to do a literature search on research in social psychology, you should look for articles
from these journals.
Social Psychology Journals
• Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
• Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
• Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
• Social Psychology and Personality Science
• Social Cognition
• European Journal of Social Psychology
• Social Psychology Quarterly
• Basic and Applied Social Psychology
• Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Note. The research articles in these journals are likely to be available in your college or university library.
A fuller list can be found here: http://www.socialpsychology.org/journals.htm#social
We’ll discuss the empirical approach and review the findings of many research projects throughout this book,
but for now let’s take a look at the basics of how scientists use research to draw overall conclusions about social
behavior. Keep in mind as you read this book, however, that although social psychologists are pretty good at
understanding the causes of behavior, our predictions are a long way from perfect. We are not able to control the
minds or the behaviors of others or to predict exactly what they will do in any given situation. Human behavior is
complicated because people are complicated and because the social situations that they find themselves in every
day are also complex. It is this complexity—at least for me—that makes studying people so interesting and fun.
Measuring Affect, Behavior, and Cognition
One important aspect of using an empirical approach to understand social behavior is that the concepts of interest
must be measured (Figure 1.7, “The Operational Definition”). If we are interested in learning how much Sarah
likes Robert, then we need to have a measure of her liking for him. But how, exactly, should we measure the broad
idea of “liking”? In scientific terms, the characteristics that we are trying to measure are known as conceptual
variables, and the particular method that we use to measure a variable of interest is called an operational
definition.
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For anything that we might wish to measure, there are many different operational definitions, and which one we
use depends on the goal of the research and the type of situation we are studying. To better understand this, let’s
look at an example of how we might operationally define “Sarah likes Robert.”
Figure 1.7 The Operational Definition. An idea or conceptual variable (such as “how much Sarah likes Robert”) is turned into a measure
through an operational definition.
One approach to measurement involves directly asking people about their perceptions using self-report measures.
Self-report measures are measures in which individuals are asked to respond to questions posed by an
interviewer or on a questionnaire. Generally, because any one question might be misunderstood or answered
incorrectly, in order to provide a better measure, more than one question is asked and the responses to the
questions are averaged together. For example, an operational definition of Sarah’s liking for Robert might involve
asking her to complete the following measure:
1. I enjoy being around Robert.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree
2. I get along well with Robert.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree
3. I like Robert.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree
The operational definition would be the average of her responses across the three questions. Because each
question assesses the attitude differently, and yet each question should nevertheless measure Sarah’s attitude
toward Robert in some way, the average of the three questions will generally be a better measure than would any
one question on its own.
Although it is easy to ask many questions on self-report measures, these measures have a potential disadvantage.
As we have seen, people’s insights into their own opinions and their own behaviors may not be perfect, and they
might also not want to tell the truth—perhaps Sarah really likes Robert, but she is unwilling or unable to tell us so.
Therefore, an alternative to self-report that can sometimes provide a more valid measure is to measure behavior
itself. Behavioral measures are measures designed to directly assess what people do. Instead of asking Sarah
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how much she likes Robert, we might instead measure her liking by assessing how much time she spends with
Robert or by coding how much she smiles at him when she talks to him. Some examples of behavioral measures
that have been used in social psychological research are shown in Table 1.3, “Examples of Operational Definitions
of Conceptual Variables That Have Been Used in Social Psychological Research.”
Table 1.3 Examples of Operational Definitions of Conceptual Variables That Have Been Used in Social
Psychological Research
Conceptual variable Operational definitions
Aggression Number of seconds taken to honk the horn atthe car ahead after a stoplight turns green
Number of presses of a button that
administers shock to another student
Interpersonal
attraction
Number of millimeters of pupil dilation when
one person looks at another
Number of times that a person looks at
another person
Altruism Number of hours of volunteering per week thata person engages in
Number of pieces of paper a person
helps another pick up
Group
decision-making
skills
Number of seconds in which a group correctly
solves a problem
Number of groups able to correctly
solve a group performance task
Prejudice Number of inches that a person places theirchair away from another person
Number of negative words used in a
creative story about another person
Social Neuroscience: Measuring Social Responses in the Brain
Still another approach to measuring thoughts and feelings is to measure brain activity, and recent advances
in brain science have created a wide variety of new techniques for doing so. One approach, known as
electroencephalography (EEG), is a technique that records the electrical activity produced by the brain’s
neurons through the use of electrodes that are placed around the research participant’s head. An
electroencephalogram (EEG) can show if a person is asleep, awake, or anesthetized because the brain wave
patterns are known to differ during each state. An EEG can also track the waves that are produced when a person
is reading, writing, and speaking with others. A particular advantage of the technique is that the participant can
move around while the recordings are being taken, which is useful when measuring brain activity in children who
often have difficulty keeping still. Furthermore, by following electrical impulses across the surface of the brain,
researchers can observe changes over very fast time periods.
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Figure 1.8 EEG Cap (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AEEG_cap.jpg) by Thuglas is under the public domain
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain).
Although EEGs can provide information about the general patterns of electrical activity within the brain, and
although they allow the researcher to see these changes quickly as they occur in real time, the electrodes must be
placed on the surface of the skull, and each electrode measures brain waves from large areas of the brain. As a
result, EEGs do not provide a very clear picture of the structure of the brain.
But techniques exist to provide more specific brain images. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is
a neuroimaging technique that uses a magnetic field to create images of brain structure and function. In research
studies that use the fMRI, the research participant lies on a bed within a large cylindrical structure containing a
very strong magnet. Nerve cells in the brain that are active use more oxygen, and the need for oxygen increases
blood flow to the area. The fMRI detects the amount of blood flow in each brain region and thus is an indicator of
which parts of the brain are active.
Very clear and detailed pictures of brain structures (see Figure 1.9, “MRI BOLD activation in an emotional
Stroop task”) can be produced via fMRI. Often, the images take the form of cross-sectional “slices” that are
obtained as the magnetic field is passed across the brain. The images of these slices are taken repeatedly and are
superimposed on images of the brain structure itself to show how activity changes in different brain structures
over time. Normally, the research participant is asked to engage in tasks while in the scanner, for instance, to make
judgments about pictures of people, to solve problems, or to make decisions about appropriate behaviors. The
fMRI images show which parts of the brain are associated with which types of tasks. Another advantage of the
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fMRI is that is it noninvasive. The research participant simply enters the machine and the scans begin.
Figure 1.9 “MRI BOLD activation in an emotional Stroop task” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:FMRI_BOLD_activation_in_an_emotional_Stroop_task.jpg) by Shima Ovaysikia, Khalid A. Tahir, Jason L. Chan and Joseph F. X.
DeSouza used under CC-BY-2.5 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/deed.en). Source: “Varian4T” (http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Varian4T) by A314268 is under the public domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain).
Although the scanners themselves are expensive, the advantages of fMRIs are substantial, and scanners are
now available in many university and hospital settings. The fMRI is now the most commonly used method
of learning about brain structure, and it has been employed by social psychologists to study social cognition,
attitudes, morality, emotions, responses to being rejected by others, and racial prejudice, to name just a few topics
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Lieberman,
Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Richeson et al.,
2003).
Observational Research
Once we have decided how to measure our variables, we can begin the process of research itself. As you can see
in Table 1.4, “Three Major Research Designs Used by Social Psychologists,” there are three major approaches
to conducting research that are used by social psychologists—the observational approach, the correlational
approach, and the experimental approach. Each approach has some advantages and disadvantages.
Table 1.4 Three Major Research Designs Used by Social Psychologists
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Research
Design Goal Advantages Disadvantages
Observational To create a snapshot of thecurrent state of affairs
Provides a relatively complete picture of
what is occurring at a given time. Allows
the development of questions for further
study.
Does not assess relationships
between variables.
Correlational
To assess the relationships
between two or more
variables
Allows the testing of expected
relationships between variables and the
making of predictions. Can assess these
relationships in everyday life events.
Cannot be used to draw
inferences about the causal
relationships between the
variables.
Experimental
To assess the causal impact
of one or more
experimental
manipulations on a
dependent variable
Allows the drawing of conclusions about
the causal relationships among variables.
Cannot experimentally
manipulate many important
variables. May be expensive
and take much time to conduct.
The most basic research design, observational research, is research that involves making observations of
behavior and recording those observations in an objective manner. Although it is possible in some cases to
use observational data to draw conclusions about the relationships between variables (e.g., by comparing the
behaviors of older versus younger children on a playground), in many cases the observational approach is used
only to get a picture of what is happening to a given set of people at a given time and how they are responding
to the social situation. In these cases, the observational approach involves creating a type of “snapshot” of the
current state of affairs.
One advantage of observational research is that in many cases it is the only possible approach to collecting data
about the topic of interest. A researcher who is interested in studying the impact of an earthquake on the residents
of Tokyo, the reactions of Israelis to a terrorist attack, or the activities of the members of a religious cult cannot
create such situations in a laboratory but must be ready to make observations in a systematic way when such
events occur on their own. Thus observational research allows the study of unique situations that could not be
created by the researcher. Another advantage of observational research is that the people whose behavior is being
measured are doing the things they do every day, and in some cases they may not even know that their behavior
is being recorded.
One early observational study that made an important contribution to understanding human behavior was reported
in a book by Leon Festinger and his colleagues (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956). The book, called When
Prophecy Fails, reported an observational study of the members of a “doomsday” cult. The cult members believed
that they had received information, supposedly sent through “automatic writing” from a planet called “Clarion,”
that the world was going to end. More specifically, the group members were convinced that Earth would be
destroyed as the result of a gigantic flood sometime before dawn on December 21, 1954.
When Festinger learned about the cult, he thought that it would be an interesting way to study how individuals
in groups communicate with each other to reinforce their extreme beliefs. He and his colleagues observed the
members of the cult over a period of several months, beginning in July of the year in which the flood was
expected. The researchers collected a variety of behavioral and self-report measures by observing the cult,
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recording the conversations among the group members, and conducting detailed interviews with them. Festinger
and his colleagues also recorded the reactions of the cult members, beginning on December 21, when the world
did not end as they had predicted. This observational research provided a wealth of information about the
indoctrination patterns of cult members and their reactions to disconfirmed predictions. This research also helped
Festinger develop his important theory of cognitive dissonance.
Despite their advantages, observational research designs also have some limitations. Most importantly, because
the data that are collected in observational studies are only a description of the events that are occurring, they do
not tell us anything about the relationship between different variables. However, it is exactly this question that
correlational research and experimental research are designed to answer.
The Research Hypothesis
Because social psychologists are generally interested in looking at relationships among variables, they begin by
stating their predictions in the form of a precise statement known as a research hypothesis. A research hypothesis
is a specific prediction about the relationship between the variables of interest and about the specific direction
of that relationship. For instance, the research hypothesis “People who are more similar to each other will be
more attracted to each other” predicts that there is a relationship between a variable called similarity and another
variable called attraction. In the research hypothesis “The attitudes of cult members become more extreme when
their beliefs are challenged,” the variables that are expected to be related are extremity of beliefs and the degree
to which the cult’s beliefs are challenged.
Because the research hypothesis states both that there is a relationship between the variables and the direction
of that relationship, it is said to be falsifiable, which means that the outcome of the research can demonstrate
empirically either that there is support for the hypothesis (i.e., the relationship between the variables was correctly
specified) or that there is actually no relationship between the variables or that the actual relationship is not in
the direction that was predicted. Thus the research hypothesis that “People will be more attracted to others who
are similar to them” is falsifiable because the research could show either that there was no relationship between
similarity and attraction or that people we see as similar to us are seen as less attractive than those who are
dissimilar.
Correlational Research
Correlational research is designed to search for and test hypotheses about the relationships between two or more
variables. In the simplest case, the correlation is between only two variables, such as that between similarity and
liking, or between gender (male versus female) and helping.
In a correlational design, the research hypothesis is that there is an association (i.e., a correlation) between the
variables that are being measured. For instance, many researchers have tested the research hypothesis that a
positive correlation exists between the use of violent video games and the incidence of aggressive behavior, such
that people who play violent video games more frequently would also display more aggressive behavior.
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Figure 1.10 Correlational Design. The research hypothesis that a positive correlation exists between the use of violent video games and the
incidence of aggressive behavior
A statistic known as the Pearson correlation coefficient (symbolized by the letter r) is normally used to
summarize the association, or correlation, between two variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient can range
from −1 (indicating a very strong negative relationship between the variables) to +1 (indicating a very strong
positive relationship between the variables). Recent research has found that there is a positive correlation between
the use of violent video games and the incidence of aggressive behavior and that the size of the correlation is
about r = .30 (Bushman & Huesmann, 2010).
One advantage of correlational research designs is that, like observational research (and in comparison with
experimental research designs in which the researcher frequently creates relatively artificial situations in a
laboratory setting), they are often used to study people doing the things that they do every day. Correlational
research designs also have the advantage of allowing prediction. When two or more variables are correlated, we
can use our knowledge of a person’s score on one of the variables to predict his or her likely score on another
variable. Because high-school grades are correlated with university grades, if we know a person’s high-school
grades, we can predict his or her likely university grades. Similarly, if we know how many violent video games a
child plays, we can predict how aggressively he or she will behave. These predictions will not be perfect, but they
will allow us to make a better guess than we would have been able to if we had not known the person’s score on
the first variable ahead of time.
Despite their advantages, correlational designs have a very important limitation. This limitation is that they cannot
be used to draw conclusions about the causal relationships among the variables that have been measured. An
observed correlation between two variables does not necessarily indicate that either one of the variables caused
the other. Although many studies have found a correlation between the number of violent video games that people
play and the amount of aggressive behaviors they engage in, this does not mean that viewing the video games
necessarily caused the aggression. Although one possibility is that playing violent games increases aggression,
Figure 1.11 Playing violent video games leads to aggressive behavior.
another possibility is that the causal direction is exactly opposite to what has been hypothesized. Perhaps increased
aggressiveness causes more interest in, and thus increased viewing of, violent games. Although this causal
relationship might not seem as logical, there is no way to rule out the possibility of such reverse causation on the
basis of the observed correlation.
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Figure 1.12 Increased aggressiveness causes more interest in, and thus increased viewing of, violent games.
Still another possible explanation for the observed correlation is that it has been produced by the presence of
another variable that was not measured in the research. Common-causal variables (also known as third variables)
are variables that are not part of the research hypothesis but that cause both the predictor and the outcome
variable and thus produce the observed correlation between them (Figure 1.13, “Correlation and Causality”). It
has been observed that students who sit in the front of a large class get better grades than those who sit in the
back of the class. Although this could be because sitting in the front causes the student to take better notes or to
understand the material better, the relationship could also be due to a common-causal variable, such as the interest
or motivation of the students to do well in the class. Because a student’s interest in the class leads him or her to
both get better grades and sit nearer to the teacher, seating position and class grade are correlated, even though
neither one caused the other.
Figure 1.13 Correlation and Causality. The correlation between where students sit in a large class and their grade in the class is likely caused
by the influence of one or more common-causal variables.
The possibility of common-causal variables must always be taken into account when considering correlational
research designs. For instance, in a study that finds a correlation between playing violent video games and
aggression, it is possible that a common-causal variable is producing the relationship. Some possibilities include
the family background, diet, and hormone levels of the children. Any or all of these potential common-causal
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variables might be creating the observed correlation between playing violent video games and aggression. Higher
levels of the male sex hormone testosterone, for instance, may cause children to both watch more violent TV and
behave more aggressively.
You may think of common-causal variables in correlational research designs as “mystery” variables, since their
presence and identity is usually unknown to the researcher because they have not been measured. Because it is not
possible to measure every variable that could possibly cause both variables, it is always possible that there is an
unknown common-causal variable. For this reason, we are left with the basic limitation of correlational research:
correlation does not imply causation.
Experimental Research
The goal of much research in social psychology is to understand the causal relationships among variables, and for
this we use experiments. Experimental research designs are research designs that include the manipulation of
a given situation or experience for two or more groups of individuals who are initially created to be equivalent,
followed by a measurement of the effect of that experience.
In an experimental research design, the variables of interest are called the independent variables and the dependent
variables. The independent variable refers to the situation that is created by the experimenter through the
experimental manipulations, and the dependent variable refers to the variable that is measured after the
manipulations have occurred. In an experimental research design, the research hypothesis is that the manipulated
independent variable (or variables) causes changes in the measured dependent variable (or variables). We can
diagram the prediction like this, using an arrow that points in one direction to demonstrate the expected direction
of causality:
viewing violence (independent variable) → aggressive behavior (dependent variable)
Consider an experiment conducted by Anderson and Dill (2000), which was designed to directly test the
hypothesis that viewing violent video games would cause increased aggressive behavior. In this research, male
and female undergraduates from Iowa State University were given a chance to play either a violent video game
(Wolfenstein 3D) or a nonviolent video game (Myst). During the experimental session, the participants played the
video game that they had been given for 15 minutes. Then, after the play, they participated in a competitive task
with another student in which they had a chance to deliver blasts of white noise through the earphones of their
opponent. The operational definition of the dependent variable (aggressive behavior) was the level and duration
of noise delivered to the opponent. The design and the results of the experiment are shown in Figure 1.14, “An
Experimental Research Design (After Anderson & Dill, 2000).”
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Figure 1.14 An Experimental Research Design (After Anderson & Dill, 2000). Two advantages of the experimental research design are (a) an
assurance that the independent variable (also known as the experimental manipulation) occurs prior to the measured dependent variable and
(b) the creation of initial equivalence between the conditions of the experiment (in this case, by using random assignment to conditions).
Experimental designs have two very nice features. For one, they guarantee that the independent variable occurs
prior to measuring the dependent variable. This eliminates the possibility of reverse causation. Second, the
experimental manipulation allows ruling out the possibility of common-causal variables that cause both the
independent variable and the dependent variable. In experimental designs, the influence of common-causal
variables is controlled, and thus eliminated, by creating equivalence among the participants in each of the
experimental conditions before the manipulation occurs.
The most common method of creating equivalence among the experimental conditions is through random
assignment to conditions before the experiment begins, which involves determining separately for each
participant which condition he or she will experience through a random process, such as drawing numbers out
of an envelope or using a website such as http://randomizer.org. Anderson and Dill first randomly assigned
about 100 participants to each of their two groups. Let’s call them Group A and Group B. Because they used
random assignment to conditions, they could be confident that before the experimental manipulation occurred, the
students in Group A were, on average, equivalent to the students in Group B on every possible variable, including
variables that are likely to be related to aggression, such as family, peers, hormone levels, and diet—and, in fact,
everything else.
Then, after they had created initial equivalence, Anderson and Dill created the experimental manipulation—they
had the participants in Group A play the violent video game and the participants in Group B play the nonviolent
video game. Then they compared the dependent variable (the white noise blasts) between the two groups and
found that the students who had viewed the violent video game gave significantly longer noise blasts than did the
students who had played the nonviolent game. When the researchers observed differences in the duration of white
noise blasts between the two groups after the experimental manipulation, they could draw the conclusion that it
was the independent variable (and not some other variable) that caused these differences because they had created
initial equivalence between the groups. The idea is that the only thing that was different between the students in
the two groups was which video game they had played.
When we create a situation in which the groups of participants are expected to be equivalent before the experiment
begins, when we manipulate the independent variable before we measure the dependent variable, and when we
change only the nature of independent variables between the conditions, then we can be confident that it is the
independent variable that caused the differences in the dependent variable. Such experiments are said to have
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high internal validity, where internal validity is the extent to which changes in the dependent variable in an
experiment can confidently be attributed to changes in the independent variable.
Despite the advantage of determining causation, experimental research designs do have limitations. One is that the
experiments are usually conducted in laboratory situations rather than in the everyday lives of people. Therefore,
we do not know whether results that we find in a laboratory setting will necessarily hold up in everyday life. To
counter this, researchers sometimes conduct field experiments, which are experimental research studies that are
conducted in a natural environment, such as a school or a factory. However, they are difficult to conduct because
they require a means of creating random assignment to conditions, and this is frequently not possible in natural
settings.
A second and perhaps more important limitation of experimental research designs is that some of the most
interesting and important social variables cannot be experimentally manipulated. If we want to study the influence
of the size of a mob on the destructiveness of its behavior, or to compare the personality characteristics of people
who join suicide cults with those of people who do not join suicide cults, these relationships must be assessed
using correlational designs because it is simply not possible to manipulate mob size or cult membership.
Factorial Research Designs
Social psychological experiments are frequently designed to simultaneously study the effects of more than one
independent variable on a dependent variable. Factorial research designs are experimental designs that have two
or more independent variables. By using a factorial design, the scientist can study the influence of each variable
on the dependent variable (known as the main effects of the variables) as well as how the variables work together
to influence the dependent variable (known as the interaction between the variables). Factorial designs sometimes
demonstrate the person by situation interaction.
In one such study, Brian Meier and his colleagues (Meier, Robinson, & Wilkowski, 2006) tested the hypothesis
that exposure to aggression-related words would increase aggressive responses toward others. Although they
did not directly manipulate the social context, they used a technique common in social psychology in which
they primed (i.e., activated) thoughts relating to social settings. In their research, half of their participants were
randomly assigned to see words relating to aggression and the other half were assigned to view neutral words that
did not relate to aggression. The participants in the study also completed a measure of individual differences in
agreeableness—a personality variable that assesses the extent to which people see themselves as compassionate,
cooperative, and high on other-concern.
Then the research participants completed a task in which they thought they were competing with another student.
Participants were told that they should press the space bar on the computer keyboard as soon as they heard a
tone over their headphones, and the person who pressed the space bar the fastest would be the winner of the trial.
Before the first trial, participants set the intensity of a blast of white noise that would be delivered to the loser
of the trial. The participants could choose an intensity ranging from 0 (no noise) to the most aggressive response
(10, or 105 decibels). In essence, participants controlled a “weapon” that could be used to blast the opponent with
aversive noise, and this setting became the dependent variable. At this point, the experiment ended.
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Figure 1.15 A Person-Situation Interaction. In this experiment by Meier, Robinson, and Wilkowski (2006) the independent variables are a
type of priming (aggression or neutral) and participant agreeableness (high or low). The dependent variable is the white noise level selected
(a measure of aggression). The participants who were low in agreeableness became significantly more aggressive after seeing aggressive
words, but those high in agreeableness did not.
As you can see in Figure 1.15, “A Person-Situation Interaction,” there was a person-by-situation interaction.
Priming with aggression-related words (the situational variable) increased the noise levels selected by participants
who were low on agreeableness, but priming did not increase aggression (in fact, it decreased it a bit) for students
who were high on agreeableness. In this study, the social situation was important in creating aggression, but it had
different effects for different people.
Deception in Social Psychology Experiments
You may have wondered whether the participants in the video game study that we just discussed were told about
the research hypothesis ahead of time. In fact, these experiments both used a cover story—a false statement of
what the research was really about. The students in the video game study were not told that the study was about
the effects of violent video games on aggression, but rather that it was an investigation of how people learn and
develop skills at motor tasks like video games and how these skills affect other tasks, such as competitive games.
The participants in the task performance study were not told that the research was about task performance. In
some experiments, the researcher also makes use of an experimental confederate—a person who is actually part
of the experimental team but who pretends to be another participant in the study. The confederate helps create the
right “feel” of the study, making the cover story seem more real.
In many cases, it is not possible in social psychology experiments to tell the research participants about the real
hypotheses in the study, and so cover stories or other types of deception may be used. You can imagine, for
instance, that if a researcher wanted to study racial prejudice, he or she could not simply tell the participants that
this was the topic of the research because people may not want to admit that they are prejudiced, even if they
really are. Although the participants are always told—through the process of informed consent—as much as is
possible about the study before the study begins, they may nevertheless sometimes be deceived to some extent.
At the end of every research project, however, participants should always receive a complete debriefing in which
all relevant information is given, including the real hypothesis, the nature of any deception used, and how the data
are going to be used.
CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY • 39
Interpreting Research
No matter how carefully it is conducted or what type of design is used, all research has limitations. Any given
research project is conducted in only one setting and assesses only one or a few dependent variables. And any
one study uses only one set of research participants. Social psychology research is sometimes criticized because
it frequently uses university students from Western cultures as participants (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010). But relationships between variables are only really important if they can be expected to be found again
when tested using other research designs, other operational definitions of the variables, other participants, and
other experimenters, and in other times and settings.
External validity refers to the extent to which relationships can be expected to hold up when they are tested
again in different ways and for different people. Science relies primarily upon replication—that is, the repeating of
research—to study the external validity of research findings. Sometimes the original research is replicated exactly,
but more often, replications involve using new operational definitions of the independent or dependent variables,
or designs in which new conditions or variables are added to the original design. And to test whether a finding is
limited to the particular participants used in a given research project, scientists may test the same hypotheses using
people from different ages, backgrounds, or cultures. Replication allows scientists to test the external validity as
well as the limitations of research findings.
In some cases, researchers may test their hypotheses, not by conducting their own study, but rather by looking at
the results of many existing studies, using a meta-analysis—a statistical procedure in which the results of existing
studies are combined to determine what conclusions can be drawn on the basis of all the studies considered
together. For instance, in one meta-analysis, Anderson and Bushman (2001) found that across all the studies they
could locate that included both children and adults, college students and people who were not in college, and
people from a variety of different cultures, there was a clear positive correlation (about r = .30) between playing
violent video games and acting aggressively. The summary information gained through a meta-analysis allows
researchers to draw even clearer conclusions about the external validity of a research finding.
Figure 1.16 Some Important Aspects of the Scientific Approach
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It is important to realize that the understanding of social behavior that we gain by conducting research is a slow,
gradual, and cumulative process. The research findings of one scientist or one experiment do not stand alone—no
one study proves a theory or a research hypothesis. Rather, research is designed to build on, add to, and expand the
existing research that has been conducted by other scientists. That is why whenever a scientist decides to conduct
research, he or she first reads journal articles and book chapters describing existing research in the domain and
then designs his or her research on the basis of the prior findings. The result of this cumulative process is that over
time, research findings are used to create a systematic set of knowledge about social psychology (Figure 1.16,
“Some Important Aspects of the Scientific Approach”).
Key Takeaways
• Social psychologists study social behavior using an empirical approach. This allows them to
discover results that could not have been reliably predicted ahead of time and that may violate
our common sense and intuition.
• The variables that form the research hypothesis, known as conceptual variables, are assessed
by using measured variables such as self-report, behavioral, or neuroimaging measures.
• Observational research is research that involves making observations of behavior and
recording those observations in an objective manner. In some cases, it may be the only
approach to studying behavior.
• Correlational and experimental research designs are based on developing falsifiable research
hypotheses.
• Correlational research designs allow prediction but cannot be used to make statements about
causality. Experimental research designs in which the independent variable is manipulated
can be used to make statements about causality.
• Social psychological experiments are frequently factorial research designs in which the
effects of more than one independent variable on a dependent variable are studied.
• All research has limitations, which is why scientists attempt to replicate their results using
different measures, populations, and settings and to summarize those results using meta-
analyses.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Using Google Scholar find journal articles that report observational, correlational, and
experimental research designs. Specify the research design, the research hypothesis, and the
conceptual and measured variables in each design.
2. For each of the following variables, (a) propose a research hypothesis in which the variable
serves as an independent variable and (b) propose a research hypothesis in which the variable
serves as a dependent variable.
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◦ Helping
◦ Aggression
◦ Prejudice
◦ Liking another person
◦ Life satisfaction
3. Visit the website http://www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm and take part in one of the
online studies listed there.
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Chapter Summary
The science of social psychology began when scientists first started to systematically and formally measure the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of human beings. Social psychology was energized by a number of researchers
who sought to better understand how the Nazis perpetrated the Holocaust against the Jews of Europe. The 1950s
and 1960s saw an expansion of social psychology into the field of attitudes and group processes. In the 1970s and
1980s, the discipline became more cognitive in orientation. Today, the field of social psychology is expanding
into still other areas, such as evolutionary psychology, the study of culture, and social neuroscience.
Social psychology is the scientific study of how we think about, feel about, and behave toward the people in our
lives and how our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by those people. The goal of this book is to
help you learn to think like a social psychologist to enable you to use social psychological principles to better
understand social relationships.
Social psychology concerns the interplay between the individual person and the social situation. The social
situation refers to the other people we interact with every day. The key aspect of the social situation is that the
people around us produce social influence, or the processes through which other people change our thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors, and through which we change theirs. Social influence operates largely through social
norms.
The most basic tendency of all living organisms is the desire to protect and enhance their own life and the lives of
important others—self-concern. People also desire to affiliate with others, a motive known as other-concern, and
doing so is an important part of human behavior.
An important source of our common human experiences is our culture—a group of people, normally living
within a given geographical region, who share a common set of social norms. Norms in Western cultures are
primarily oriented toward individualism and self-concern, whereas norms in East Asian cultures are more focused
on collectivism and other-concern.
Three fundamental capacities of human beings are affect, behavior, and cognition—the ABCs of social
psychology. Affect refers to the feelings we experience as part of our everyday lives. The basic component
of affect is mood—the positive or negative feelings that are in the background of our everyday experiences.
Emotions are mental states like moods, but they are shorter-lived, stronger, more intense, and more specific forms
of affect.
Human beings exchange goods, services, and other benefits with other people in the process of social exchange.
The mutual, and generally equitable, exchange of benefits is known as reciprocal altruism.
Social cognition relates to social activities and helps us understand and predict the behavior of ourselves and
others. Two types of knowledge particularly important in social psychology are schemas and attitudes.
Although common sense is useful for getting ideas, and although our intuitions are sometimes correct, they are
not perfect. Thus social psychologists conduct empirical research to test their ideas. The concepts of interest must
be measured using operational definitions. Both self-report and behavioral measures can be used.
One approach to learning about social psychology involves using observational research to make observations of
behavior. In some cases, this approach is the only way to learn about and study social events.
Because social psychologists are generally interested in looking at relationships between variables, they begin by
stating their predictions in the form of a precise statement known as a research hypothesis.
The goal of correlational research is to search for and test hypotheses about the relationships between two or
more variables. In these studies, a statistic known as the Pearson correlation coefficient is used to summarize the
association, or correlation, between the variables.
Because scientists are interested in determining the causal relationships among variables, they frequently use
experimental research designs. In experiments, the variables of interest are called the independent variable and the
dependent variable. The most common method of creating equivalence among the experimental conditions, and
thus increasing internal validity, is through random assignment to conditions.
External validity refers to the extent to which relationships can be expected to hold up when they are tested again
in different ways and for different people. Meta-analyses can be used to assess the observed relationships among
variables across many studies.
See Table 1.5, “Is Social Psychology Just Common Sense? Answers and Explanations,” for the answers and for
explanations to the questions raised in Table 1.1, “Is Social Psychology Just Common Sense?”.
Table 1.5 Is Social Psychology Just Common Sense? Answers and Explanations
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Opposites attract. False.The opposite is more the case. Similarity, particularly in valuesand beliefs, is an important determinant of liking.
An athlete who wins the bronze medal (third
place) in an event is happier about his or her
performance than the athlete who won the
silver medal (second place).
True. We frequently compare our actual outcomes with what “might
have been.” This leads the silver medalist to compare the possibility of
having won the gold, whereas the bronze medalist compares the
possibility of having won no medal at all.
Having good friends you can count on can
keep you from catching colds.
True. Social support—the perception that we have people we can count
on and talk to—provides many positive benefits to our mental and
physical health.
Subliminal advertising (i.e., persuasive
messages that are presented out of our
awareness on TV or movie screens) is very
effective in getting us to buy products.
False. Although there is evidence that events that occur out of our
awareness can influence our behavior, there is little evidence that
subliminal advertising is effective.
The greater the reward promised for an
activity, the more one will come to enjoy
engaging in that activity.
False. In fact, providing a reward for an activity that is already enjoyed
(such as paying a child to get good grades) can undermine a person’s
enjoyment of the activity.
Physically attractive people are seen as less
intelligent than less attractive people.
False. You of course know that this must be false. Why else would you
look your very best when you go for a job interview?
Punching a pillow or screaming out loud is a
good way to reduce frustration and aggressive
tendencies.
False. There is no evidence that engaging in violent behavior can ever
reduce the desire to be aggressive. The opposite is much more common.
Engaging in aggression leads to more aggression.
People pull harder in a tug-of-war when
they’re pulling alone than when pulling in a
group.
True. Social loafing (reducing our effort because we think that others in
the group will make up for us) is more likely.
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2. Social Cognition
Chapter Learning Objectives
1. Sources of Social Knowledge
• Review the principles of operant, associational, and observational learning, and explain the
similarities and differences between them.
• Explain how and when schemas and attitudes do and do not change as a result of the
operation of accommodation and assimilation.
• Outline the ways that schemas are likely to be maintained through processes that create
assimilation.
2. How We Use Our Expectations
• Provide examples of how salience and accessibility influence information processing.
• Review, differentiate, and give examples of some important cognitive heuristics that influence
social judgment.
• Summarize and give examples of the importance of social cognition in everyday life.
3. Social Cognition and Affect
• Describe important ways in which our affective states can influence our social cognition, both
directly and indirectly, for example, through the operation of the affect heuristic.
• Outline mechanisms through which our social cognition can alter our affective states, for
instance, through the mechanism of misattribution of arousal.
• Review the role that strategies, including cognitive reappraisal, can play in successful self-
regulation.
• Explore the relationship between positive cognition, affect, and behaviors.
• Outline important findings in relation to our affective forecasting abilities.
In this chapter, our focus will be on social cognition—cognition that relates to social activities and that helps us
understand and predict the behavior of ourselves and others (Fiske & Taylor, 2007; Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010).
A fundamental part of social cognition involves learning, the relatively permanent change in knowledge that is
acquired through experience. We will see that a good part of our learning and our judgment of other people
operates out of our awareness—we are profoundly affected by things that we do not know are influencing us.
However, we also consciously think about and analyze our lives and our relationships with others, seeking out the
best ways to fulfill our goals and aspirations.
As we investigate the role of cognition in everyday life, we will consider the ways that people use their cognitive
abilities to make good decisions and to inform their behavior in a useful and accurate way. We will also consider
the potential for mistakes and biases in human judgment. We will see that although we are generally pretty good
at sizing up other people and creating effective social interactions, we are not perfect. And we will further see that
the errors we make frequently occur because of our reliance on our schemas and and a general tendency to take
shortcuts through the use of cognitive heuristics, information-processing rules of thumb that enable us to think in
ways that are quick and easy but that may sometimes lead to error. In short, although our cognitive abilities are
often “good enough,” there is definitely room for improvement in our social cognition.
Huge Fall in Global Markets Causes Fear and Panic for Investors
September 16, 2008, as a result of the failure of over a dozen large banks in the United States, was the
beginning of a global stock market crisis. On October 11, 2008, the head of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) warned that the world financial system was teetering on “the brink of systemic meltdown.”
Over the next year, the crash erased $8.3 trillion in shareholder wealth.
Since these calamitous financial events, the repercussions of which are still being felt in many regions of
the world, much ink has been spilled about the reasons for this global economic meltdown. How could
so many highly educated, intelligent people in so many important positions make so many judgments that
now seem, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, to have incurred such high risks? Why didn’t enough people
in key positions see the collapse coming? The study of social cognition can perhaps provide some clues.
Through studying the factors that affect our social judgments, social psychologists have helped to shed
some important light on why we often have difficulty making sound decisions about an uncertain world.
Figure 2.1 Stock traders are expected to make rational decisions about their investments, but their emotions can influence their
decisions. Sao Paulo Stock Exchange by Rafael Matsunaga (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sao_Paulo_Stock_Exchange.jpg)
used under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en)
Source: http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-09-145686747_x.htm?csp=34.
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Learning Objectives
1. Review the principles of operant, associational, and observational learning, and explain the
similarities and differences between them.
2. Explain how and when schemas and attitudes do and do not change as a result of the
operation of accommodation and assimilation.
3. Outline the ways that schemas are likely to be maintained through processes that create
assimilation.
Human beings have proportionately very large brains and highly developed cognitive capacities in comparison
with other species. Thus it should come as no surprise that we meet the challenges of everyday life largely by
thinking about them and then planning what to do. Over time, we develop a huge amount of knowledge about
ourselves, other people, social relationships, and social groups. This knowledge guides our responses to the people
we interact with every day. But where does this social knowledge come from?
Our Knowledge Accumulates as a Result of Learning
People have many memories about their experiences with other people, and they use this information to make
predictions about what people will do in the future. This knowledge is gained through learning. The study of
learning is closely associated with the behaviorist school of psychology, which includes the psychologists John B.
Watson and B. F. Skinner. For behaviorists, the fundamental aspect of learning is the process of conditioning, the
ability to connect stimuli (things or events in the environment) with responses (behaviors or other actions). The
behaviorists described two types of conditioning that are particularly important: operant conditioning (also known
as instrumental conditioning) and classical conditioning (also known as respondent conditioning). When applied
to human behavior, these two processes are frequently called, respectively, operant learning and associational
learning.
Operant Learning
If a child touches a hot radiator, he or she quickly learns that the radiator is dangerous and is not likely to touch it
again. Through stimulus generalization, the child will also learn that radiators in general are not to be touched. If
we have unpleasant experiences with people from a certain city, region, or country, or a positive relationship
with a person who has blond hair or green eyes, we may develop negative or positive attitudes about people with
these particular characteristics and attempt to reduce or increase our interactions with them. These changes in our
understanding of our environments represent operant learning, the principle that experiences that are followed
by positive emotions (reinforcements or rewards) are likely to be repeated, whereas experiences that are followed
by negative emotions (punishments) are less likely to be repeated. In operant learning, the person thus learns from
the consequences of his or her own actions.
Although its principles are very simple, operant learning is probably the most important form of human learning.
For example, operant learning occurs when a schoolroom bully threatens his classmates because doing so allows
him to get his way, or when a child gets good grades because her parents threaten to punish her if she doesn’t, or
when we begin to like someone who smiles at us frequently, and in hundreds of other cases every day. Operant
learning can also be used to help explain how people learn complex behaviors, such as how to read, and to
understand complex social behaviors, such as the development of social norms and culture.
The application of operant learning to social psychology can help us to explain how we know which behaviors
are most appropriate in a social situation. We learn, in part, because we have been reinforced for engaging in
the appropriate ones and punished for engaging in the inappropriate ones. It does not take us long to learn that
Margette is more likely to give us the kiss we have been hoping for if we are nice to her or that our children are
more likely to share their toys with others if we reward them for doing it. Operant learning has even been used
to explain why some people choose to engage in antisocial and criminal behavior. According to this approach,
criminal behavior is determined by the reinforcements and punishments that the individual experiences (e.g., with
peers and with parents) as a result of his or her behavior (Akers, 1998).
Associational Learning
Associational learning occurs when an object or event comes to be associated with a natural response, such
as an automatic behavior or a positive or negative emotion. If you have ever become hungry when you drive
by one of your favorite pizza stores, it is probably because the sight of the pizzeria has become associated
with your experiences of enjoying the pizzas. We may enjoy smoking cigarettes, drinking coffee, and eating not
only because they give us pleasure themselves but also because they have been associated with pleasant social
experiences in the past.
Associational learning also influences our knowledge and judgment about other people. For instance, research has
shown that people more favorably view men and women who are seen alongside other people who are attractive,
or who are said to have attractive girlfriends or boyfriends, than they do the same people who are seen alongside
more average-looking others (Sigall & Landy, 1973). This liking is due to associational learning: we have positive
feelings toward the people simply because those people are associated with the positive features of the attractive
others.
Associational learning has long been, and continues to be, an effective tool in marketing and advertising
(Hawkins, Best, & Coney, 1998). The general idea is to create an advertisement that has positive features so that
it creates enjoyment in the person exposed to it. Because the product being advertised is mentioned in the ad, it
becomes associated with the positive feelings that the ad creates. In the end, if everything has gone well, seeing
the product online or in a store will then create a positive response in the buyer, leading him or her to be more
likely to purchase the product.
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A YouTube element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here:
https://opentextbc.ca/socialpsychology/?p=55
Video 2.1 Funny Commercials (http://youtu.be/_Km-2ecLrPo) uploaded by no name
Can you determine how associational learning is being used in these ads?
A similar strategy is used by corporations that sponsor teams or events. For instance, if people enjoy watching
a particular sports team, and if that team is sponsored by a product, such as Pepsi, then people may end up
experiencing the positive feelings they have for their team when they view a can of Pepsi.
Advertisers use a variety of techniques to create positive advertisements, including enjoyable music, cute babies,
attractive models, and funny spokespeople. In one study, Gorn (1982) showed research participants pictures of
different colored writing pens, but paired one of the pens with pleasant music and another with unpleasant music.
When given a choice as a free gift, more people chose the pen that had been associated with the pleasant music.
In another study, Schemer, Matthes, Wirth, and Textor (2008) found that people were more interested in products
that had been embedded in music videos of artists that they liked and less likely to be interested when the products
were in videos featuring artists that they did not like.
Another type of ad that is based on principles of classical conditioning is one that associates fear with the use of a
product or behavior, such as those that show pictures of deadly automobile accidents to encourage seatbelt use or
images of lung cancer surgery to discourage smoking. Indeed, many governments around the world have recently
created negative and graphic images to place on cigarette packs in order to increase an association between
negative responses and cigarettes. The idea is that when we see a cigarette and the fear of dying is associated with
it, we will be less likely to light up. These ads have also been found to be effective largely because of conditioning
(Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; Perloff, 2003; Witte & Allen, 2000).
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Figure 2.2 The goal of these images is to associate the fear of dying with cigarette smoking.
Source: “Cigarettes brazil” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cigarettes_brazil.JPG) by Brazilian Health Ministry (MS) in public domain
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain)
Taken together then, research studies provide ample evidence of the utility of associational learning in advertising.
This does not mean, however, that we are always influenced by these ads. The likelihood that associational
learning will be successful is greater when we do not know much about the products, where the differences
between products are relatively minor, and when we do not think too carefully about the choices (Schemer,
Matthes, Wirth, & Textor, 2008).
Associational learning has also been implicated in the development of unfair and unjustified racial prejudices. We
may dislike people from certain racial or ethnic groups because we frequently see them portrayed in the media as
associated with violence, drug use, or terrorism. And we may avoid people with certain physical characteristics
simply because they remind us of other people we do not like. For example, Lewicki (1985) conducted an
experiment where high school students first had a brief interaction with a female experimenter who had short
hair and wore glasses. The study was set up so that the students had to ask the experimenter a question, and
(according to random assignment) the experimenter responded in either a negative way or a neutral way toward
the participants. Then the students were told to go into a second room in which two experimenters were present
and to approach either one of them. The researchers arranged it so that one of the two experimenters looked a
lot like the original experimenter and the other one did not (she had longer hair and did not wear glasses). The
students were significantly more likely to avoid the experimenter who looked like the original experimenter when
that experimenter had been negative to them than when she had treated them neutrally. As a result of associational
learning, the negative behavior of the first experimenter unfairly “rubbed off” onto the second.
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Figure 2.3 Are your beliefs about people from different social groups influenced by associational learning?
Source: Terrorist Disguised as a Woman (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Terrorist_Disguised_as_a_Woman.jpg) by Israel Defense Forces used under CC BY-SA 3.0
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en); Flooded urban poor area in Manila (https://www.flickr.com/photos/gtzecosan/
4046572382/) by SuSanA Secretariat used under CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/); Father and Son by Shawn used
under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/);
Donal Carlston and his colleagues discovered still another way that associational learning can occur: when we
say good or bad things about another person in public, the people who hear us say these things associate those
characteristics with us, such that they like people who say positive things and dislike people who say negative
things (Mae & Carlston, 2005; Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998). The moral is clear—associational
learning is powerful, so be careful what you do and say.
Observational Learning
In addition to operant and associational learning, people learn by observing the behavior of others. This is known
as observational learning. To demonstrate the importance of observational learning in children, Bandura and
Walters (1959) made a film of a young woman beating up a bobo doll—an inflatable balloon with a weight in
the bottom that makes it bob back up when you knock it down. The woman violently hit the doll, shouting
“Sockeroo!” She also kicked it, sat on it, and hit it with a hammer.
Bandura showed his film to groups of nursery school children and then let them play in a room in which there
were some really fun toys. To create some frustration in the children, Bandura let the children play with the fun
toys for only a couple of minutes before taking them away. Then Bandura gave the children a chance to play with
the bobo doll. You probably won’t be surprised to hear that many of the children imitated the young woman in the
film. They punched the bobo doll, shouted “Sockeroo!” and hit the doll with a hammer.
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A YouTube element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here:
https://opentextbc.ca/socialpsychology/?p=55
Video 2.2 Bandura Discussing Clips From His Modeling Studies
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZXOp5PopIA) uploaded by Heath
Kaplan.
Take a moment to see how Albert Bandura explains his research into the
modeling of aggression in children.
For some of the children, the female model was shown being rewarded for
engaging in the behavior, and for other children, she was punished. In support
of the principles of operant learning, Bandura’s study found that the children
were more likely to be aggressive when the model had been rewarded for the behavior and were less likely to be so
when the model had been punished. But even the children who did not see the model receive any reward
nevertheless imitated the behavior to some extent. One of the major contributions of this study is the
demonstration that children learned new types of aggressive behaviors simply by observing and imitating others.
Bandura’s seminal research has inspired a generation of inquiry into the role of social learning in aggressive
behavior, including studies of the relationship between exposure to violent media and violent conduct.
Observational learning is involved in much of our learning about our social worlds. For example, it teaches us
that Ravi is friendly, that Joanna is selfish, and that Frankie has a crush on Malik. In other cases, our knowledge
comes more indirectly, from what we read in books or see on TV, or from what our friends tell us, for instance.
Observational learning is useful because it allows people to learn without having to actually engage in what might
be a risky behavior. As Bandura put it:
the prospects for [human] survival would be slim indeed if one could learn only by suffering the
SOURCES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE • 55
consequences of trial and error. For this reason, one does not teach children to swim, adolescents to drive
automobiles, and novice medical students to perform surgery by having them discover the appropriate
behavior through the consequences of their successes and failures. The more costly and hazardous the
possible mistakes, the heavier is the reliance on observational learning from competent learners. (1977, p.
12).
Bandura considered observational learning to be a fundamental determinant of all social behavior, particularly
when people pay attention to the behavior of models and are highly motivated to imitate them.
Schemas as Social Knowledge
The outcome of learning is knowledge, and this knowledge is stored in the form of schemas, which are knowledge
representations that include information about a person, group, or situation. In the brain, our schemas reside
primarily in the prefrontal cortexthe part of the brain that lies in front of the motor areas of the cortex and
that helps us remember the characteristics and actions of other people, plan complex social behaviors, and
coordinate our behaviors with those of others(Mitchell, Mason, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). The prefrontal cortex
is the “social” part of the brain. It is also the newest part of the brain, evolutionarily speaking, and has enlarged as
the social relationships among humans have become more frequent, important, and complex. Demonstrating its
importance in social behaviors, people with damage to the prefrontal cortex are likely to experience changes in
social behaviors, including memory, personality, planning, and morality (Koenigs et al., 2007).
Figure 2.4 The prefrontal cortex is the area of the brain that stores information about people and our interactions with them.
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How Schemas Develop: Accommodation and Assimilation
Because they represent our past experience, and because past experience is useful for prediction, our schemas
influence our expectations about future events. For instance, if you have watched Italian movies or if you have
visited Italy, you might have come to the conclusion that Italians frequently gesture a lot with their hands when
they talk—that they are quite nonverbally expressive. If so, this knowledge will be contained in your group
schema about Italians. Therefore, when you meet someone who is Italian, or even when you meet someone who
reminds you of an Italian person, you may well expect that he or she will gesture when talking.
Having a database of social knowledge to draw on is obviously extremely useful. If we didn’t know or couldn’t
remember anything about anyone or about anything that we had encountered in the past, our life would be
very difficult because we would continually have to start our learning over again. Our schemas allow us to
better understand people and help us make sense of information, particularly when the information is unclear or
ambiguous. They also allow us to “fill in the blanks” by making guesses about what other people are probably
like or probably going to do in cases where things are uncertain. Furthermore, the fact that different people have
different past experiences—and thus that their schemas and attitudes are different—helps explain why different
people draw different conclusions about the same events.
Once they have developed, schemas influence our subsequent learning, such that the new people and situations
we encounter are interpreted and understood in terms of our existing knowledge (Piaget & Inhelder, 1962; Taylor
& Crocker, 1981). Imagine, for instance, that you have a schema—and thus an expectation—that Italians are very
expressive, and you now meet Bianca, who has arrived at your school directly from Rome. You immediately
expect her to be outgoing and expressive. However, as you get to know Bianca, you discover that she is not
at all expressive and does not “talk with her hands.” In fact, she is quite shy and reserved. How does existing
information influence how you react to the new information you receive?
One possibility is that the new information simply updates existing expectations. You might decide, for instance,
that there is more variation among Italians in terms of expressiveness than you had previously realized, and
you might resolve that Italians can sometimes be very shy and thoughtful. Or perhaps you note that although
Bianca is Italian, she is also a woman. This might lead you to change your schema to believe that although Italian
men are expressive, Italian women are not.
When existing schemas change on the basis of new information, we call the process accommodation. In other
cases, however, we engage in assimilation, a process in which our existing knowledge influences new conflicting
information to better fit with our existing knowledge, thus reducing the likelihood of schema change. In the
scenario above, if you used assimilation, instead of changing your expectations about Italians, you might try
to reinterpret Bianca’s unexpected behavior to make it more consistent with your expectations. For instance,
you might decide that Bianca’s behavior is actually more expressive than you thought it was at first, or that she is
acting in a more shy and reserved manner because she is trying to impress you with her thoughtfulness or because
she is not yet comfortable at the new school. Or you might assume that she is expressive at home with her family
but not around you. In these cases, the process of assimilation has led you to process the new information about
Bianca in a way that allows you to keep your existing expectations about Italians more generally intact.
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How Schemas Maintain Themselves: The Power of Assimilation
As we have seen in our earlier discussion, accommodation (i.e., the changing of beliefs on the basis of new
information) does occur; indeed it is the process of learning itself. For example, your belief about Italians may
well change through your encounters with Bianca. However, there are many factors that lead us to assimilate
information into our expectations rather than to accommodate our expectations to fit new information. In fact, we
can say that in most cases, once a schema is developed, it will be difficult to change it because the expectation
leads us to process new information in ways that serve to strengthen it rather than to weaken it.
The tendency toward assimilation is so strong that it has substantial effects on our everyday social cognition. One
outcome of assimilation is the confirmation bias, the tendency for people to seek out and favor information that
confirms their expectations and beliefs, which in turn can further help to explain the often self-fulfilling nature of
our schemas. The confirmation bias has been shown to occur in many contexts and groups, although there is some
evidence of cultural differences in its extent and prevalence. Kastenmuller and colleagues (2010), for instance,
found that the bias was stronger among people with individualist versus collectivist cultural backgrounds, and
argued that this partly stemmed from collectivist cultures putting greater importance in being self-critical, which
is less compatible with seeking out confirming as opposed to disconfirming evidence.
Research Focus
The Confirmation Bias
Consider the results of a research study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) that demonstrated the
confirmation bias. In this research, high school students were asked to read a set of 25 pairs of cards, in which
each pair supposedly contained one real and one fake suicide note. The students’ task was to examine both cards
and to decide which of the two notes was written by an actual suicide victim. After the participants read each card
and made their decision, the experimenter told them whether their decision was correct or incorrect. However, the
feedback was not at all based on the participants’ responses. Rather, the experimenters arranged the feedback so
that, on the basis of random assignment, different participants were told either that they were successful at the task
(they got 24 out of 25 correct), average at the task (they got 17 out of 25 correct), or poor at the task (they got 10
out of 25 correct), regardless of their actual choices.
At this point, the experimenters stopped the experiment and explained to the participants what had happened,
including how the feedback they had received was predetermined so that they would learn that they were either
successful, average, or poor at the task. They were even shown the schedule that the experimenters had used to
give them the feedback. Then the participants were asked, as a check on their reactions to the experiment, to
indicate how many answers they thought they would get correct on a subsequent—and real—series of 25 card
pairs.
As you can see in Figure 2.5, the results of this experiment showed a clear tendency for expectations to be
maintained even in the face of information that should have discredited them. Students who had been told that
they were successful at the task indicated that they thought they would get more responses correct in a real test of
their ability than those who thought they were average at the task, and students who thought they were average
thought they would do better than those told they were poor at the task. In short, once students had been convinced
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that they were either good or bad at the task, they really believed it. It then became very difficult to remove their
beliefs, even by providing information that should have effectively done so.
Figure 2.5 In this demonstration of the power of assimilation, participants were given initial feedback that they were good, average, or poor
at a task but then told that the feedback was entirely false. The feedback, which should have been discounted, nevertheless continued to
influence participants’ estimates of how well they would do on a future task. Data are from Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975).
Why do we tend to hold onto our beliefs rather than change them? One reason that our beliefs often outlive the
evidence on which they are supposed to be based is that people come up with reasons to support their beliefs.
People who learned that they were good at detecting real suicide notes probably thought of a lot of reasons
why this might be the case—“I predicted that Suzy would break up with Billy,” or “I knew that my mother was
going to be sad after I left for university”—whereas the people who learned that they were not good at the task
probably thought of the opposite types of reasons—“I had no idea that Jean was going to drop out of high school.”
You can see that these tendencies will produce assimilation—the interpretation of our experiences in ways that
support our existing beliefs. Indeed, research has found that perhaps the only way to reduce our tendencies to
assimilate information into our existing belief is to explicitly force people to think about exactly the opposite
belief (Anderson & Sechler, 1986).
In some cases, our existing knowledge acts to direct our attention toward information that matches our
expectations and prevents us from attempting to attend to or acknowledge conflicting information (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). To return to our example of Bianca from Rome, when you first meet her, you may immediately
begin to look for signs of expressiveness in her behavior and personality. Because we expect people to confirm
our expectations, we frequently respond to new people as if we already know what they are going to be like.
For example, Trope and Thompson (1997) found in their research that individuals addressed fewer questions
to people about whom they already had strong expectations and that the questions they did ask were likely to
confirm the expectations they already had. If you believe that Italians are expressive, you would expect to see that
behavior in Bianca, you would preferentially attend to information that confirms those beliefs, and you would tend
to ignore any disconfirming information. The outcome is that expectations resist change (Fazio, Ledbetter, &
Towles-Schwen, 2000).
Not only do we often seek out evidence more readily if it fits our pre-existing beliefs, but we also tend to evaluate
its credibility more favorably than we do evidence that runs against what we believe (Stanovich, West, & Toplak,
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2013). These tendencies in turn help to explain the inertia that our beliefs often display, and their resistance to
contradictory evidence, even when they are inaccurate or dysfuntional.
Applying these insights to the case study that opened this chapter, perhaps the financial meltdown of 2008 was
caused in part by key decision-makers continuing with high-risk investment strategies, even in the face of
growing evidence of the potential negative consequences. Seen through the lens of the confirmation bias, these
judgments start to make sense. Confirmation bias can lead investors to be overconfident, ignoring evidence that
their strategies will lose money (Kida, 2006). It seems, then, that too much effort was spent on finding evidence
confirming the wisdom of the current strategies and not enough time was allocated to finding the counterevidence.
Our reliance on confirmatory thinking can also make it more difficult for us to “think outside the box.” Peter
Wason (1960) asked college students to determine the rule that was used to generate the numbers 2-4-6 by asking
them to generate possible sequences and then telling them if those numbers followed the rule. The first guess
that students made was usually “consecutive ascending even numbers,” and they then asked questions designed
to confirm their hypothesis (“Does 102-104-106 fit?” “What about 434-436-438?”). Upon receiving information
that those guesses did fit the rule, the students stated that the rule was “consecutive ascending even numbers.” But
the students’ use of the confirmation bias led them to ask only about instances that confirmed their hypothesis and
not about those that would disconfirm it. They never bothered to ask whether 1-2-3 or 3-11-200 would fit; if they
had, they would have learned that the rule was not “consecutive ascending even numbers” but simply “any three
ascending numbers.” Again, you can see that once we have a schema (in this case, a hypothesis), we continually
retrieve that schema from memory rather than other relevant ones, leading us to act in ways that tend to confirm
our beliefs.
Because expectations influence what we attend to, they also influence what we remember. One frequent outcome
is that information that confirms our expectations is more easily processed and understood, and thus has a
bigger impact than does disconfirming information. There is substantial research evidence indicating that when
processing information about social groups, individuals tend to remember information better that confirms their
existing beliefs about those groups (Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996). If we have
the (statistically erroneous) stereotype that women are bad drivers, we tend to remember the cases where we see
a woman driving poorly but to forget the cases where we see a woman driving well. This of course strengthens
and maintains our beliefs and produces even more assimilation. And our schemas may also be maintained because
when people get together, they talk about other people in ways that tend to express and confirm existing beliefs,
including stereotypes (Ruscher & Duval, 1998; Schaller & Conway, 1999).
Darley and Gross (1983) demonstrated how schemas about social class could influence memory. In their research,
they gave participants a picture and some information about a girl in grade 4, named Hannah. To activate a schema
about her social class, Hannah was pictured sitting in front of a nice suburban house for one half of the participants
and in front of an impoverished house in an urban area for the other half. Then the participants watched a video
that showed Hannah taking an intelligence test. As the test went on, Hannah got some of the questions right and
some of them wrong, but the number of correct and incorrect answers was the same in both conditions. Then
the participants were asked to remember how many questions Hannah got right and wrong. Demonstrating that
stereotypes had influenced memory, the participants who thought that Hannah had come from an upper-class
background judged that she had gotten more correct answers than those who thought she was from a lower-class
background. It seems, then, that we have a reconstructive memory bias, as we often remember things that match
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our current beliefs better than those that don’t and reshape those memories to better align with our current beliefs
(Hilsabeck, Gouvier, & Bolter, 1998).
This is not to say that we only remember information that matches our expectations. Sometimes we encounter
information that is so extreme and so conflicting with our expectations that we cannot help but attend to and
remember it (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Imagine that you have formed an impression of a good friend of yours as a very
honest person. One day you discover, however, that he has taken some money from your wallet without getting
your permission or even telling you. It is likely that this new information—because it is so personally involving
and important—will have a dramatic effect on your perception of your friend and that you will remember it for
a long time. In short, information that is either consistent with, or very inconsistent with, an existing schema or
attitude is likely to be well remembered.
Still another way that our expectations tend to maintain themselves is by leading us to act toward others on the
basis of our expectations, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. A self-fulfilling prophecy is a process that occurs
when our expectations about others lead us to behave toward those others in ways that make our expectations
come true. If I have a stereotype that Italians are friendly, then I may act toward Bianca in a friendly way. My
friendly behavior may be reciprocated by Bianca, and if many other people also engage in the same positive
behaviors with her, in the long run she may actually become a friendlier person, thus confirming my initial
expectations. Of course, the opposite is also possible—if I believe that Italian people are boring, my behavior
toward them may lead me to maintain those more negative, and probably inaccurate, beliefs as well (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6 Self-fulfilling prophecy effects have been implicated in a wide variety of social domains, including client responses to
psychotherapy (Tambling, 2012), negative perceptions of aging (Wurm, Zielgelmann, Wolff, & Schuz, 2013), and parents’ beliefs about their
children’s marijuana use (Lamb & Crano, 2014).
We can now begin to see why an individual who initially makes a judgment that a person has engaged in a given
behavior (e.g., an eyewitness who believes that he or she saw a given person commit a crime) will find it very
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difficult to change his or her mind about that decision later. Even if the individual is provided with evidence that
suggests that he or she was wrong, that individual will likely assimilate that information to the existing belief.
Assimilation is thus one of many factors that help account for the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Research Focus
Schemas as Energy Savers
If schemas serve in part to help us make sense of the world around us, then we should be particularly likely to
use them in situations where there is a lot of information to learn about, or when we have few cognitive resources
available to process information. Schemas function like energy savers, to help us keep track of things when
information processing gets complicated.
Stangor and Duan (1991) tested the hypothesis that people would be more likely to develop schemas when
they had a lot of information to learn about. In the research, participants were shown information describing
the behaviors of people who supposedly belonged to different social groups, although the groups were actually
fictitious and were labeled only as the “red group,” the “blue group,” the “yellow group,” and the “green group.”
Each group engaged in behaviors that were primarily either honest, dishonest, intelligent, or unintelligent. Then,
after they had read about the groups, the participants were asked to judge the groups and to recall as much
information that they had read about them as they could.
Stangor and Duan found that participants remembered more stereotype-supporting information about the groups
when they were required to learn about four different groups than when they only needed to learn about one or two
groups. This result is consistent with the idea that we use our stereotypes more when “the going gets rough”—that
is, when we need to rely on them to help us make sense of new information.
Figure 2.7 Schemas are particularly powerful when we are tired. Participants were asked to judge the degree to which a defendant was guilty
of a crime for which he was accused (however unfairly) and for which the crime fit the stereotype (e.g., that student athletes were likely to
cheat on exams). Participants had previously indicated whether they were “morning people” or “night people” on a questionnaire and were
tested in either the morning or the evening. Data from Bodenhausen (1990).
Bodenhausen (1990) presented research participants with information about court cases in jury trials.
Furthermore, he had obtained self-reports from the participants about whether they considered themselves to be
primarily “morning people” (those who feel better and are more alert in the morning) or “evening people” (those
who are more alert in the evening). As shown in Figure 2.7, Bodenhausen found that participants were more likely
to make use of their stereotypes when they were judging the guilt or innocence of the individuals on trial at the
time of day when the participants acknowledged that they were normally more fatigued. People who reported
being most alert in the morning stereotyped more at night, and vice versa. This experiment thus provides more
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support for the idea that schemas—in this case, those about social groups—serve, in part, to make our lives easier
and that we rely on them when we need to rely on cognitive efficiency—for instance, when we are tired.
Key Takeaways
• Human beings respond to the social challenges they face by relying on their substantial
cognitive capacities.
• Our knowledge about and our responses to social events are developed and influenced by
operant learning, associational learning, and observational learning.
• One outcome of our experiences is the development of mental representations about our
environments—schemas and attitudes. Once they have developed, our schemas influence our
subsequent learning, such that the new people and situations we encounter are interpreted and
understood in terms of our existing knowledge.
• Accommodation occurs when existing schemas change on the basis of new information.
Assimilation occurs when our knowledge acts to influence new information in a way that
makes the conflicting information fit with our existing schemas.
• Because our expectations influence our attention and responses to, and our memory for, new
information, often in a way that leads our expectations to be maintained, assimilation is
generally more likely than accommodation.
• Schemas serve as energy savers. We are particularly likely to use them when we are tired or
when the situation that we must analyze is complex.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Describe a time when you learned new social information or new behaviors through operant,
associational, or observational learning.
2. Think about a time when you made a snap judgment about another person. How did your
expectations about people influence your judgment of this person? Looking back on this, to
what extent do you think that the judgment fair or unfair?
3. Consider some of your beliefs about the people you know. Were these beliefs formed through
assimilation, accommodation, or a combination of both? To what degree do you think that
your expectations now influence how you respond to these people?
4. Describe a time when you had a strong expectation about another person’s likely behavior. In
what ways and to what extent did that expectation serve as an energy saver?
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How We Use Our Expectations
Learning Objectives
1. Provide examples of how salience and accessibility influence information processing.
2. Review, differentiate, and give examples of some important cognitive heuristics that influence
social judgment.
3. Summarize and give examples of the importance of social cognition in everyday life.
Once we have developed a set of schemas and attitudes, we naturally use that information to help us evaluate
and respond to others. Our expectations help us to think about, size up, and make sense of individuals, groups
of people, and the relationships among people. If we have learned, for example, that someone is friendly and
interested in us, we are likely to approach them; if we have learned that they are threatening or unlikable, we
will be more likely to withdraw. And if we believe that a person has committed a crime, we may process new
information in a manner that helps convince us that our judgment was correct. In this section, we will consider
how we use our stored knowledge to come to accurate (and sometimes inaccurate) conclusions about our social
worlds.
Automatic versus Controlled Cognition
A good part of both cognition and social cognition is spontaneous or automatic. Automatic cognition refers to
thinking that occurs out of our awareness, quickly, and without taking much effort (Ferguson & Bargh, 2003;
Ferguson, Hassin, & Bargh, 2008). The things that we do most frequently tend to become more automatic each
time we do them, until they reach a level where they don’t really require us to think about them very much. Most
of us can ride a bike and operate a television remote control in an automatic way. Even though it took some work
to do these things when we were first learning them, it just doesn’t take much effort anymore. And because we
spend a lot of time making judgments about others, many of these judgments, which are strongly influenced by
our schemas, are made quickly and automatically (Willis & Todorov, 2006).
Because automatic thinking occurs outside of our conscious awareness, we frequently have no idea that it is
occurring and influencing our judgments or behaviors. You might remember a time when you returned home,
unlocked the door, and 30 seconds later couldn’t remember where you had put your keys! You know that you must
have used the keys to get in, and you know you must have put them somewhere, but you simply don’t remember a
thing about it. Because many of our everyday judgments and behaviors are performed automatically, we may not
always be aware that they are occurring or influencing us.
It is of course a good thing that many things operate automatically because it would be extremely difficult to have
to think about them all the time. If you couldn’t drive a car automatically, you wouldn’t be able to talk to the other
people riding with you or listen to the radio at the same time—you’d have to be putting most of your attention into
driving. On the other hand, relying on our snap judgments about Bianca—that she’s likely to be expressive, for
instance—can be erroneous. Sometimes we need to—and should—go beyond automatic cognition and consider
people more carefully. When we deliberately size up and think about something, for instance, another person, we
call it controlled cognition. Although you might think that controlled cognition would be more common and that
automatic thinking would be less likely, that is not always the case. The problem is that thinking takes effort and
time, and we often don’t have too much of those things available.
In the following Research Focus, we consider an example of automatic cognition in a study that uses a common
social cognitive procedure known as priming, a technique in which information is temporarily brought into
memory through exposure to situational events, which can then influence judgments entirely out of awareness.
Research Focus
Behavioral Effects of Priming
In one demonstration of how automatic cognition can influence our behaviors without us being aware of
them, John Bargh and his colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) conducted two studies, each with
the exact same procedure. In the experiments, they showed college students sets of five scrambled words.
The students were to unscramble the five words in each set to make a sentence. Furthermore, for half of
the research participants, the words were related to the stereotype of elderly people. These participants saw
words such as “in Florida retired live people” and “bingo man the forgetful plays.”
The other half of the research participants also made sentences but did so out of words that had nothing
to do with the elderly stereotype. The purpose of this task was to prime (activate) the schema of elderly
people in memory for some of the participants but not for others.
The experimenters then assessed whether the priming of elderly stereotypes would have any effect on
the students’ behavior—and indeed it did. When each research participant had gathered all his or her
belongings, thinking that the experiment was over, the experimenter thanked him or her for participating
and gave directions to the closest elevator. Then, without the participant knowing it, the experimenters
recorded the amount of time that the participant spent walking from the doorway of the experimental room
toward the elevator. As you can see in Figure 2.8, “Automatic Priming and Behavior,” the same results
were found in both experiments—the participants who had made sentences using words related to the
elderly stereotype took on the behaviors of the elderly—they walked significantly more slowly (in fact,
about 12% more slowly across the two studies) as they left the experimental room.
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Figure 2.8 Automatic Priming and Behavior. In two separate experiments, Bargh, Chen, and Borroughs (1996) found that students
who had been exposed to words related to the elderly stereotype walked more slowly than those who had been exposed to more
neutral words.
To determine if these priming effects occurred out of the conscious awareness of the participants, Bargh
and his colleagues asked a third group of students to complete the priming task and then to indicate whether
they thought the words they had used to make the sentences had any relationship to each other or could
possibly have influenced their behavior in any way. These students had no awareness of the possibility that
the words might have been related to the elderly or could have influenced their behavior.
The point of these experiments, and many others like them, is clear—it is quite possible that our judgments
and behaviors are influenced by our social situations, and this influence may be entirely outside of our
conscious awareness. To return again to Bianca, it is even possible that we notice her nationality and that
our beliefs about Italians influence our responses to her, even though we have no idea that they are doing
so and really believe that they have not.
Salience and Accessibility Determine Which Expectations We Use
We each have a large number of schemas that we might bring to bear on any type of judgment we might
make. When thinking about Bianca, for instance, we might focus on her nationality, her gender, her physical
attractiveness, her intelligence, or any of many other possible features. And we will react to Bianca differently
depending on which schemas we use. Schema activation is determined both by the salience of the characteristics
of the person we are judging and by the current activation or cognitive accessibility of the schema.
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Salience
Figure 2.9 Which of these people are more salient and therefore more likely to attract your attention?
Source: Man with a moustache (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Man_with_a_moustache,_Chambal,_India.jpg) by yann used under
CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en). Jill Jackson (https://www.flickr.com/photos/kriskesiak/
6493819855/) by Kris Kesiak used under CC BY-NC 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/). Amelia earhart
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Amelia_earhart.jpeg) in Public Domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain). Ralph Lauren
Photoshoot (https://www.flickr.com/photos/brandoncwarren/2964734674/) by Brandon Warren used under CC BY-NC 2.0
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/brandoncwarren/2964734674/). Wild Hair (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wild_hair.jpg) by peter klashorst
used under CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en)
One determinant of which schemas are likely to be used in social judgment is the extent to which we attend to
particular features of the person or situation that we are responding to. We are more likely to judge people on
the basis of characteristics of salience, which attract our attention when we see someone with them. For example,
things that are unusual, negative, colorful, bright, and moving are more salient and thus more likely to be attended
to than are things that do not have these characteristics (McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978).
We are more likely to initially judge people on the basis of their sex, race, age, and physical attractiveness,
rather than on, say, their religious orientation or their political beliefs, in part because these features are so salient
when we see them (Brewer, 1988). Another thing that makes something particularly salient is its infrequency
or unusualness. If Bianca is from Italy and very few other people in our community are, that characteristic is
something that we notice, it is salient, and we are therefore likely to attend to it. That she is also a woman is, at
least in this context, is less salient.
The salience of the stimuli in our social worlds may sometimes lead us to make judgments on the basis of
information that is actually less informative than is other less salient information. Imagine, for instance, that you
wanted to buy a new smartphone for yourself. You’ve been trying to decide whether to get the iPhone or a rival
product. You went online and checked out the reviews, and you found that although the phones differed on many
dimensions, including price, battery life, and so forth, the rival product was nevertheless rated significantly higher
by the owners than was the iPhone. As a result, you decide to go and purchase one the next day. That night,
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however, you go to a party, and a friend of yours shows you her iPhone. You check it out, and it seems really
great. You tell her that you were thinking of buying a rival product, and she tells you that you are crazy. She says
she knows someone who had one and had a lot of problems—it didn’t download music properly, the battery died
right after the warranty was up, and so forth, and that she would never buy one. Would you still buy it, or would
you switch your plans?
If you think about this question logically, the information that you just got from your friend isn’t really all that
important; you now know the opinions of one more person, but that can’t really change the overall consumer
ratings of the two machines very much. On the other hand, the information your friend gives you and the chance
to use her iPhone are highly salient. The information is right there in front of you, in your hand, whereas the
statistical information from reviews is only in the form of a table that you saw on your computer. The outcome
in cases such as this is that people frequently ignore the less salient, but more important, information, such as
the likelihood that events occur across a large population, known as base rates, in favor of the actually less
important, but nevertheless more salient, information.
Another case in which we ignore base-rate information occurs when we use the representativeness heuristic,
which occurs when we base our judgments on information that seems to represent, or match, what we expect
will happen, while ignoring more informative base-rate information. Consider, for instance, the following puzzle.
Let’s say that you went to a hospital this week, and you checked the records of the babies that were born on that
day (Table 2.2, “Using the Representativeness Heuristic”). Which pattern of births do you think that you are most
likely to find?
Table 2.2 Using the Representativeness Heuristic
List A List B
6:31 a.m. Girl 6:31 a.m Boy
8:15 a.m. Girl 8:15 a.m. Girl
9:42 a.m. Girl 9:42 a.m. Boy
1:13 p.m. Girl 1:13 p.m. Girl
3:39 p.m. Boy 3:39 p.m. Girl
5:12 p.m. Boy 5:12 p.m. Boy
7:42 p.m. Boy 7:42 p.m. Girl
11:44 p.m. Boy 11:44 p.m. Boy
Most people think that List B is more likely, probably because it looks more random and thus matches (is
“representative of”) our ideas about randomness. But statisticians know that any pattern of four girls and four boys
is equally likely and thus that List B is no more likely than List A. The problem is that we have an image of what
randomness should be, which doesn’t always match what is rationally the case. Similarly, people who see a coin
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that comes up heads five times in a row will frequently predict (and perhaps even bet!) that tails will be next—it
just seems like it has to be. But mathematically, this erroneous expectation (known as the gambler’s fallacy) is
simply not true: the base-rate likelihood of any single coin flip being tails is only 50%, regardless of how many
times it has come up heads in the past.
To take one more example, consider the following information:
I have a friend who is analytical, argumentative, and is involved in community activism. Which of the following
is she? (Choose one.)
—A lawyer
—A salesperson
Can you see how you might be led, potentially incorrectly, into thinking that my friend is a lawyer? Why? The
description (“analytical, argumentative, and is involved in community activism”) just seems more representative
or stereotypical of our expectations about lawyers than salespeople. But the base rates tell us something
completely different, which should make us wary of that conclusion. Simply put, the number of salespeople
greatly outweighs the number of lawyers in society, and thus statistically it is far more likely that she is
a salesperson. Nevertheless, the representativeness heuristic will often cause us to overlook such important
information. One unfortunate consequence of this is that it can contribute to the maintenance of stereotypes. If
someone you meet seems, superficially at least, to represent the stereotypical characteristics of a social group, you
may incorrectly classify that person as a member of that group, even when it is highly likely that he or she is not.
Cognitive Accessibility
Although the characteristics that we use to think about objects or people are determined in part by their salience,
individual differences in the person who is doing the judging are also important. People vary in the type of
schemas that they tend to use when judging others and when thinking about themselves. One way to consider this
is in terms of the cognitive accessibility of the schema. Cognitive accessibility refers to the extent to which a
schema is activated in memory and thus likely to be used in information processing. Simply put, the schemas we
tend to typically use are often those that are most accessible to us.
You probably know people who are football nuts (or maybe tennis or some other sport nuts). All they can talk
about is football. For them, we would say that football is a highly accessible construct. Because they love football,
it is important to their self-concept; they set many of their goals in terms of the sport, and they tend to think
about things and people in terms of it (“If he plays or watches football, he must be okay!”). Other people have
highly accessible schemas about eating healthy food, exercising, environmental issues, or really good coffee, for
instance. In short, when a schema is accessible, we are likely to use it to make judgments of ourselves and others.
Although accessibility can be considered a person variable (a given idea is more highly accessible for some people
than for others), accessibility can also be influenced by situational factors. When we have recently or frequently
thought about a given topic, that topic becomes more accessible and is likely to influence our judgments. This is
in fact a potential explanation for the results of the priming study you read about earlier—people walked slower
because the concept of elderly had been primed and thus was currently highly accessible for them.
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Because we rely so heavily on our schemas and attitudes, and particularly on those that are salient and accessible,
we can sometimes be overly influenced by them. Imagine, for instance, that I asked you to close your eyes and
determine whether there are more words in the English language that begin with the letter R or that have the letter
R as the third letter. You would probably try to solve this problem by thinking of words that have each of the
characteristics. It turns out that most people think there are more words that begin with R, even though there are
in fact more words that have R as the third letter.
You can see that this error can occur as a result of cognitive accessibility. To answer the question, we naturally
try to think of all the words that we know that begin with R and that have R in the third position. The problem
is that when we do that, it is much easier to retrieve the former than the latter, because we store words by their
first, not by their third, letter. We may also think that our friends are nice people because we see them primarily
when they are around us (their friends). And the traffic might seem worse in our own neighborhood than we think
it is in other places, in part because nearby traffic jams are more accessible for us than are traffic jams that occur
somewhere else. And do you think it is more likely that you will be killed in a plane crash or in a car crash? Many
people fear the former, even though the latter is much more likely: statistically, your chances of being involved
in an aircraft accident are far lower than being killed in an automobile accident. In this case, the problem is that
plane crashes, which are highly salient, are more easily retrieved from our memory than are car crashes, which
often receive far less media coverage.
The tendency to make judgments of the frequency of an event, or the likelihood that an event will occur, on the
basis of the ease with which the event can be retrieved from memory is known as the availability heuristic
(Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The idea is that things that are highly accessible (in
this case, the term availability is used) come to mind easily and thus may overly influence our judgments. Thus,
despite the clear facts, it may be easier to think of plane crashes than of car crashes because the former are more
accessible. If so, the availability heuristic can lead to errors in judgments.
For example, as people tend to overestimate the risk of rare but dramatic events, including plane crashes and
terrorist attacks, their responses to these estimations may not always be proportionate to the true risks. For
instance, it has been widely documented that fewer people chose to use air travel in the aftermath of the September
11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, particularly in the United States. Correspondingly,
many individuals chose other methods of travel, often electing to drive rather than fly to their destination.
Statistics across all regions of the world confirm that driving is far more dangerous than flying, and this prompted
the cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer to estimate how many extra deaths that the increased road traffic
following 9/11 might have caused. He arrived at an estimate of around an additional 1,500 road deaths in the
United States alone in the year following those terrorist attacks, which was six times the number of people killed
on the airplanes on September 11, 2001 (Gigerenzer, 2006).
Another way that the cognitive accessibility of constructs can influence information processing is through their
effects on processing fluency. Processing fluency refers to the ease with which we can process information in
our environments. When stimuli are highly accessible, they can be quickly attended to and processed, and they
therefore have a large influence on our perceptions. This influence is due, in part, to the fact that we often react
positively to information that we can process quickly, and we use this positive response as a basis of judgment
(Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).
In one study demonstrating this effect, Norbert Schwarz and his colleagues (Schwarz et al., 1991) asked one set
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of college students to list six occasions when they had acted either assertively or unassertively, and asked another
set of college students to list 12 such examples. Schwarz determined that for most students, it was pretty easy to
list six examples but pretty hard to list 12.
The researchers then asked the participants to indicate how assertive or unassertive they actually were. You can
see from Figure 2.10, “Processing Fluency,” that the ease of processing influenced judgments. The participants
who had an easy time listing examples of their behavior (because they only had to list six instances) judged that
they did in fact have the characteristics they were asked about (either assertive or unassertive), in comparison with
the participants who had a harder time doing the task (because they had to list 12 instances). Other research has
found similar effects—people rate that they ride their bicycles more often after they have been asked to recall only
a few rather than many instances of doing so (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), and they hold an attitude with more
confidence after being asked to generate few rather than many arguments that support it (Haddock, Rothman,
Reber, & Schwarz, 1999). Sometimes less really is more!
Figure 2.10 Processing Fluency. When it was relatively easy to complete the questionnaire (only six examples were required), the student
participants rated that they had more of the trait than when the task was more difficult (12 answers were required). Data are from Schwarz et
al. (1991).
Echoing the findings mentioned earlier in relation to schemas, we are likely to use this type of quick and
“intuitive” processing, based on our feelings about how easy it is to complete a task, when we don’t have much
time or energy for more in-depth processing, such as when we are under time pressure, tired, or unwilling to
process the stimulus in sufficient detail. Of course, it is very adaptive to respond to stimuli quickly (Sloman,
2002; Stanovich & West, 2002; Winkielman, Schwarz, & Nowak, 2002), and it is not impossible that in at least
some cases, we are better off making decisions based on our initial responses than on a more thoughtful cognitive
analysis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). For instance, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren
(2006) found that when participants were given tasks requiring decisions that were very difficult to make on the
basis of a cognitive analysis of the problem, they made better decisions when they didn’t try to analyze the details
carefully but simply relied on their intuitions.
In sum, people are influenced not only by the information they get but on how they get it. We are more highly
influenced by things that are salient and accessible and thus easily attended to, remembered, and processed. On the
other hand, information that is harder to access from memory, is less likely to be attended to, or takes more effort
to consider is less likely to be used in our judgments, even if this information is statistically more informative.
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The False Consensus Bias Makes Us Think That Others Are More Like Us Than They Really Are
The tendency to base our judgments on the accessibility of social constructs can lead to still other errors in
judgment. One such error is known as the false consensus bias, the tendency to overestimate the extent to which
other people hold similar views to our own. As our own beliefs are highly accessible to us, we tend to rely on them
too heavily when asked to predict those of others. For instance, if you are in favor of abortion rights and opposed
to capital punishment, then you are likely to think that most other people share these beliefs (Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977). In one demonstration of the false consensus bias, Joachim Krueger and his colleagues (Krueger &
Clement, 1994) gave their research participants, who were college students, a personality test. Then they asked
the same participants to estimate the percentage of other students in their school who would have answered the
questions the same way that they did. The students who agreed with the items often thought that others would
agree with them too, whereas the students who disagreed typically believed that others would also disagree. A
closely related bias to the false consensus effect is the projection bias, which is the tendency to assume that others
share our cognitive and affective states (Hsee, Hastie, & Chen, 2008).
In regards to our chapter case study, the false consensus effect has also been implicated in the potential causes of
the 2008 financial collapse. Considering investor behavior within its social context, an important part of sound
decision making is the ability to predict other investors’ intentions and behaviors, as this will help to foresee
potential market trends. In this context, Egan, Merkle, and Weber (in press) outline how the false consensus effect
can lead investors to overestimate the extent to which other investors share their judgments about the likely trends,
which can in turn lead them to make inaccurate predictions of their behavior, with dire economic consequences.
Although it is commonly observed, the false consensus bias does not occur on all dimensions. Specifically, the
false consensus bias is not usually observed on judgments of positive personal traits that we highly value as
important. People (falsely, of course) report that they have better personalities (e.g., a better sense of humor),
that they engage in better behaviors (e.g., they are more likely to wear seatbelts), and that they have brighter
futures than almost everyone else (Chambers, 2008). These results suggest that although in most cases we assume
that we are similar to others, in cases of valued personal characteristics the goals of self-concern lead us to see
ourselves more positively than we see the average person. There are some important cultural differences here,
though, with members of collectivist cultures typically showing less of this type of self-enhancing bias, than those
from individualistic cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999).
Perceptions of What “Might Have Been” Lead to Counterfactual Thinking
In addition to influencing our judgments about ourselves and others, the salience and accessibility of information
can have an important effect on our own emotions and self-esteem. Our emotional reactions to events are often
colored not only by what did happen but also by what might have happened. If we can easily imagine an outcome
that is better than what actually happened, then we may experience sadness and disappointment; on the other hand,
if we can easily imagine that a result might have been worse that what actually happened, we may be more likely
to experience happiness and satisfaction. The tendency to think about events according to what might have been
is known as counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997).
Imagine, for instance, that you were participating in an important contest, and you won the silver medal. How
would you feel? Certainly you would be happy that you won, but wouldn’t you probably also be thinking a lot
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about what might have happened if you had been just a little bit better—you might have won the gold medal! On
the other hand, how might you feel if you won the bronze medal (third place)? If you were thinking about the
counterfactual (the “what might have been”), perhaps the idea of not getting any medal at all would have been
highly accessible and so you’d be happy that you got the medal you did get.
Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) investigated exactly this idea by videotaping the responses of athletes who
won medals in the 1992 summer Olympic Games. They videotaped the athletes both as they learned that they
had won a silver or a bronze medal and again as they were awarded the medal. Then they showed these videos,
without any sound, to people who did not know which medal which athlete had won. The raters indicated how
they thought the athlete was feeling, on a range from “agony” to “ecstasy.” The results showed that the bronze
medalists did indeed seem to be, on average, happier than were the silver medalists. Then, in a follow-up study,
raters watched interviews with many of these same athletes as they talked about their performance. The raters
indicated what we would expect on the basis of counterfactual thinking. The silver medalists often talked about
their disappointments in having finished second rather than first, whereas the bronze medalists tended to focus on
how happy they were to have finished third rather than fourth.
Figure 2.11 Does the bronze medalist look happier to you than the silver medalist? Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) found that, on
average, bronze medalists were happier than silver medalists.
Source: Tina Maze Andrea Fischbacher and Lindsey Vonn by Duncan Rawlinson (https://www.flickr.com/photos/44124400268@N01/
4374497787) used under CC BY-NC 2.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/)
Counterfactual thinking seems to be part of the human condition and has even been studied in numerous other
social settings, including juries. For example, people who were asked to award monetary damages to others who
had been in an accident offered them substantially more in compensation if they were almost not injured than they
did if the accident seemed more inevitable (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988).
Again, the moral of the story regarding the importance of cognitive accessibility is clear—in the case of
counterfactual thinking, the accessibility of the potential alternative outcome can lead to some seemingly
paradoxical effects.
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Anchoring and Adjustment Lead Us to Accept Ideas That We Should Revise
In some cases, we may be aware of the danger of acting on our expectations and attempt to adjust for them.
Perhaps you have been in a situation where you are beginning a course with a new professor and you know that a
good friend of yours does not like him. You may be thinking that you want to go beyond your negative expectation
and prevent this knowledge from biasing your judgment. However, the accessibility of the initial information
frequently prevents this adjustment from occurring—leading us to weight initial information too heavily and
thereby insufficiently move our judgment away from it. This is called the problem of anchoring and adjustment.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked some of the student participants in one of their studies of anchoring and
adjustment to solve this multiplication problem quickly and without using a calculator:
1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8
They asked other participants to solve this problem:
8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1
They found that students who saw the first problem gave an estimated answer of about 512, whereas the students
who saw the second problem estimated about 2,250. Tversky and Kahneman argued that the students couldn’t
solve the whole problem in their head, so they did the first few multiplications and then used the outcome of this
preliminary calculation as their starting point, or anchor. Then the participants used their starting estimate to find
an answer that sounded plausible. In both cases, the estimates were too low relative to the true value of the product
(which is 40,320)—but the first set of guesses were even lower because they started from a lower anchor.
Interestingly, the tendency to anchor on initial information seems to be sufficiently strong that in some cases,
people will do so even when the anchor is clearly irrelevant to the task at hand. For example, Ariely, Loewenstein,
and Prelec (2003) asked students to bid on items in an auction after having noted the last two digits of their social
security numbers. They then asked the students to generate and write down a hypothetical price for each of the
auction items, based on these numbers. If the last two digits were 11, then the bottle of wine, for example, was
priced at $11. If the two numbers were 88, the textbook was $88. After they wrote down this initial, arbitrary
price, they then had to bid for the item. People with high numbers bid up to 346% more than those with low
ones! Ariely, reflecting further on these findings, concluded that the “Social security numbers were the anchor in
this experiment only because we requested them. We could have just as well asked for the current temperature or
the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. Any question, in fact, would have created the anchor. Does that seem
rational? Of course not” (2008, p. 26). A rather startling conclusion from the effect of arbitrary, irrelevant anchors
on our judgments is that we will often grab hold of any available information to guide our judgments, regardless
of whether it is actually germane to the issue.
Of course, savvy marketers have long used the anchoring phenomenon to help them. You might not be surprised
to hear that people are more likely to buy more products when they are listed as four for $1.00 than when they
are listed as $0.25 each (leading people to anchor on the four and perhaps adjust only a bit away). And it is no
accident that a car salesperson always starts negotiating with a high price and then works down. The salesperson
is trying to get the consumer anchored on the high price, with the hope that it will have a big influence on the final
sale value.
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Overconfidence
Still another potential judgmental bias, and one that has powerful and often negative effects on our judgments, is
the overconfidence bias, a tendency to be overconfident in our own skills, abilities, and judgments. We often have
little awareness of our own limitations, leading us to act as if we are more certain about things than we should
be, particularly on tasks that are difficult. Adams and Adams (1960) found that for words that were difficult to
spell, people were correct in spelling them only about 80% of the time, even though they indicated that they were
“100% certain” that they were correct. David Dunning and his colleagues (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross,
1990) asked college students to predict how another student would react in various situations. Some participants
made predictions about a fellow student whom they had just met and interviewed, and others made predictions
about their roommates. In both cases, participants reported their confidence in each prediction, and accuracy was
determined by the responses of the target persons themselves. The results were clear: regardless of whether they
judged a stranger or a roommate, the students consistently overestimated the accuracy of their own predictions
(Figure 2.12).
Figure 2.12 Dunning and colleagues (1990) found that, regardless of whether they were judging strangers or their roommates, students were
overconfident. The percentage confidence that they assigned to their own predictions was significantly higher than the actual percentage of
their predictions that were correct.
Making matters even worse, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that people who scored low rather than high
on tests of spelling, logic, grammar, and humor appreciation were also most likely to show overconfidence by
overestimating how well they would do. Apparently, poor performers are doubly cursed—they not only are unable
to predict their own skills but also are the most unaware that they can’t do so (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, &
Kruger, 2003).
The tendency to be overconfident in our judgments can have some very negative effects. When eyewitnesses
testify in courtrooms regarding their memories of a crime, they often are completely sure that they are identifying
the right person. But their confidence doesn’t correlate much with their actual accuracy. This is, in part, why
so many people have been wrongfully convicted on the basis of inaccurate eyewitness testimony given by
overconfident witnesses (Wells & Olson, 2003). Overconfidence can also spill over into professional judgments,
for example, in clinical psychology (Oskamp, 1965) and in market investment and trading (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger,
& Rui, 2007). Indeed, in regards to our case study at the start of this chapter, the role of overconfidence bias in
the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath has been well documented (Abbes, 2012).
This overconfidence also often seems to apply to social judgments about the future in general. A
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pervasive optimistic bias has been noted in members of many cultures (Sharot, 2011), which can be defined
as a tendency to believe that positive outcomes are more likely to happen than negative ones, particularly in
relation to ourselves versus others. Importantly, this optimism is often unwarranted. Most people, for example,
underestimate their risk of experiencing negative events like divorce and illness, and overestimate the likelihood
of positive ones, including gaining a promotion at work or living to a ripe old age (Schwarzer, 1994). There
is some evidence of diversity in regards to optimism, however, across different groups. People in collectivist
cultures tend not to show this bias to the same extent as those living in individualistic ones (Chang, Asakawa, &
Sanna, 2001). Moreover, individuals who have clinical depression have been shown to evidence a phenomenon
termed depressive realism, whereby their social judgments about the future are less positively skewed and often
more accurate than those who do not have depression (Moore & Fresco, 2012).
The optimistic bias can also extend into the planning fallacy, defined as a tendency to overestimate the amount
that we can accomplish over a particular time frame. This fallacy can also entail the underestimation of the
resources and costs involved in completing a task or project, as anyone who has attempted to budget for home
renovations can probably attest to. Everyday examples of the planning fallacy abound, in everything from the
completion of course assignments to the construction of new buildings. On a grander scale, newsworthy items
in any country hosting a major sporting event, for example, the Olympics or World Cup soccer always seem to
include the spiralling budgets and overrunning timelines as the events approach.
Why is the planning fallacy so persistent? Several factors appear to be at work here. Buehler, Griffin and Peetz
(2010) argue that when planning projects, individuals orient to the future and pay too little attention to their past
relevant experiences. This can cause them to overlook previous occasions where they experienced difficulties and
over-runs. They also tend to plan for what time and resources are likely to be needed, if things run as planned.
That is, they do not spend enough time thinking about all the things that might go wrong, for example, all the
unforeseen demands on their time and resources that may occur during the completion of the task. Worryingly,
the planning fallacy seems to be even stronger for tasks where we are highly motivated and invested in timely
completions. It appears that wishful thinking is often at work here (Buehler et al., 2010). For some further
perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of the optimism bias, see this engaging TED Talk by Tali Sharot
at: http://www.ted.com/talks/tali_sharot_the_optimism_bias
If these biases related to overconfidence appear at least sometimes to lead us to inaccurate social judgments, a
key question here is why are they so pervasive? What functions do they serve? One possibility is that they help to
enhance people’s motivation and self-esteem levels. If we have a positive view of our abilities and judgments, and
are confident that we can execute tasks to deadlines, we will be more likely to attempt challenging projects and
to put ourselves forward for demanding opportunities. Moreover, there is consistent evidence that a mild degree
of optimism can predict a range of positive outcomes, including success and even physical health (Forgeard &
Seligman, 2012).
The Importance of Cognitive Biases in Everyday Life
In our review of some of the many cognitive biases that affect our social judgment, we have seen that the effects
on us as individuals range from fairly trivial decisions; for example, which phone to buy (which perhaps doesn’t
seem so trivial at the time) to potentially life and death decisions (about methods of travel, for instance).
However, when we consider that many of these errors will not only affect us but also everyone around us, then
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their consequences can really add up. Why would so many people continue to buy lottery tickets or to gamble
their money in casinos when the likelihood of them ever winning is so low? One possibility, of course, is the
representative heuristic—people ignore the low base rates of winning and focus their attention on the salient
likelihood of winning a huge prize. And the belief in astrology, which all scientific evidence suggests is not
accurate, is probably driven in part by the salience of the occasions when the predictions do occur—when a
horoscope is correct (which it will of course sometimes be), the correct prediction is highly salient and may allow
people to maintain the (overall false) belief as they recollect confirming evidence more readily.
People may also take more care to prepare for unlikely events than for more likely ones because the unlikely ones
are more salient or accessible. For instance, people may think that they are more likely to die from a terrorist attack
or as the result of a homicide than they are from diabetes, stroke, or tuberculosis. But the odds are much greater of
dying from the health problems than from terrorism or homicide. Because people don’t accurately calibrate their
behaviors to match the true potential risks, the individual and societal costs are quite large (Slovic, 2000).
As well as influencing our judgments relating to ourselves, salience and accessibility also color how we perceive
our social worlds, which may have a big influence on our behavior. For instance, people who watch a lot of violent
television shows also tend to view the world as more dangerous in comparison to those who watch less violent
TV (Doob & Macdonald, 1979). This follows from the idea that our judgments are based on the accessibility of
relevant constructs. We also overestimate our contribution to joint projects (Ross & Sicoly, 1979), perhaps in part
because our own contributions are so obvious and salient, whereas the contributions of others are much less so.
And the use of cognitive heuristics can even affect our views about global warming. Joireman, Barnes, Truelove,
and Duell (2010) found that people were more likely to believe in the existence of global warming when they were
asked about it on hotter rather than colder days and when they had first been primed with words relating to heat.
Thus the principles of salience and accessibility, because they are such an important part of our social judgments,
can create a series of biases that can make a difference on a truly global level.
As we have already seen specifically in relation to overconfidence, research has found that even people who
should know better—and who need to know better—are subject to cognitive biases in general. Economists, stock
traders, managers, lawyers, and even doctors have been found to make the same kinds of mistakes in their
professional activities that people make in their everyday lives (Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Gilovich, Griffin, &
Kahneman, 2002; Hilton, 2001). And the use of cognitive heuristics is increased when people are under time
pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) or when they feel threatened (Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, 2009), exactly
the situations that often occur when professionals are required to make their decisions.
Biased About Our Biases: The Bias Blind Spot
So far, we have discussed some of the most important and heavily researched social cognitive biases that affect
our appraisals of ourselves in relation to our social worlds and noted some of their key limitations. Recently, some
social psychologists have become interested in how aware we are of how these biases and the ways in which
they can affect our own and others’ thinking. The short answer to this is that we often underestimate the extent
to which our social cognition is biased, and that we typically (incorrectly) believe that we are less biased than the
average person. Researchers have named this tendency to believe that our own judgments are less susceptible to
the influence of bias than those of others as the bias blind spot (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005). Interestingly,
the level of bias blind spot that people demonstrate is unrelated to the actual amount of bias they show in their
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social judgments (West, Meserve, & Stanovich, 2012). Moreover, those scoring higher in cognitive ability actually
tend to show a larger bias blind spot (West et al., 2012).
So, if our social cognition appears to be riddled with multiple biases, and we tend to show biases about these
biases, what hope is there for us in reaching sound social judgments? Before we arrive at such a pessimistic
conclusion, however, it is important to redress the balance of evidence a little. Perhaps just learning more about
these biases, as we have done in this chapter, can help us to recognize when they are likely to be useful to our
social judgments, and to take steps to reduce their effects when they hinder our understanding of our social worlds.
Maybe, although many of the biases discussed tend to persist even in the face of our awareness, at the very
least, learning about them could be an important first step toward reducing their unhelpful effects on our social
cognition. In order to get reliably better at policing our biases, though, we probably need to go further. One of the
world’s foremost authorities on social cognitive biases, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman, certainly thinks so. He
argues that individual awareness of biases is an important precursor to the development of a common vocabulary
about them, that will then make us better able as communities to discuss their effects on our social judgments
(Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman also asserts that we may be more likely to recognize and challenge bias in each
other’s thinking than in our own, an observation that certainly fits with the concept of the bias blind spot. Perhaps,
even if we cannot effectively police our thinking on our own, we can help to police one another’s.
These arguments are consistent with some evidence that, although mere awareness is rarely enough to
significantly attenuate the effects of bias, it can be helpful when accompanied by systematic cognitive
retraining. Many social psychologists and other scientists are working to help people make better decisions. One
possibility is to provide people with better feedback. Weather forecasters, for instance, are quite accurate in their
decisions (at least in the short-term), in part because they are able to learn from the clear feedback that they
get about the accuracy of their predictions. Other research has found that accessibility biases can be reduced
by leading people to consider multiple alternatives rather than focusing only on the most obvious ones, and by
encouraging people to think about exactly the opposite possible outcomes than the ones they are expecting (Hirt,
Kardes, & Markman, 2004). And certain educational experiences can help people to make better decisions. For
instance, Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett (1988) found that graduate students in medicine, law, and chemistry, and
particularly those in psychology, all showed significant improvement in their ability to reason correctly over the
course of their graduate training.
Another source for some optimism about the accuracy of our social cognition is that these heuristics and biases
can, despite their limitations, often lead us to a broadly accurate understanding of the situations we encounter.
Although we do have limited cognitive abilities, information, and time when making social judgments, that does
not mean we cannot and do not make enough sense of our social worlds in order to function effectively in our
daily lives. Indeed, some researchers, including Cosmides and Tooby (2000) and Gigerenzer (2004) have argued
that these biases and heuristics have been sculpted by evolutionary forces to offer fast and frugal ways of reaching
sound judgments about our infinitely complex social worlds enough of the time to have adaptive value. If, for
example, you were asked to say which Spanish city had a larger population, Madrid or Valencia, the chances
are you would quickly answer that Madrid was bigger, even if you did not know the relevant population figures.
Why? Perhaps the availability heuristic and cognitive accessibility had something to do with it—the chances are
that most people have just heard more about Madrid in the global media over the years, and they can more readily
bring these instances to mind. From there, it is a short leap to the general rule that larger cities tend to get more
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media coverage. So, although our journeys to our social judgments may not be always be pretty, at least we often
arrive at the right destination.
Social Psychology in the Public Interest
The Validity of Eyewitness Testimony
One social situation in which the accuracy of our person-perception skills is vitally important is the area of
eyewitness testimony (Charman & Wells, 2007; Toglia, Read, Ross, & Lindsay, 2007; Wells, Memon, & Penrod,
2006). Every year, thousands of individuals are charged with and often convicted of crimes based largely on
eyewitness evidence. In fact, many people who were convicted prior to the existence of forensic DNA have
now been exonerated by DNA tests, and more than 75% of these people were victims of mistaken eyewitness
identification (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006; Fisher, 2011).
The judgments of eyewitnesses are often incorrect, and there is only a small correlation between how accurate and
how confident an eyewitness is. Witnesses are frequently overconfident, and a person who claims to be absolutely
certain about his or her identification is not much more likely to be accurate than someone who appears much less
sure, making it almost impossible to determine whether a particular witness is accurate or not (Wells & Olson,
2003).
To accurately remember a person or an event at a later time, we must be able to accurately see and store the
information in the first place, keep it in memory over time, and then accurately retrieve it later. But the social
situation can influence any of these processes, causing errors and biases.
In terms of initial encoding of the memory, crimes normally occur quickly, often in situations that are
accompanied by a lot of stress, distraction, and arousal. Typically, the eyewitness gets only a brief glimpse of
the person committing the crime, and this may be under poor lighting conditions and from far away. And the
eyewitness may not always focus on the most important aspects of the scene. Weapons are highly salient, and
if a weapon is present during the crime, the eyewitness may focus on the weapon, which would draw his or her
attention away from the individual committing the crime (Steblay, 1997). In one relevant study, Loftus, Loftus,
and Messo (1987) showed people slides of a customer walking up to a bank teller and pulling out either a pistol
or a checkbook. By tracking eye movements, the researchers determined that people were more likely to look at
the gun than at the checkbook and that this reduced their ability to accurately identify the criminal in a lineup that
was given later.
People may be particularly inaccurate when they are asked to identify members of a race other than their
own (Brigham, Bennett, Meissner, & Mitchell, 2007). In one field study, for example, Meissner and Brigham
(2001) sent European-American, African-American, and Hispanic students into convenience stores in El Paso,
Texas. Each of the students made a purchase, and the researchers came in later to ask the clerks to identify photos
of the shoppers. Results showed that the clerks demonstrated the own-race bias: they were all more accurate at
identifying customers belonging to their own racial or ethnic group, which may be more salient to them, than
they were at identifying people from other groups. There seems to be some truth to the adage that “They all look
alike”—at least if an individual is looking at someone who is not of his or her own race.
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Figure 2.13 One source of error in eyewitness testimony is the relative difficulty of accurately identifying people who are not of one’s own
race.
Source: Ladakh, Hemis Shukpachan by Dietmar Temps (https://www.flickr.com/photos/deepblue66/10607432526) used under CC
BY-NC-SA 2.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/). Group Portrait by John Ragai (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
johnragai/13167551744) used under CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/). College students by Adam S
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/111963716@N06/11529206136) used under CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)
Even if information gets encoded properly, memories may become distorted over time. For one thing, people
might discuss what they saw with other people, or they might read information relating to it from other bystanders
or in the media. Such postevent information can distort the original memories such that the witnesses are no
longer sure what the real information is and what was provided later. The problem is that the new, inaccurate
information is highly cognitively accessible, whereas the older information is much less so. The reconstructive
memory bias suggests that the memory may shift over time to fit the individual’s current beliefs about the crime.
Even describing a face makes it more difficult to recognize the face later (Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997).
In an experiment by Loftus and Palmer (1974), participants viewed a film of a traffic accident and then, according
to random assignment to experimental conditions, answered one of three questions:
1. About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?
2. About how fast were the cars going when they smashed each other?
3. About how fast were the cars going when they contacted each other?
As you can see in in the Figure 2.14, “Reconstructive Memory,” although all the participants saw the same
accident, their estimates of the speed of the cars varied by condition. People who had seen the “smashed” question
estimated the highest average speed, and those who had seen the “contacted” question estimated the lowest.
Figure 2.14 Reconstructive Memory
Participants viewed a film of a traffic accident and then answered a question about the accident. According to
random assignment, the blank was filled by either “hit,” “smashed,” or “contacted” each other. The wording of
the question influenced the participants’ memory of the accident. Data are from Loftus and Palmer (1974).
The situation is particularly problematic when the eyewitnesses are children, because research has found that
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children are more likely to make incorrect identifications than are adults (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998) and are also
subject to the own-race identification bias (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Moore, 2003). In many cases, when sex
abuse charges have been filed against babysitters, teachers, religious officials, and family members, the children
are the only source of evidence. The possibility that children are not accurately remembering the events that have
occurred to them creates substantial problems for the legal system.
Another setting in which eyewitnesses may be inaccurate is when they try to identify suspects from mug shots
or lineups. A lineup generally includes the suspect and five to seven other innocent people (the fillers), and the
eyewitness must pick out the true perpetrator. The problem is that eyewitnesses typically feel pressured to pick a
suspect out of the lineup, which increases the likelihood that they will mistakenly pick someone (rather than no
one) as the suspect.
Research has attempted to better understand how people remember and potentially misremember the scenes of and
people involved in crimes and to attempt to improve how the legal system makes use of eyewitness testimony. In
many states, efforts are being made to better inform judges, juries, and lawyers about how inaccurate eyewitness
testimony can be. Guidelines have also been proposed to help ensure that child witnesses are questioned in
a nonbiasing way (Poole & Lamb, 1998). Steps can also be taken to ensure that lineups yield more accurate
eyewitness identifications. Lineups are more fair when the fillers resemble the suspect, when the interviewer
makes it clear that the suspect might or might not be present (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001), and
when the eyewitness has not been shown the same pictures in a mug-shot book prior to the lineup decision.
And several recent studies have found that witnesses who make accurate identifications from a lineup reach their
decision faster than do witnesses who make mistaken identifications, suggesting that authorities must take into
consideration not only the response but how fast it is given (Dunning & Perretta, 2002).
In addition to distorting our memories for events that have actually occurred, misinformation may lead us to
falsely remember information that never occurred. Loftus and her colleagues asked parents to provide them with
descriptions of events that did happen (e.g., moving to a new house) and did not happen (e.g., being lost in
a shopping mall) to their children. Then (without telling the children which events were real or made up) the
researchers asked the children to imagine both types of events. The children were instructed to “think really hard”
about whether the events had occurred (Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994). More than half of the children
generated stories regarding at least one of the made-up events, and they remained insistent that the events did
in fact occur even when told by the researcher that they could not possibly have occurred (Loftus & Pickrell,
1995). Even college students are susceptible to manipulations that make events that did not actually occur seem
as if they did (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001).
The ease with which memories can be created or implanted is particularly problematic when the events to be
recalled have important consequences. Therapists often argue that patients may repress memories of traumatic
events they experienced as children, such as childhood sexual abuse, and then recover the events years later as the
therapist leads them to recall the information—for instance, by using dream interpretation and hypnosis (Brown,
Scheflin, & Hammond, 1998).
But other researchers argue that painful memories such as sexual abuse are usually very well remembered,
that few memories are actually repressed, and that even if they are, it is virtually impossible for patients
to accurately retrieve them years later (McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003; Pope, Poliakoff, Parker, Boynes,
& Hudson, 2007). These researchers have argued that the procedures used by the therapists to “retrieve” the
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memories are more likely to actually implant false memories, leading the patients to erroneously recall events
that did not actually occur. Because hundreds of people have been accused, and even imprisoned, on the basis of
claims about “recovered memory” of child sexual abuse, the accuracy of these memories has important societal
implications. Many psychologists now believe that most of these claims of recovered memories are due to
implanted, rather than real, memories (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994).
Taken together, then, the problems of eyewitness testimony represent another example of how social
cognition—including the processes that we use to size up and remember other people—may be influenced,
sometimes in a way that creates inaccurate perceptions, by the operation of salience, cognitive accessibility, and
other information-processing biases.
Key Takeaways
• We use our schemas and attitudes to help us judge and respond to others. In many cases, this
is appropriate, but our expectations can also lead to biases in our judgments of ourselves and
others.
• A good part of our social cognition is spontaneous or automatic, operating without much
thought or effort. On the other hand, when we have the time and the motivation to think about
things carefully, we may engage in thoughtful, controlled cognition.
• Which expectations we use to judge others is based on both the situational salience of the
things we are judging and the cognitive accessibility of our own schemas and attitudes.
• Variations in the accessibility of schemas lead to biases such as the availability heuristic, the
representativeness heuristic, the false consensus bias, biases caused by counterfactual
thinking, and those elated to overconfidence.
• The potential biases that are the result of everyday social cognition can have important
consequences, both for us in our everyday lives but even for people who make important
decisions affecting many other people. Although biases are common, they are not impossible
to control, and psychologists and other scientists are working to help people make better
decisions.
• The operation of cognitive biases, including the potential for new information to distort
information already in memory, can help explain the tendency for eyewitnesses to be
overconfident and frequently inaccurate in their recollections of what occurred at crime
scenes.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Give an example of a time when you may have committed one of the cognitive heuristics and
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biases discussed in this chapter. What factors (e.g., availability; salience) caused the error, and
what was the outcome of your use of the shortcut or heuristic? What do you see as the general
advantages and disadvantages of using this bias in your everyday life? Describe one possible
strategy you could use to reduce the potentially harmful effects of this bias in your life.
2. Go to the website http://thehothand.blogspot.com, which analyzes the extent to which people
accurately perceive “streakiness” in sports. Based on the information provided on this site, as
well as that in this chapter, in what ways might our sports perceptions be influenced by our
expectations and the use of cognitive heuristics and biases?
3. Different cognitive heuristics and biases often operate together to influence our social
cognition in particular situations. Describe a situation where you feel that two or more biases
were affecting your judgment. How did they interact? What combined effects on your social
cognition did they have? Which of the heuristics and biases outlined in this chapter do you
think might be particularly likely to happen together in social situations and why?
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Social Cognition and Affect
Learning Objectives
1. Describe important ways in which our affective states can influence our social cognition, both
directly and indirectly, for example, through the operation of the affect heuristic.
2. Outline mechanisms through which our social cognition can alter our affective states, for
instance, through the mechanism of misattribution of arousal.
3. Review the role that strategies, including cognitive reappraisal, can play in successful self-
regulation.
4. Explore the relationship between positive cognition, affect, and behaviors.
5. Outline important findings in relation to our affective forecasting abilities.
This chapter is about social cognition, and so it should not be surprising that we have been focusing, so far, on
cognitive phenomena, including schemas and heuristics, that affect our social judgments. In reality, though, these
cognitive influences do not operate in isolation from our feelings, or affect. Indeed, researchers have long been
interested in the complex ways in which our thoughts are shaped by our feelings, and vice versa (Oatley, Parrott,
Smith, & Watts, 2011).
Affect Influences Cognition
There is abundant evidence that our social cognition is strongly influenced by our affective states. For example,
whatever current mood we are experiencing can influence our judgments of people we meet. Think back to a
time when you were in a positive mood when you were introduced to someone new versus a time you were in
a negative mood. The chances are that you made more positive evaluations than you did when you met a person
when you were feeling bad (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1993). Don’t new places also often seem better when you
visit them in a good mood? The influences of mood on our social cognition even seem to extend to our judgments
about ideas, with positive mood linked to more positive appraisals than neutral mood (Garcia-Marques, Mackie,
Claypool & Garcia-Marques, 2004). Positive moods may even help to reduce negative feelings toward others.
For example, Ito, Chiao, Devine, Lorig, and Cacioppo (2006) found that people who were smiling were also less
prejudiced.
Mood states are also powerful determinants of our current judgments about our well-being. Norbert Schwarz and
Gerald Clore (1983) called participants on the telephone, pretending that they were researchers from a different
city conducting a survey. Furthermore, they varied the day on which they made the calls, such that some of the
participants were interviewed on sunny days and some were interviewed on rainy days. During the course of the
interview, the participants were asked to report on their current mood states and also on their general well-being.
Schwarz and Clore found that the participants reported better moods and greater well-being on sunny days than
they did on rainy days.
Schwarz and Clore wondered whether people were using their current mood (“I feel good today”) to determine
how they felt about their life overall. To test this idea, they simply asked half of their respondents about the local
weather conditions at the beginning of the interview. The idea was to subtly focus these participants on the fact
that the weather might be influencing their mood states. They found that as soon as they did this, although mood
states were still influenced by the weather, the weather no longer influenced perceptions of well-being (Figure
2.15, “Mood as Information”). When the participants were aware that their moods might have been influenced
by the weather, they realized that the moods were not informative about their overall well-being, and so they no
longer used this information. Similar effects have been found for mood that is induced by music or other sources
(Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998).
Figure 2.15 Mood as Information. The current weather influences people’s judgments of their well-being, but only when they are not aware
that it might be doing so. After Schwarz and Clore (1983).
Even moods that are created very subtly can have effects on our social judgments. Fritz Strack and his colleagues
(Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) had participants rate how funny cartoons were while holding a writing pen in
their mouth such that it forced them either to use muscles that are associated with smiling or to use muscles that
are associated with frowning (Figure 2.16, “Facial Expression and Mood”). They found that participants rated
the cartoons as funnier when the pen created muscle contractions that are normally used for smiling rather than
frowning. And Stepper and Strack (1993) found that people interpreted events more positively when they were
sitting in an upright position rather than a slumped position. Even finding a coin in a pay phone or being offered
some milk and cookies is enough to put people in a good mood and to make them rate their surroundings more
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positively (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978).
Figure 2.16 Facial Expression and Mood. The position of our mouth muscles can influence our mood states and our social judgments (Strack,
Martin, & Stepper, 1988).
We have seen many ways in which our current mood can help to shape our social cognition. There are many
possible mechanisms that can help to explain this influence, but one concept seems particularly relevant here. The
affect heuristic describes a tendency to rely on automatically occurring affective responses to stimuli to guide
our judgments of them. For example, we judge a particular product to be the best option because we experience a
very favorable affective response to its packaging, or we choose to hire a new staff member because we like her
or him better than the other candidates. Empirically, the affect heuristic has been shown to influence a wide range
of social judgments and behaviors (Kahneman, 2011; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Kahneman
(2003) has gone so far as to say that “The idea of an affect heuristic…is probably the most important development
in the study of…heuristics in the past few decades. There is compelling evidence for the proposition that every
stimulus evokes an affective evaluation, which is not always conscious….”(p. 710)
Given the power of the affect heuristic to influence our judgments, it is useful to explore why it is so strong. As
with other heuristics, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) proposed that the affect heuristic works by a process called
attribute substitution, which happens without conscious awareness. According to this theory, when somebody
makes a judgment about a target attribute that is very complex to calculate, for example, the overall suitability of a
candidate for a job, that person tends to substitute these calculations for an easier heuristic attribute, for example,
the likeability of a candidate. In effect, we deal with cognitively difficult social judgments by replacing them with
easier ones, without being aware of this happening. To return to our choice of job applicant, rather than trying to
reach a judgment based on the complex question of which candidate would be the best one to select, given their
past experiences, future potential, the demands of the position, the organizational culture, and so on, we choose
to base it on the much simpler question of which candidate do we like the most. In this way, people often do hire
the candidates they like the best, and, not coincidentally, also those who tend to be more similar to themselves
(Rivera, 2012).
So far, we have seen some of the many ways that our affective states can directly influence our social judgments.
There are other, more indirect means by which this can happen, too. As well as affecting the content of our
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social judgments, our moods can also affect the types of cognitive strategies that we use to make them. Our
current mood, either positive or negative, can, for instance, influence our tendency to use more automatic versus
controlled thinking about our social worlds. For example, there is some evidence that being in a happy, as opposed
to a neutral, mood can actually make people more likely to rely on cognitive heuristics than on more effortful
strategies (Ruder & Bless, 2003). There are also indications that experiencing certain negative affective states, for
example anger, can cause individuals to make more stereotypical judgments of others, compared with individuals
who are in a neutral mood (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). So, being in particular affective states
may further increase the likelihood of us relying on heuristics, and these processes, as we have already seen, have
big effects on our social judgments.
Affect may also influence our social judgments indirectly by influencing the type of information that we draw
on. Our mood can, for example, affect both the type and intensity of our schemas that are active in particular
situations. For instance, when in an angry mood, we may find that our schemas relating to that emotion are more
active than those relating to other affective states, and these schemas will in turn influence our social judgments
(Lomax & Lam, 2011). In addition to influencing our schemas, our mood can also cause us to retrieve particular
types of memories that we then use to guide our social judgments. Mood-dependent memory describes a
tendency to better remember information when our current mood matches the mood we were in when we encoded
that information. For example, if we originally learned the information while experiencing positive affect, we will
tend to find it easier to retrieve and then use if we are currently also in a good mood. Similarly, mood congruence
effects occur when we are more able to retrieve memories that match our current mood. Have you ever noticed,
for example, that when you are feeling sad, that sad memories seem to come more readily to mind than happy
ones?
So, our affective states can influence our social cognition in multiple ways, but what about situations where our
cognition influences our mood? Here, too, we find some interesting relationships.
Cognition Influences Affect
Just as they have helped to illuminate some of the routes through which our moods influence our cognition,
so social cognitive researchers have also contributed to our knowledge of how our thoughts can change our
moods. Indeed, some researchers have argued that affective experiences are only possible following cognitive
appraisals. Although physiological arousal is necessary for emotion, many have argued that it is not sufficient
(Lazarus, 1984). Under this view, arousal becomes emotion only when it is accompanied by a label or by an
explanation for the arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962). If this is correct, then emotions have two factors—an
arousal factor and a cognitive factor (James, 1890; Schachter & Singer, 1962).
In some cases, it may be difficult for people who are experiencing a high level of arousal to accurately determine
which emotion they are experiencing. That is, they may be certain that they are feeling arousal, but the meaning
of the arousal (the cognitive factor) may be less clear. Some romantic relationships, for instance, are characterized
by high levels of arousal, and the partners alternately experience extreme highs and lows in the relationship.
One day they are madly in love with each other, and the next they are having a huge fight. In situations that
are accompanied by high arousal, people may be unsure what emotion they are experiencing. In the high-arousal
relationship, for instance, the partners may be uncertain whether the emotion they are feeling is love, hate, or both
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at the same time. Misattribution of arousal occurs when people incorrectly label the source of the arousal that
they are experiencing.
Research Focus
Misattributing Arousal
If you think a bit about your own experiences of different emotions, and if you consider the equation
that suggests that emotions are represented by both arousal and cognition, you might start to wonder how
much was determined by each. That is, do we know what emotion we are experiencing by monitoring our
feelings (arousal) or by monitoring our thoughts (cognition)?
Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962) addressed this question in a well-known social psychological
experiment. Schachter and Singer believed that the cognitive part of the emotion was critical—in fact, they
believed that the arousal that we are experiencing could be interpreted as any emotion, provided we had the
right label for it. Thus they hypothesized that if individuals are experiencing arousal for which they have
no immediate explanation, they will “label” this state in terms of the cognitions that are most accessible
in the environment. On the other hand, they argued that people who already have a clear label for their
arousal would have no need to search for a relevant label and therefore should not experience an emotion.
In the research experiment, the male participants were told that they would be participating in a study on
the effects of a new drug, called “suproxin,” on vision. On the basis of this cover story, the men were
injected with a shot of epinephrine, a drug that produces physiological arousal. The idea was to give all the
participants arousal; epinephrine normally creates feelings of tremors, flushing, and accelerated breathing
in people.
Then, according to random assignment to conditions, the men were told that the drug would make them
feel certain ways. The men in the epinephrine-informed condition were told the truth about the effects of
the drug—they were told that other participants had experienced tremors and that their hands would start
to shake, their hearts would start to pound, and their faces might get warm and flushed. The participants
in the epinephrine-uninformed condition, however, were told something untrue—that their feet would feel
numb, that they would have an itching sensation over parts of their body, and that they might get a slight
headache. The idea was to make some of the men think that the arousal they were experiencing was caused
by the drug (the informed condition), whereas others would be unsure where the arousal came from (the
uninformed condition).
Then the men were left alone with a confederate who they thought had received the same injection.
While they were waiting for the experiment (which was supposedly about vision) to begin, the confederate
behaved in a wild and crazy (Schachter and Singer called it “euphoric”) manner. He wadded up spitballs,
flew paper airplanes, and played with a hula hoop. He kept trying to get the participants to join in his
games. Then right before the vision experiment was to begin, the participants were asked to indicate their
current emotional states on a number of scales. One of the emotions they were asked about was euphoria.
If you are following the story here, you will realize what was expected—that the men who had a label
for their arousal (the informed group) would not be experiencing much emotion—they had a label already
available for their arousal. The men in the misinformed group, on the other hand, were expected to be
unsure about the source of the arousal—they needed to find an explanation for their arousal, and the
confederate provided one. Indeed, as you can see in Figure 2.17, “Misattributing Emotion,” this is just
what the researchers found.
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Then Schachter and Singer did another part of the study, using new participants. Everything was exactly
the same except for the behavior of the confederate. Rather than being euphoric, he acted angry. He
complained about having to complete the questionnaire he had been asked to do, indicating that the
questions were stupid and too personal. He ended up tearing up the questionnaire that he was working on,
yelling, “I don’t have to tell them that!” Then he grabbed his books and stormed out of the room.
What do you think happened in this condition? The answer, of course, is, exactly the same thing—the
misinformed participants experienced more anger than did the informed participants. The idea is that
because cognitions are such strong determinants of emotional states, the same state of physiological
arousal could be labeled in many different ways, depending entirely on the label provided by the social
situation. We will revisit the effects of misattribution of arousal when we consider sources of romantic
attraction.
Figure 2.17 Misattributing Emotion. The results of an experiment by Schachter and Singer (1962) supported the two-factor theory
of emotion. The participants who did not have a clear label for their arousal were more likely to take on the emotion of the
confederate.
So, our attribution of the sources of our arousal will often strongly influence the emotional states we experience in
social situations. How else might our cognition influence our affect? Another example is demonstrated in framing
effects, which occur when people’s judgments about different options are affected by whether they are framed
as resulting in gains or losses. In general, people feel more positive about options that are framed positively, as
opposed to negatively. For example, individuals seeking to eat healthily tend to feel more positive about a product
described as 95% fat free than one described as 5% fat, even though the information in the two messages is the
same. In the same way, people tend to prefer treatment options that stress survival rates as opposed to death rates.
Framing effects have been demonstrated in regards to numerous social issues, including judgments relating to
charitable donations (Chang & Lee, 2010) and green environmental practices (Tu, Kao, & Tu, 2013). In reference
to our chapter case study, they have also been implicated in decisions about risk in financial contexts and in the
explanation of market behaviors (Kirchler, Maciejovsky, & Weber, 2010).
Social psychologists have also studied how we use our cognitive faculties to try to control our emotions in social
situations, to prevent them from letting our behavior get out of control. The process of setting goals and using
our cognitive and affective capacities to reach those goals is known as self-regulation, and a good part of self-
regulation involves regulating our emotions. To be the best people that we possibly can, we have to work hard at
it. Succeeding at school, at work, and at our relationships with others takes a lot of effort. When we are successful
at self-regulation, we are able to move toward or meet the goals that we set for ourselves. When we fail at self-
regulation, we are not able to meet those goals. People who are better able to regulate their behaviors and emotions
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are more successful in their personal and social encounters (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992), and thus self-regulation is
a skill we should seek to master.
A significant part of our skill in self-regulation comes from the deployment of cognitive strategies to try to
harness positive emotions and to overcome more challenging ones. For example, to achieve our goals we often
have to stay motivated and to be persistent in the face of setbacks. If, for example, an employee has already
gone for a promotion at work and has been unsuccessful twice before, this could lead him or her to feel very
negative about his or her competence and the possibility of trying for promotion again, should an opportunity
arise. In these types of challenging situations, the strategy of cognitive reappraisal can be a very effective way of
coping. Cognitive reappraisal involves altering an emotional state by reinterpreting the meaning of the triggering
situation or stimulus. For example, if another promotion position does comes up, the employee could reappraise
it as an opportunity to be successful and focus on how the lessons learned in previous attempts could strengthen
his or her candidacy this time around. In this case, the employee would likely feel more positive towards the
opportunity and choose to go after it.
Using strategies like cognitive reappraisal to self-regulate negative emotional states and to exert greater self-
control in challenging situations has some important positive outcomes. Consider, for instance, research by Walter
Mischel and his colleagues (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). In their studies, they had four- and five-year-
old children sit at a table in front of a yummy snack, such as a chocolate chip cookie or a marshmallow. The
children were told that they could eat the snack right away if they wanted to. However, they were also told that if
they could wait for just a couple of minutes, they’d be able to have two snacks—both the one in front of them and
another just like it. However, if they ate the one that was in front of them before the time was up, they would not
get a second.
Mischel found that some children were able to self-regulate—they were able to use their cognitive abilities
to override the impulse to seek immediate gratification in order to obtain a greater reward at a later time.
Other children, of course, were not—they just ate the first snack right away. Furthermore, the inability to delay
gratification seemed to occur in a spontaneous and emotional manner, without much thought. The children who
could not resist simply grabbed the cookie because it looked so yummy, without being able to cognitively stop
themselves (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2007).
The ability to self-regulate in childhood has important consequences later in life. When Mischel followed up on
the children in his original study, he found that those who had been able to self-regulate as children grew up
to have some highly positive characteristics—they got better SAT scores, were rated by their friends as more
socially adept, and were found to cope with frustration and stress better than those children who could not resist
the tempting first cookie at a young age. Effective self-regulation is therefore an important key to success in life
(Ayduk et al., 2000; Eigsti et al., 2006; Mischel, Ayduk, & Mendoza-Denton, 2003).
Self-regulation is difficult, though, particularly when we are tired, depressed, or anxious, and it is under these
conditions that we more easily lose our self-control and fail to live up to our goals (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000). If you are tired and worried about an upcoming test, you may find yourself getting angry and taking it out
on your friend, even though your friend really hasn’t done anything to deserve it and you don’t really want to be
angry. It is no secret that we are more likely to fail at our diets when we are under a lot of stress or at night when
we are tired. In these challenging situations, and when our resources are particularly drained, the ability to use
cognitive strategies to successfully self-regulate becomes more even more important, and difficult.
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Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) conducted a study to demonstrate that emotion regulation—that is, either
increasing or decreasing our emotional responses—takes work. They speculated that self-control was like a
muscle—it just gets tired when it is used too much. In their experiment, they asked their participants to watch
a short movie about environmental disasters involving radioactive waste and their negative effects on wildlife.
The scenes included sick and dying animals, which were very upsetting. According to random assignment to
conditions, one group (the increase-emotional-response condition) was told to really get into the movie and
to express emotions in response to it, a second group was to hold back and decrease emotional responses
(the decrease-emotional-response condition), and a third (control) group received no instructions on emotion
regulation.
Both before and after the movie, the experimenter asked the participants to engage in a measure of physical
strength by squeezing as hard as they could on a hand-grip exerciser, a device used for building up hand muscles.
The experimenter put a piece of paper in the grip and timed how long the participants could hold the grip together
before the paper fell out. Table 2.2, “Self-Control Takes Effort,” shows the results of this study. It seems that
emotion regulation does indeed take effort because the participants who had been asked to control their emotions
showed significantly less ability to squeeze the hand grip after the movie than before. Thus the effort to regulate
emotional responses seems to have consumed resources, leaving the participants less capacity to make use of in
performing the hand-grip task.
Table 2.2 Self-Control Takes Effort
Condition Handgrip strength before movie Handgrip strength after movie Change
Increase emotional response 78.73 54.63 –25.1
No emotional control 60.09 58.52 –1.57
Decrease emotional response 70.74 52.25 –18.49
Participants who had been required to either express or refrain from expressing their emotions had less strength to
squeeze a hand grip after doing so. Data are from Muraven et al. (1998).
In other studies, people who had to resist the temptation to eat chocolates and cookies, who made important
decisions, or who were forced to conform to others all performed more poorly on subsequent tasks that took
energy in comparison to people who had not been emotionally taxed. After controlling their emotions, they gave
up on subsequent tasks sooner and failed to resist new temptations (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).
Can we improve our emotion regulation? It turns out that training in self-regulation—just like physical
training—can help. Students who practiced doing difficult tasks, such as exercising, avoiding swearing, or
maintaining good posture, were later found to perform better in laboratory tests of self-regulation (Baumeister,
Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007; Oaten & Cheng, 2006), such as
maintaining a diet or completing a puzzle.
The Power of Positive Cognition
You have probably heard about “the power of positive thinking”—the idea that thinking positively helps people
meet their goals and keeps them healthy, happy, and able to effectively cope with the negative events that they
experience. It turns out that positive thinking really works. People who think positively about their future, who
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believe that they can control their outcomes, and who are willing to open up and share with others are happier,
healthier people (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).
The power of positive thinking comes in different forms, but they are all helpful. Notwithstanding the potential
risks of wildly optimistic beliefs about the future, outlined earlier in this chapter, some researchers have studied
the effects of having an optimistic explanatory style, a way of explaining current outcomes affecting the self
in a way that leads to an expectation of positive future outcomes, and have found that optimists are happier
and have less stress (Carver & Scheier, 2009). Others have focused on self-efficacy, the belief in our ability to
carry out actions that produce desired outcomes. People with high self-efficacy feel more confident to respond
to environmental and other threats in an active, constructive way—by getting information, talking to friends, and
attempting to face and reduce the difficulties they are experiencing. These people, too, are better able to ward off
their stresses in comparison with people with less self-efficacy (Thompson, 2009).
Self-efficacy helps in part because it leads us to perceive that we can control the potential stressors that may
affect us. Workers who have control over their work environment (e.g., by being able to move furniture and
control distractions) experience less stress, as do patients in nursing homes who are able to choose their everyday
activities (Rodin, 1986). Glass, Reim, and Singer (1971) found in a study that participants who believed they
could stop a loud noise experienced less stress than those who did not think they could, even though the people
who had the option never actually used it. The ability to control our outcomes may help explain why animals and
people who have higher social status live longer (Sapolsky, 2005). Importantly, it is possible to learn to think more
positively, and doing so can be beneficial to our moods and behaviors. For example, Antoni et al. (2001) found
that pessimistic cancer patients who were given training in optimism reported more optimistic outlooks after the
training and were less fatigued after their treatments.
Cognition About Affect: The Case of Affective Forecasting
Another way in which our cognition intersects with our emotions occurs when we engage in affective
forecasting, which describes our attempts to predict how future events will make us feel. For example, we may
decide to apply for a promotion at work with a larger salary partly based on forecasting that the increased income
will make us happier. While it is true that we do need money to afford food and adequate shelter for ourselves and
our families, after this minimum level of wealth is reached, more money does not generally buy more happiness
(Easterlin, 2005). For instance, citizens in many countries today have several times the buying power they had in
previous decades, and yet overall reported happiness has not typically increased (Layard, 2005).
Psychologists have found that our affective forecasting is often not very accurate (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). For
one, we tend to overestimate our emotional reactions to events. Although we think that positive and negative
events that we might experience will make a huge difference in our lives, and although these changes do make at
least some difference in well-being, they tend to be less influential than we think they are going to be. Positive
events tend to make us feel good, but their effects wear off pretty quickly, and the same is true for negative events.
For instance, Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) interviewed people who had won more than $50,000
in a lottery and found that they were not happier than they had been in the past and were also not happier than
a control group of similar people who had not won the lottery. On the other hand, the researchers found that
individuals who were paralyzed as a result of accidents were not as unhappy as might be expected.
How can this possibly be? There are several reasons. For one, people are resilient; they bring their coping skills
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into play when negative events occur, and this makes them feel better. Second, most people do not continually
experience very positive or very negative affect over a long period of time but, rather, adapt to their current
circumstances. Just as we enjoy the second chocolate bar we eat less than we enjoy the first, as we experience
more and more positive outcomes in our daily lives, we habituate to them and our well-being returns to a more
moderate level (Small, Zatorre, Dagher, Evans, & Jones-Gotman, 2001). Another reason we may predict our
happiness incorrectly is that our social comparisons change when our own status changes as a result of new events.
People who are wealthy compare themselves with other wealthy people, people who are poor tend to compare
themselves with other poor people, and people who are ill tend to compare themselves with other ill people.
When our comparisons change, our happiness levels are correspondingly influenced. And when people are asked
to predict their future emotions, they may focus only on the positive or negative event they are asked about and
forget about all the other things that won’t change. Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, and Axsom (2000) found
that when people were asked to focus on all the more regular things that they will still be doing in the future (e.g.,
working, going to church, socializing with family and friends), their predictions about how something really good
or bad would influence them were less extreme.
If pleasure is fleeting, at least misery shares some of the same quality. We might think we can’t be happy if
something terrible were to happen to us, such as losing a partner, but after a period of adjustment, most people
find that happiness levels return to prior levels (Bonanno et al., 2002). Health concerns tend to decrease subjective
well-being, and those with a serious disability or illness show slightly lowered mood levels. But even when
health is compromised, levels of misery are lower than most people expect (Lucas, 2007). For instance, although
individuals with disabilities have more concern about health, safety, and acceptance in the community, they
still experience overall positive happiness levels (Marinić & Brkljačić, 2008). It has been estimated that taken
together, our wealth, health, and life circumstances account for only 15% to 20% of well-being scores (Argyle,
1999). Clearly, the main ingredient in happiness lies beyond, or perhaps beneath, external factors. For some
further perspectives on our affective forecasting abilities, and their implications for the study of happiness, see
Daniel Gilbert’s popular TED Talk at: http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_gilbert_asks_why_are_we_happy
Having reviewed some of the literature on the interplay between social cognition and affect, it is clear that we
must be mindful of how our thoughts and moods shape one another, and, in turn, affect our evaluations of our
social worlds.
Key Takeaways
• Our current affective states profoundly shape our social cognition.
• Our cognitive processes, in turn, influence our affective states.
• Our ability to forecast our future emotional states is often less accurate than we think.
• The better we understand these links between our cognition and affect, the better we can
harness both to reach our social goals.
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Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Describe a time when you feel that the affect heuristic played a big part in a social judgment
or decision that you made. What impact did this heuristic have? Looking back, how sound
was the judgment or decision that you made and why?
2. Outline a situation where you experienced either mood-dependent memory or the mood-
congruence effect. What effects did this then have on your affect and social cognition?
3. Describe a situation where you feel that you may have misattributed the source of an
emotional state you experienced. Who or what did you misattribute the arousal to and
why? In hindsight, who or what do you think was the actual source of your arousal? With this
knowledge, outline how the emotion you experienced at the time may have been different if
you had made a correct source attribution.
4. Outline a situation that you interpreted in an optimistic way and describe how you feel that
this then affected your future outcomes.
5. Describe an instance where you feel that your affective forecasting about how a future event
would make you feel was particularly inaccurate. Try to identify the reasons why your
predictions were so far off the mark.
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Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about Social Cognition
Consider your schemas and attitudes toward some of the many people you have met in your life—perhaps those
you knew in school, the people in your family, or those in your wider social groups or other organizations. And
also think about people you have only heard about rather than have met—maybe those from other countries or
cultures. Did operant learning influence your opinions about them? Did you model your behavior after them? Or
perhaps you had a single negative encounter with one person and disliked that person or his or her social group
for a long time after.
Perhaps you can remember some times when you may have misinterpreted events or judged people incorrectly
because your opinions were influenced by the operation of your existing expectations. Did you ever falsely
assume that someone had a given characteristic and assimilate information into your existing expectations more
than you might have? For instance, did you ever find yourself thinking that the referees in a sports game were
favoring the other team rather than your own, or that the media was treating the political candidate that you
oppose better than the one you prefer? Could this have occurred because your attitudes or beliefs influenced your
interpretation of the information?
And perhaps you can remember times when you were influenced by salience, accessibility, or other information-
processing biases. Did you ever feel bad when you got a 94 on your test when a 95 would have given you an A,
or when you changed an answer on an exam rather than sticking with it? In these cases, you might have fallen
victim to counterfactual thinking. Perhaps you erroneously judged someone on the basis of your beliefs about
what they “should have been like” rather than on the basis of more accurate statistical information—the misuse of
the representativeness heuristic.
Maybe you can now more fully reflect on all the ways in which your social cognition and affective states influence
each other, and just how intertwined they are in understanding your social worlds.
Finally, think back once more on the story with which we opened this chapter. Can you see how important social
cognitive biases can be in how we understand the world we live in, and how useful it is to understand the ways
in which our thinking operates to produce accurate, and yet sometimes inaccurate, judgments? In many ways, our
lives are influenced by our social cognition.
We hope that this chapter has provided you with some new and useful ideas about how you and others form
impressions and has reminded you how others are forming (potentially erroneous) impressions of you. Most
important, perhaps you have learned to be more modest about your judgments. Please remember to consider the
possibility that your judgments and decisions, no matter how right and accurate they feel to you, may simply be
wrong.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter has focused primarily on one central topic in social psychology: namely, the ways that we learn
about and judge other people—our social cognition. The ability to make accurate judgments about our social
situation is critical. For example, if we cannot understand others and predict how they will respond to us, our
social interactions will be difficult indeed.
We have seen that social cognition is efficient, frequently operating quickly and even out of our awareness, and
generally accurate. However, although we are often quite accurate at evaluating other people and in creating
effective social interactions, we are not perfect. The errors we make frequently occur because of our reliance
on our mental knowledge (our schemas and attitudes) as well our tendency to take shortcuts through the use of
cognitive heuristics. We use schemas and heuristics as energy savers, because we are often overwhelmed by the
amount of information we need to process.
Social knowledge is gained as the result of learning—the relatively permanent change in thoughts, feelings,
or behavior that occurs as a result of experience. Some learning is based on the principles of operant
learning—experiences that are followed by positive emotions (rewards) are more likely to be repeated, whereas
experiences that are followed by negative emotions (punishments) are less likely to be repeated. Associational
learning occurs when an object or event comes to be associated with a response, such as a behavior or a positive
or negative emotion. We also learn through observational learning by modeling the behavior of others.
Accommodation occurs when our existing schemas or attitudes change on the basis of new information.
Assimilation, on the other hand, occurs when our existing knowledge influences new information in a way that
makes the conflicting information fit with our existing knowledge. Assimilation is often more powerful than is
accommodation.
Much of our social cognition is automatic, meaning that it occurs quickly and without taking much effort. In other
cases, when we have the time and motivation, we think about things more deliberately and carefully. In this case,
we are engaging in more thoughtful, controlled cognition.
We pay particular attention to stimuli that are salient—things that are unique, negative, colorful, bright, and
moving. In many cases, we base our judgments on information that seems to represent, or match, what we expect
will happen. When we do so, we are using the representativeness heuristic.
Cognitive accessibility refers to the extent to which knowledge is activated in memory and thus likely to be used to
guide our reactions to others. The tendency to overuse accessible social constructs can lead to errors in judgment,
such as the availability heuristic and the false consensus bias. Counterfactual thinking about what might have
happened and the tendency to anchor on an initial construct and not adjust sufficiently from it are also influenced
by cognitive accessibility. We also have a tendency to be overconfident in our judgments of ourselves, others,
and the future. We should also be mindful that we tend to have blind spots about our own biases and how much
they affect our social cognition. Perhaps the best hope, then, for us going forward is that we become better at
recognizing and challenging biases in each other’s thinking.
Ultimately, perhaps we can use our understanding of social cognition to understand more fully how we think
accurately—but also sometimes inaccurately—about ourselves and others.
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3. The Self
Chapter Learning Objectives
1. The Cognitive Self: The Self-Concept
• Define and describe the self-concept, its influence on information processing, and its diversity
across social groups.
• Describe the concepts of self-complexity and self-concept clarity, and explain how they
influence social cognition and behavior.
• Differentiate the various types of self-awareness and self-consciousness.
• Describe self-awareness, self-discrepancy, and self-affirmation theories, and their
interrelationships.
• Explore how we sometimes overestimate the accuracy with which other people view us.
2. The Feeling Self: Self-Esteem
• Define self-esteem and explain how it is measured by social psychologists.
• Explore findings indicating diversity in self-esteem in relation to culture, gender, and age.
• Provide examples of ways that people attempt to increase and maintain their self-esteem.
• Outline the benefits of having high self-esteem.
• Review the limits of self-esteem, with a focus on the negative aspects of narcissism.
3. The Social Self: The Role of the Social Situation
• Describe the concept of the looking-glass self and how it affects our self-concept.
• Explore the impact of the labeling bias, self-labeling, and internalized prejudice on people’s
self-concepts, particularly in those from marginalized social groups.
• Define social comparison, and summarize how people use it to define their self-concepts and
self-esteem.
• Give examples of the use of upward and downward social comparison and their influences on
social cognition and affect.
• Explain the concept of social identity and why it is important to human behavior.
• Describe how self-evaluation maintenance theory helps to explain how we react when other
people’s behaviors threaten our sense of self.
• Describe the concept of self-presentation and the various strategies we use to portray
ourselves to others.
• Outline the concept of reputation management and how it relates to self-presentation.
• Discuss the individual-difference variable of self-monitoring and how it relates to the ability
and desire to self-present.
Social Media – Living Our Social Lives Online
Recent statistics suggest that there are around 2.5 billion global Internet users as of 2014 – roughly 35
percent of the world’s population. Some sources suggest the true figure to be closer to 3 billion people, and
this number will likely continue to grow, particularly with the increasing availability of mobile technology.
Figure 3.1. Girl on Cellphone. Tween Texting (https://flic.kr/p/9qQCYc) by Carissa Rogers (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
goodncrazy/) under CC BY (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)
As well as having increased access to the Internet, people across all regions of the globe are spending
greater amounts of their time online. Many recent studies in a large number of countries indicate that
people are spending several hours every day online, on their PCs, laptops, and mobiles. Of that time online,
often more than 20 percent is spent on social networking sites. Facebook, QZone, Google+, LinkedIn,
Twitter, Tumblr, and Tencent Weibo all had more than 200 million registered users by 2014. Facebook
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alone now has more than 1 billion users. These social networking users are also drawn from increasingly
diverse demographic groups.
Social psychologists have become very interested in why and how so many of us are conducting increasing
amounts of our social interactions online, and on social networking sites in particular. Like any social
context in the offline world, sites like Facebook and Twitter provide an environment where a huge range
of human social cognition, affect, and behavior can be displayed, with everything from posting selfies and
status updates about wild nights out to communicating our views about social issues.
One area of social psychology that seems particularly relevant to these online activities is the study of the
self—our thoughts and feelings about who we are and the social influences on them. In many ways, the
online social behaviors outlined above both affect and are a result of people’s perceptions of and feelings
about themselves, and their desire to project those selves out into the social worlds that they belong to.
Often, these dynamics in our online lives mirror those that social psychologists have long been aware of as
operating in our offline existences. We will thus explore the various aspects of the self in relation to both
our offline and online social lives throughout this chapter.
Source: http://wearesocial.net/blog/2014/01/social-digital-mobile-worldwide-2014/
At the foundation of all human behavior is the self—our sense of personal identity and of who we are as
individuals. Because an understanding of the self is so important, it has been studied for many years by
psychologists (James, 1890; Mead, 1934) and is still one of the most important and most researched topics in
social psychology (Dweck & Grant, 2008; Taylor & Sherman, 2008). Social psychologists conceptualize the
self using the basic principles of social psychology—that is, the relationship between individual persons and
the people around them (the person-situation interaction) and the ABCs of social psychology—the affective,
behavioral, and cognitive components of the self.
In this chapter, we will first consider the cognitive aspects of the self, including the self-concept (the thoughts
that we hold about ourselves) and self-awareness (the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our
own self-concept). Then we will move on to the role of affect, focusing on concepts including self-esteem (the
positive or negative feelings that we have about ourselves) and the many ways that we try to gain positive self-
esteem. Finally, we will consider the social aspects of the self, including how we present ourselves to others in
order to portray a positive self-image, as well as the many ways that our thoughts and feelings about ourselves are
determined by our relationships with others.
References
Dweck, C. S., & Grant, H. (2008). Self-theories, goals, and meaning. In J. Y. Shah, W. L. Gardner, J. Y. E.
Shah, & W. L. E. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 405–416). New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York, NY: Dover. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self,
and society. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. University of
Chicago Press: Chicago.
3. THE SELF • 111
Taylor, S. E., & Sherman, D. K. (2008). Self-enhancement and self-affirmation: The consequences of
positive self-thoughts for motivation and health. In J. Y. Shah, W. L. Gardner, J. Y. E. Shah, & W. L. E.
Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 57–70). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
112 • PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY - 1ST INTERNATIONAL EDITION
The Cognitive Self: The Self-Concept
Learning Objectives
1. Define and describe the self-concept, its influence on information processing, and its diversity
across social groups.
2. Describe the concepts of self-complexity and self-concept clarity, and explain how they
influence social cognition and behavior.
3. Differentiate the various types of self-awareness and self-consciousness.
4. Describe self-awareness, self-discrepancy, and self-affirmation theories, and their
interrelationships.
5. Explore how we sometimes overestimate the accuracy with which other people view us.
Some nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and perhaps dolphins, have at least a primitive
sense of self (Boysen & Himes, 1999). We know this because of some interesting experiments that have been
done with animals. In one study (Gallup, 1970), researchers painted a red dot on the forehead of anesthetized
chimpanzees and then placed the animals in a cage with a mirror. When the chimps woke up and looked in the
mirror, they touched the dot on their faces, not the dot on the faces in the mirror. This action suggests that the
chimps understood that they were looking at themselves and not at other animals, and thus we can assume that
they are able to realize that they exist as individuals. Most other animals, including dogs, cats, and monkeys, never
realize that it is themselves they see in a mirror.
Figure 3.2 A simple test of self-awareness is the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror. Humans and chimpanzees can pass the test; dogs
never do.
Getting ready by Flavia (https://www.flickr.com/photos/mistressf/3068196530/) used under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/). Mirror mirror by rromer (https://www.flickr.com/photos/rromer/6309501395/)
used under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/). Quite Reflection by Valerie
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/ucumari/374017970/in/photostream/) used under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/). Toddler in mirror by Samantha Steele (https://www.flickr.com/photos/samanthasteele/3983047059/) used under CC
BY-NC-ND 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/)
Infants who have similar red dots painted on their foreheads recognize themselves in a mirror in the same way that
chimps do, and they do this by about 18 months of age (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996; Povinelli,
Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). The child’s knowledge about the self continues to develop as the child grows. By
two years of age, the infant becomes aware of his or her gender as a boy or a girl. At age four, the child’s self-
descriptions are likely to be based on physical features, such as hair color, and by about age six, the child is able to
understand basic emotions and the concepts of traits, being able to make statements such as “I am a nice person”
(Harter, 1998).
By the time children are in grade school, they have learned that they are unique individuals, and they can think
about and analyze their own behavior. They also begin to show awareness of the social situation—they understand
that other people are looking at and judging them the same way that they are looking at and judging others
(Doherty, 2009).
Development and Characteristics of the Self-Concept
Part of what is developing in children as they grow is the fundamental cognitive part of the self, known as the self-
concept. The self-concept is a knowledge representation that contains knowledge about us, including our beliefs
about our personality traits, physical characteristics, abilities, values, goals, and roles, as well as the knowledge
that we exist as individuals. Throughout childhood and adolescence, the self-concept becomes more abstract and
complex and is organized into a variety of different cognitive aspects of the self, known as self-schemas. Children
have self-schemas about their progress in school, their appearance, their skills at sports and other activities, and
many other aspects. In turn, these self-schemas direct and inform their processing of self-relevant information
(Harter, 1999), much as we saw schemas in general affecting our social cognition.
These self-schemas can be studied using the methods that we would use to study any other schema. One approach
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is to use neuroimaging to directly study the self in the brain. As you can see in Figure 3.3, neuroimaging studies
have shown that information about the self is stored in the prefrontal cortex, the same place that other information
about people is stored (Barrios et al., 2008).
Figure 3.3 This figure shows the areas of the human brain that are known to be important in processing information about the self. They
include primarily areas of the prefrontal cortex (areas 1, 2, 4, and 5). Data are from Lieberman (2010)
Another approach to studying the self is to investigate how we attend to and remember things that relate to the
self. Indeed, because the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, it has an extraordinary degree of
influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Have you ever been at a party where there was a lot of noise
and bustle, and yet you were surprised to discover that you could easily hear your own name being mentioned in
the background? Because our own name is such an important part of our self-concept, and because we value it
highly, it is highly accessible. We are very alert for, and react quickly to, the mention of our own name.
Other research has found that information related to the self-schema is better remembered than information that
is unrelated to it, and that information related to the self can also be processed very quickly (Lieberman, Jarcho,
& Satpute, 2004). In one classic study that demonstrated the importance of the self-schema, Rogers, Kuiper, and
Kirker (1977) conducted an experiment to assess how college students recalled information that they had learned
under different processing conditions. All the participants were presented with the same list of 40 adjectives
to process, but through the use of random assignment, the participants were given one of four different sets of
instructions about how to process the adjectives.
Participants assigned to the structural task condition were asked to judge whether the word was printed in
uppercase or lowercase letters. Participants in the phonemic task condition were asked whether the word rhymed
with another given word. In the semantic task condition, the participants were asked if the word was a synonym
of another word. And in the self-reference task condition, participants indicated whether the given adjective was
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or was not true of themselves. After completing the specified task, each participant was asked to recall as many
adjectives as he or she could remember. Rogers and his colleagues hypothesized that different types of processing
would have different effects on memory. As you can see in Figure 3.4, “The Self-Reference Effect,” the students
in the self-reference task condition recalled significantly more adjectives than did students in any other condition.
Figure 3.4 The Self-Reference Effect
The chart shows the proportion of adjectives that students were able to recall under each of four learning
conditions. The same words were recalled significantly better when they were processed in relation to the self
than when they were processed in other ways. Data from Rogers et al. (1977).
The finding that information that is processed in relationship to the self is particularly well remembered, known as
the self-reference effect, is powerful evidence that the self-concept helps us organize and remember information.
The next time you are studying, you might try relating the material to your own experiences—the self-reference
effect suggests that doing so will help you better remember the information.
The specific content of our self-concept powerfully affects the way that we process information relating to
ourselves. But how can we measure that specific content? One way is by using self-report tests. One of these is a
deceptively simple fill-in-the-blank measure that has been widely used by many scientists to get a picture of the
self-concept (Rees & Nicholson, 1994). All of the 20 items in the measure are exactly the same, but the person is
asked to fill in a different response for each statement. This self-report measure, known as the Twenty Statements
Test (TST), can reveal a lot about a person because it is designed to measure the most accessible—and thus the
most important—parts of a person’s self-concept. Try it for yourself, at least five times:
• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________
• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________
• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________
• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________
• I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________
Although each person has a unique self-concept, we can identify some characteristics that are common across the
responses given by different people on the measure. Physical characteristics are an important component of the
self-concept, and they are mentioned by many people when they describe themselves. If you’ve been concerned
lately that you’ve been gaining weight, you might write, “I am overweight.” If you think you’re particularly good
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looking (“I am attractive”), or if you think you’re too short (“I am too short”), those things might have been
reflected in your responses. Our physical characteristics are important to our self-concept because we realize that
other people use them to judge us. People often list the physical characteristics that make them different from
others in either positive or negative ways (“I am blond,” “I am short”), in part because they understand that these
characteristics are salient and thus likely to be used by others when judging them (McGuire, McGuire, Child, &
Fujioka, 1978).
A second aspect of the self-concept relating to personal characteristics is made up of personality traits—the
specific and stable personality characteristics that describe an individual (“I am friendly,” “I am shy,” “I
am persistent”). These individual differences are important determinants of behavior, and this aspect of the self-
concept varies among people.
The remainder of the self-concept reflects its more external, social components; for example, memberships in
the social groups that we belong to and care about. Common responses for this component may include “I am
an artist,” “I am Jewish,” and “I am a mother, sister, daughter.” As we will see later in this chapter, group
memberships form an important part of the self-concept because they provide us with our social identity—the
sense of our self that involves our memberships in social groups.
Although we all define ourselves in relation to these three broad categories of characteristics—physical,
personality, and social – some interesting cultural differences in the relative importance of these categories have
been shown in people’s responses to the TST. For example, Ip and Bond (1995) found that the responses from
Asian participants included significantly more references to themselves as occupants of social roles (e.g., “I
am Joyce’s friend”) or social groups (e.g., “I am a member of the Cheng family”) than those of American
participants. Similarly, Markus and Kitayama (1991) reported that Asian participants were more than twice as
likely to include references to other people in their self-concept than did their Western counterparts. This greater
emphasis on either external and social aspects of the self-concept reflects the relative importance that collectivistic
and individualistic cultures place on an interdependence versus independence (Nisbett, 2003).
Interestingly, bicultural individuals who report acculturation to both collectivist and individualist cultures show
shifts in their self-concept depending on which culture they are primed to think about when completing the TST.
For example, Ross, Xun, & Wilson (2002) found that students born in China but living in Canada reported more
interdependent aspects of themselves on the TST when asked to write their responses in Chinese, as opposed to
English. These culturally different responses to the TST are also related to a broader distinction in self-concept,
with people from individualistic cultures often describing themselves using internal characteristics that emphasize
their uniqueness, compared with those from collectivistic backgrounds who tend to stress shared social group
memberships and roles. In turn, this distinction can lead to important differences in social behavior.
One simple yet powerful demonstration of cultural differences in self-concept affecting social behavior is shown
in a study that was conducted by Kim and Markus (1999). In this study, participants were contacted in the waiting
area of the San Francisco airport and asked to fill out a short questionnaire for the researcher. The participants
were selected according to their cultural background: about one-half of them indicated they were European
Americans whose parents were born in the United States, and the other half indicated they were Asian Americans
whose parents were born in China and who spoke Chinese at home. After completing the questionnaires (which
were not used in the data analysis except to determine the cultural backgrounds), participants were asked if
they would like to take a pen with them as a token of appreciation. The experimenter extended his or her hand,
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which contained five pens. The pens offered to the participants were either three or four of one color and one
or two of another color (the ink in the pens was always black). As shown in Figure 3.5, “Cultural Differences
in Desire for Uniqueness,” and consistent with the hypothesized preference for uniqueness in Western, but not
Eastern, cultures, the European Americans preferred to take a pen with the more unusual color, whereas the Asian
American participants preferred one with the more common color.
Figure 3.5 Cultural Differences in Desire for Uniqueness
In this study, participants from European American and East Asian cultures were asked to choose a pen as a token
of appreciation for completing a questionnaire. There were either four pens of one color and one of another color,
or three pens of one color and two of another. European Americans were significantly more likely to choose the
more uncommon pen color in both cases. Data are from Kim and Markus (1999, Experiment 3).
Cultural differences in self-concept have even been found in people’s self-descriptions on social networking sites.
DeAndrea, Shaw, and Levine (2010) examined individuals’ free-text self-descriptions in the About Me section
in their Facebook profiles. Consistent with the researchers’ hypotheses, and with previous research using the
TST, African American participants had the most the most independently (internally) described self-concepts,
and Asian Americans had the most interdependent (external) self-descriptions, with European Americans in the
middle.
As well as indications of cultural diversity in the content of the self-concept, there is also evidence of parallel
gender diversity between males and females from various cultures, with females, on average, giving more external
and social responses to the TST than males (Kashima et al., 1995). Interestingly, these gender differences have
been found to be more apparent in individualistic nations than in collectivistic nations (Watkins et al., 1998).
Self-Complexity and Self-Concept Clarity
As we have seen, the self-concept is a rich and complex social representation of who we are, encompassing both
our internal characteristics and our social roles. In addition to our thoughts about who we are right now, the self-
concept also includes thoughts about our past self—our experiences, accomplishments, and failures—and about
our future self—our hopes, plans, goals, and possibilities (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004). The
multidimensional nature of our self-concept means that we need to consider not just each component in isolation,
but also their interactions with each other and their overall structure. Two particularly important structural aspects
of our self-concept are complexity and clarity.
Although every human being has a complex self-concept, there are nevertheless individual differences in self-
complexity, the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking
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about themselves (Linville, 1987; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Some selves are more complex than others, and these
individual differences can be important in determining psychological outcomes. Having a complex self means that
we have a lot of different ways of thinking about ourselves. For example, imagine a woman whose self-concept
contains the social identities of student, girlfriend, daughter, psychology student, and tennis player and who has
encountered a wide variety of life experiences. Social psychologists would say that she has high self-complexity.
On the other hand, a man who perceives himself primarily as either a student or as a member of the soccer team
and who has had a relatively narrow range of life experiences would be said to have low self-complexity. For
those with high self-complexity, the various aspects of the self are separate, as the positive and negative thoughts
about a particular self-aspect do not spill over into thoughts about other aspects.
Research has found that compared with people low in self-complexity, those higher in self-complexity tend to
experience more positive outcomes, including higher levels of self-esteem (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002),
lower levels of stress and illness (Kalthoff & Neimeyer, 1993), and a greater tolerance for frustration (Gramzow,
Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000).
The benefits of self-complexity occur because the various domains of the self help to buffer us against negative
events and enjoy the positive events that we experience. For people low in self-complexity, negative outcomes in
relation to one aspect of the self tend to have a big impact on their self-esteem. For example, if the only thing that
Maria cares about is getting into medical school, she may be devastated if she fails to make it. On the other hand,
Marty, who is also passionate about medical school but who has a more complex self-concept, may be better able
to adjust to such a blow by turning to other interests.
Although having high self-complexity seems useful overall, it does not seem to help everyone equally in their
response to all events (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). People with high self-complexity seem to react more
positively to the good things that happen to them but not necessarily less negatively to the bad things. And the
positive effects of self-complexity are stronger for people who have other positive aspects of the self as well.
This buffering effect is stronger for people with high self-esteem, whose self-complexity involves positive rather
than negative characteristics (Koch & Shepperd, 2004), and for people who feel that they have control over their
outcomes (McConnell et al., 2005).
Just as we may differ in the complexity of our self-concept, so we may also differ in its clarity. Self-concept
clarity is the extent to which one’s self-concept is clearly and consistently defined (Campbell, 1990).
Theoretically, the concepts of complexity and clarity are independent of each other—a person could have either
a more or less complex self-concept that is either well defined and consistent, or ill defined and inconsistent.
However, in reality, they each have similar relationships to many indices of well-being.
For example, as has been found with self-complexity, higher self-concept clarity is positively related to self-
esteem (Campbell et al., 1996). Why might this be? Perhaps people with higher self-esteem tend to have a
more well-defined and stable view of their positive qualities, whereas those with lower self-esteem show more
inconsistency and instability in their self-concept, which is then more vulnerable to being negatively affected
by challenging situations. Consistent with this assertion, self-concept clarity appears to mediate the relationship
between stress and well-being (Ritchie et al., 2011).
Also, having a clear and stable view of ourselves can help us in our relationships. Lewandowski, Nardine, and
Raines (2010) found a positive correlation between clarity and relationship satisfaction, as well as a significant
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increase in reported satisfaction following an experimental manipulation of participants’ self-concept clarity.
Greater clarity may promote relationship satisfaction in a number of ways. As Lewandowski and
colleagues (2010) argue, when we have a clear self-concept, we may be better able to consistently communicate
who we are and what we want to our partner, which will promote greater understanding and satisfaction. Also,
perhaps when we feel clearer about who we are, then we feel less of a threat to our self-concept and autonomy
when we find ourselves having to make compromises in our close relationships.
Thinking back to the cultural differences we discussed earlier in this section in the context of people’s self-
concepts, it could be that self-concept clarity is generally higher in individuals from individualistic cultures, as
their self-concept is based more on internal characteristics that are held to be stable across situations, than on
external social facets of the self that may be more changeable. This is indeed what the research suggests. Not only
do members of more collectivistic cultures tend to have lower self-concept clarity, that clarity is also less strongly
related to their self-esteem compared with those from more individualistic cultures (Campbell et al., 1996). As
we shall see when our attention turns to perceiving others in Chapter 5, our cultural background not only affects
the clarity and consistency of how we see ourselves, but also how consistently we view other people and their
behavior.
Self-Awareness
Like any other schema, the self-concept can vary in its current cognitive accessibility. Self-awareness refers to
the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept. When our self-concept becomes
highly accessible because of our concerns about being observed and potentially judged by others, we experience
the publicly induced self-awareness known as self-consciousness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Rochat, 2009).
Perhaps you can remember times when your self-awareness was increased and you became self-conscious—for
instance, when you were giving a presentation and you were perhaps painfully aware that everyone was looking
at you, or when you did something in public that embarrassed you. Emotions such as anxiety and embarrassment
occur in large part because the self-concept becomes highly accessible, and they serve as a signal to monitor and
perhaps change our behavior.
Not all aspects of our self-concept are equally accessible at all times, and these long-term differences in the
accessibility of the different self-schemas help create individual differences in terms of, for instance, our current
concerns and interests. You may know some people for whom the physical appearance component of the self-
concept is highly accessible. They check their hair every time they see a mirror, worry whether their clothes are
making them look good, and do a lot of shopping—for themselves, of course. Other people are more focused on
their social group memberships—they tend to think about things in terms of their role as Muslims or Christians,
for example, or as members of the local tennis or soccer team.
In addition to variation in long-term accessibility, the self and its various components may also be made
temporarily more accessible through priming. We become more self-aware when we are in front of a mirror, when
a TV camera is focused on us, when we are speaking in front of an audience, or when we are listening to our own
tape-recorded voice (Kernis & Grannemann, 1988). When the knowledge contained in the self-schema becomes
more accessible, it also becomes more likely to be used in information processing and to influence our behavior.
Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979) conducted a field experiment to see if self-awareness would
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influence children’s honesty. The researchers expected that most children viewed stealing as wrong but that they
would be more likely to act on this belief when they were more self-aware. They conducted this experiment on
Halloween in homes within the city of Seattle, Washington. At particular houses, children who were trick-or-
treating were greeted by one of the experimenters, shown a large bowl of candy, and were told to take only one
piece each. The researchers unobtrusively watched each child to see how many pieces he or she actually took. In
some of the houses there was a large mirror behind the candy bowl; in other houses, there was no mirror. Out of
the 363 children who were observed in the study, 19% disobeyed instructions and took more than one piece of
candy. However, the children who were in front of a mirror were significantly less likely to steal (14.4%) than
were those who did not see a mirror (28.5%).
These results suggest that the mirror activated the children’s self-awareness, which reminded them of their belief
about the importance of being honest. Other research has shown that being self-aware has a powerful influence on
other behaviors as well. For instance, people are more likely to stay on a diet, eat better food, and act more morally
overall when they are self-aware (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007; Heatherton, Polivy, Herman, & Baumeister,
1993). What this means is that when you are trying to stick to a diet, study harder, or engage in other difficult
behaviors, you should try to focus on yourself and the importance of the goals you have set.
Social psychologists are interested in studying self-awareness because it has such an important influence on
behavior. People become more likely to violate acceptable, mainstream social norms when, for example, they put
on a Halloween mask or engage in other behaviors that hide their identities. For example, the members of the
militant White supremacist organization the Ku Klux Klan wear white robes and hats when they meet and when
they engage in their racist behavior. And when people are in large crowds, such as in a mass demonstration or a
riot, they may become so much a part of the group that they experience deindividuation—the loss of individual
self-awareness and individual accountability in groups (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969)
and become more attuned to themselves as group members and to the specific social norms of the particular
situation (Reicher & Stott, 2011).
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Figure 3.6 Examples of situations that may create deindividuation include wearing uniforms that hide the self and alcohol intoxication.
08KKKfamilyPortrait by Image Editor (http://www.flickr.com/photos/11304375@N07/2534972038) used under CC BY 2.0 license
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/). Catholic clergy and Nazi official (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:CatholicClergyAndNaziOfficials.jpg) is in the public domain. Eric Church by Larry Darling (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
tncountryfan/6171754005/) used under CC BY-NC 2.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/)
Social Psychology in the Public Interest
Deindividuation and Rioting
Rioting occurs when civilians engage in violent public disturbances. The targets of these disturbances can be
people in authority, other civilians, or property. The triggers for riots are varied, including everything from the
aftermath of sporting events, to the killing of a civilian by law enforcement officers, to commodity shortages,
to political oppression. Both civilians and law enforcement personnel are frequently seriously injured or killed
during riots, and the damage to public property can be considerable.
Social psychologists, like many other academics, have long been interested in the forces that shape rioting
behavior. One of the earliest and most influential perspectives on rioting was offered by French sociologist,
Gustav Le Bon (1841–1931). In his book The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, Le Bon (1895) described
the transformation of the individual in the crowd. According to Le Bon, the forces of anonymity, suggestibility,
and contagion combine to change a collection of individuals into a “psychological crowd.” Under this view, the
individuals then become submerged in the crowd, lose self-control, and engage in antisocial behaviors.
Some of the early social psychological accounts of rioting focused in particular on the concept of deindividuation
as a way of trying to account for the forces that Le Bon described. Festinger et al. (1952), for instance, argued
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that members of large groups do not pay attention to other people as individuals and do not feel that their
own behavior is being scrutinized. Under this view, being unidentified and thereby unaccountable has the
psychological consequence of reducing inner restraints and increasing behavior that is usually repressed, such as
that often seen in riots.
Extending these ideas, Zimbardo (1969) argued that deindividuation involved feelings of reduced self-
observation, which then bring about antinormative and disinhibited behavior. In support of this position, he
found that participants engaged in more antisocial behavior when their identity was made anonymous by wearing
Ku Klux Klan uniforms. However, in the context of rioting, these perspectives, which focus on behaviors
that are antinormative (e.g., aggressive behavior is typically antinormative), neglect the possibility that they
might actually be normative in the particular situation. For example, during some riots, antisocial behavior
can be viewed as a normative response to injustice or oppression. Consistent with this assertion, Johnson and
Downing (1979) found that when participants were able to mask their identities by wearing nurses uniforms, their
deindividuated state actually led them to show more prosocial behavior than when their identities were visible to
others. In other words, if the group situation is associated with more prosocial norms, deindividuation can actually
increase these behaviors, and therefore does not inevitably lead to antisocial conduct.
Building on these findings, researchers have developed more contemporary accounts of deindividuation and
rioting. One particularly important approach has been the social identity model of deindividuation effects (or
SIDE model), developed by Reicher, Spears, and Postmes (1995). This perspective argues that being in a
deindividuated state can actually reinforce group salience and conformity to specific group norms in the current
situation. According to this model, deindividuation does not, then, lead to a loss of identity per se. Instead, people
take on a more collective identity. Seen in this way, rioting behavior is more about the conscious adoption of
behaviors reflecting collective identity than the abdication of personal identity and responsibility outlined in the
earlier perspectives on deindividuation.
In support of the SIDE model, although crowd behavior during riots might seem mindless, antinormative, and
disinhibited to the outside observer, to those taking part it is often perceived as rational, normative, and subject to
well-defined limits (Reicher, 1987). For instance, when law enforcement officers are the target of rioters, then any
targeting of other civilians by rioters is often condemned and policed by the group members themselves (Reicher
& Stott, 2011). Indeed, as Fogelson (1971) concluded in his analysis of rioting in the United States in the 1960s,
restraint and selectivity, as opposed to mindless and indiscriminate violence, were among the most crucial features
of the riots.
Seeing rioting in this way, as a rational, normative response, Reicher and Stott (2011) describe it as being
caused by a number of interlocking factors, including a sense of illegitimacy or grievance, a lack of alternatives
to confrontation, the formation of a shared identity, and a sense of confidence in collective power. Viewing
deindividuation as a force that causes people to increase their sense of collective identity and then to express that
identity in meaningful ways leads to some important recommendations for controlling rioting more effectively,
including that:
• Labeling rioters as “mindless,” “thugs,” and so on will not address the underlying causes of riots.
• Indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force by police will often lead to an escalation of rioting
behavior.
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• Law enforcement personnel should allow legitimate and legal protest behaviors to occur during riots,
and only illegal and inappropriate behaviors should be targeted.
• Police officers should communicate their intentions to crowds before using force.
Tellingly, in analyses of the policing of high-risk rioting situations, when police follow these guidelines, riots are
often prevented altogether, or at least de-escalated relatively quickly (Reicher & Stott, 2011). Thus, the social
psychological research on deindividuation has not only helped us to refine our understanding of this concept, but
has also led us to better understand the social dynamics of rioting behavior. Ultimately, this increased
understanding has helped to put more effective strategies in place for reducing the risks to people and property
that riots bring.
Two aspects of individual differences in self-awareness have been found to be important, and they relate to
self-concern and other-concern, respectively (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu,
2009). Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings.
People who are high in private self-consciousness tend to think about themselves a lot and agree with statements
such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I am generally attentive to my inner feelings.” People who
are high on private self-consciousness are likely to base their behavior on their own inner beliefs and values—they
let their inner thoughts and feelings guide their actions—and they may be particularly likely to strive to succeed
on dimensions that allow them to demonstrate their own personal accomplishments (Lalwani et al., 2009).
Public self-consciousness, in contrast, refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and to be
particularly aware of the extent to which we are meeting the standards set by others. Those high in public self-
consciousness agree with statements such as “I’m concerned about what other people think of me,” “Before I
leave my house, I check how I look,” and “I care a lot about how I present myself to others.” These are the people
who check their hair in a mirror they pass and spend a lot of time getting ready in the morning; they are more likely
to let the opinions of others (rather than their own opinions) guide their behaviors and are particularly concerned
with making good impressions on others.
Research has found cultural differences in public self-consciousness, with people from East Asian, collectivistic
cultures having higher public self-consciousness than people from Western, individualistic cultures. Steve Heine
and colleagues (2008) found that when college students from Canada (a Western culture) completed
questionnaires in front of a large mirror, they subsequently became more self-critical and were less likely to
cheat (much like the trick-or-treaters discussed earlier) than were Canadian students who were not in front of a
mirror. However, the presence of the mirror had no effect on college students from Japan. This person-situation
interaction is consistent with the idea that people from East Asian cultures are normally already high in public self-
consciousness compared with people from Western cultures, and thus manipulations designed to increase public
self-consciousness influence them less.
So we see that there are clearly individual and cultural differences in the degree to and manner in which we
tend to be aware of ourselves. In general, though, we all experience heightened moments of self-awareness
from time to time. According to self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), when we focus our attention
on ourselves, we tend to compare our current behavior against our internal standards. Sometimes when we
make these comparisons, we realize that we are not currently measuring up. In these cases, self-discrepancy
theory states that when we perceive a discrepancy between our actual and ideal selves, this is distressing to
us (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987). In contrast, on the occasions when self-awareness leads us to comparisons
124 • PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY - 1ST INTERNATIONAL EDITION
where we feel that we are being congruent with our standards, then self-awareness can produce positive affect
(Greenberg & Musham, 1981). Tying these ideas from the two theories together, Philips and Silvia (2005) found
that people felt significantly more distressed when exposed to self-discrepancies while sitting in front of a mirror.
In contrast, those not sitting in front of a mirror, and presumably experiencing lower self-awareness, were not
significantly emotionally affected by perceived self-discrepancies. Simply put, the more self-aware we are in a
given situation, the more pain we feel when we are not living up to our ideals.
In part, the stress arising from perceived self-discrepancy relates to a sense of cognitive dissonance, which is the
discomfort that occurs when we respond in ways that we see as inconsistent. In these cases, we may realign our
current state to be closer to our ideals, or shift our ideals to be closer to our current state, both of which will help
reduce our sense of dissonance. Another potential response to feelings of self-discrepancy is to try to reduce the
state of self-awareness that gave rise to these feelings by focusing on other things. For example, Moskalenko and
Heine (2002) found that people who are given false negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence
test, which presumably lead them to feel discrepant from their internal performance standards about such tasks,
subsequently focused significantly more on a video playing in a room than those given positive feedback.
There are certain situations, however, where these common dissonance-reduction strategies may not be realistic
options to pursue. For example, if someone who has generally negative attitudes toward drug use nevertheless
becomes addicted to a particular substance, it will often not be easy to quit the habit, to reframe the evidence
regarding the drug’s negative effects, or to reduce self-awareness. In such cases, self-affirmation theory suggests
that people will try to reduce the threat to their self-concept posed by feelings of self-discrepancy by focusing on
and affirming their worth in another domain, unrelated to the issue at hand. For instance, the person who has
become addicted to an illegal substance may choose to focus on healthy eating and exercise regimes instead as a
way of reducing the dissonance created by the drug use.
Although self-affirmation can often help people feel more comfortable by reducing their sense of dissonance,
it can also have have some negative effects. For example, Munro and Stansbury (2009) tested people’s social
cognitive responses to hypotheses that were either threatening or non-threatening to their self-concepts, following
exposure to either a self-affirming or non-affirming activity. The key findings were that those who had engaged
in the self-affirmation condition and were then exposed to a threatening hypothesis showed greater tendencies
than those in the non-affirming group to seek out evidence confirming their own views, and to detect illusory
correlations in support of these positions. One possible interpretation of these results is that self-affirmation
elevates people’s mood and they then become more likely to engage in heuristic processing, as discussed in
Chapter 2.
Still another option to pursue when we feel that our current self is not matching up to our ideal self is to seek out
opportunities to get closer to our ideal selves. One method of doing this can be in online environments. Massively
multiplayer online (MMO) gaming, for instance, offers people the chance to interact with others in a virtual world,
using graphical alter egos, or avatars, to represent themselves. The role of the self-concept in influencing people’s
choice of avatars is only just beginning to be researched, but some evidence suggests that gamers design avatars
that are closer to their ideal than their actual selves. For example, a study of avatars used in one popular MMO
role-play game indicated that players rated their avatars as having more favorable attributes than their own self-
ratings, particularly if they had lower self-esteem (Bessiere, Seay, & Keisler, 2007). They also rated their avatars
as more similar to their ideal selves than they themselves were. The authors of this study concluded that these
online environments allow players to explore their ideal selves, freed from the constraints of the physical world.
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There are also emerging findings exploring the role of self-awareness and self-affirmation in relation to behaviors
on social networking sites. Gonzales and Hancock (2011) conducted an experiment showing that individuals
became more self-aware after viewing and updating their Facebook profiles, and in turn reported higher self-
esteem than participants assigned to an offline, control condition. The increased self-awareness that can come
from Facebook activity may not always have beneficial effects, however. Chiou and Lee (2013) conducted two
experiments indicating that when individuals put personal photos and wall postings onto their Facebook accounts,
they show increased self-awareness, but subsequently decreased ability to take other people’s perspectives.
Perhaps sometimes we can have too much self-awareness and focus to the detriment of our abilities to understand
others. Toma and Hancock (2013) investigated the role of self-affirmation in Facebook usage and found that users
viewed their profiles in self-affirming ways, which enhanced their self-worth. They were also more likely to look
at their Facebook profiles after receiving threats to their self-concept, doing so in an attempt to use self-affirmation
to restore their self-esteem. It seems, then, that the dynamics of self-awareness and affirmation are quite similar
in our online and offline behaviors.
Having reviewed some important theories and findings in relation to self-discrepancy and affirmation, we should
now turn our attention to diversity. Once again, as with many other aspects of the self-concept, we find that
there are important cultural differences. For instance, Heine and Lehman (1997) tested participants from a more
individualistic nation (Canada) and a more collectivistic one (Japan) in a situation where they took a personality
test and then received bogus positive or negative feedback. They were then asked to rate the desirability of 10
music CDs. Subsequently, they were offered the choice of taking home either their fifth- or sixth-ranked CD, and
then required to re-rate the 10 CDs. The critical finding was that the Canadians overall rated their chosen CD
higher and their unchosen one lower the second time around, mirroring classic findings on dissonance reduction,
whereas the Japanese participants did not. Crucially, though, the Canadian participants who had been given
positive feedback about their personalities (in other words, had been given self-affirming evidence in an unrelated
domain) did not feel the need to pursue this dissonance reduction strategy. In contrast, the Japanese did not
significantly adjust their ratings in response to either positive or negative feedback from the personality test.
Once more, these findings make sense if we consider that the pressure to avoid self-discrepant feelings will tend
to be higher in individualistic cultures, where people are expected to be more cross-situationally consistent in their
behaviors. Those from collectivistic cultures, however, are more accustomed to shifting their behaviors to fit the
needs of the ingroup and the situation, and so are less troubled by such seeming inconsistencies.
Overestimating How Closely and Accurately Others View Us
Although the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, and although people (particularly those high
in self-consciousness) are aware of their self and how they are seen by others, this does not mean that people are
always thinking about themselves. In fact, people do not generally focus on their self-concept any more than they
focus on the other things and other people in their environments (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982).
On the other hand, self-awareness is more powerful for the person experiencing it than it is for others who are
looking on, and the fact that self-concept is so highly accessible frequently leads people to overestimate the
extent to which other people are focusing on them (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Although you may be highly self-
conscious about something you’ve done in a particular situation, that does not mean that others are necessarily
paying all that much attention to you. Research by Thomas Gilovich and colleagues (Gilovich, Medvec, &
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Savitsky, 2000) found that people who were interacting with others thought that other people were paying much
more attention to them than those other people reported actually doing. This may be welcome news, for example,
when we find ourselves wincing over an embarrassing comment we made during a group conversation. It may
well be that no one else paid nearly as much attention to it as we did!
There is also some diversity in relation to age. Teenagers are particularly likely to be highly self-conscious, often
believing that others are watching them (Goossens, Beyers, Emmen, & van Aken, 2002). Because teens think
so much about themselves, they are particularly likely to believe that others must be thinking about them, too
(Rycek, Stuhr, McDermott, Benker, & Swartz, 1998). Viewed in this light, it is perhaps not surprising that teens
can become embarrassed so easily by their parents’ behaviour in public, or by their own physical appearance, for
example.
People also often mistakenly believe that their internal states show to others more than they really do. Gilovich,
Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) asked groups of five students to work together on a “lie detection” task. One at a
time, each student stood up in front of the others and answered a question that the researcher had written on a card
(e.g., “I have met David Letterman”). On each round, one person’s card indicated that they were to give a false
answer, whereas the other four were told to tell the truth.
After each round, the students who had not been asked to lie indicated which of the students they thought had
actually lied in that round, and the liar was asked to estimate the number of other students who would correctly
guess who had been the liar. As you can see in Figure 3.7, “The Illusion of Transparency,” the liars overestimated
the detectability of their lies: on average, they predicted that over 44% of their fellow players had known that they
were the liar, but in fact only about 25% were able to accurately identify them. Gilovich and colleagues called
this effect the “illusion of transparency.” This illusion brings home an important final learning point about our
self-concepts: although we may feel that our view of ourselves is obvious to others, it may not always be!
Figure 3.7 The Illusion of Transparency
Key Takeaways
• The self-concept is a schema that contains knowledge about us. It is primarily made up of
physical characteristics, group memberships, and traits.
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• Because the self-concept is so complex, it has extraordinary influence on our thoughts,
feelings, and behavior, and we can remember information that is related to it well.
• Self-complexity, the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively
independent ways of thinking about themselves, helps people respond more positively to
events that they experience.
• Self-concept clarity, the extent to which individuals have self-concepts that are clearly
defined and stable over time, can also help people to respond more positively to challenging
situations.
• Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own
self-concept. Differences in the accessibility of different self-schemas help create individual
differences: for instance, in terms of our current concerns and interests.
• People who are experiencing high self-awareness may notice self-discrepancies between their
actual and ideal selves. This can, in turn, lead them to engage in self-affirmation as a way of
resolving these discrepancies.
• When people lose their self-awareness, they experience deindividuation.
• Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and
feelings; public self-consciousness refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image
and the standards set by others.
• There are cultural differences in self-consciousness: public self-consciousness may be higher
in Eastern than in Western cultures.
• People frequently overestimate the extent to which others are paying attention to them and
accurately understand their true intentions in public situations.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. What are the most important aspects of your self-concept, and how do they influence your
self-esteem and social behavior?
2. Consider people you know who vary in terms of their self-complexity and self-concept
clarity. What effects do these differences seem to have on their self-esteem and behavior?
3. Describe a situation where you experienced a feeling of self-discrepancy between your actual
and ideal selves. How well does self-affirmation theory help to explain how you responded to
these feelings of discrepancy?
4. Try to identify some situations where you have been influenced by your private and public
self-consciousness. What did this lead you to do? What have you learned about yourself from
these experiences?
5. Describe some situations where you overestimated the extent to which people were paying
attention to you in public. Why do you think that you did this and what were the
consequences?
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The Feeling Self: Self-Esteem
Learning Objectives
1. Define self-esteem and explain how it is measured by social psychologists.
2. Explore findings indicating diversity in self-esteem in relation to culture, gender, and age.
3. Provide examples of ways that people attempt to increase and maintain their self-esteem.
4. Outline the benefits of having high self-esteem.
5. Review the limits of self-esteem, with a focus on the negative aspects of narcissism.
As we have noted in our discussions of the self-concept, our sense of self is partly determined by our cognition.
However, our view of ourselves is also the product of our affect, in other words how we feel about ourselves. Just
as we explored in Chapter 2, cognition and affect are inextricably linked. For example, self-discrepancy theory
highlights how we feel distress when we perceive a gap between our actual and ideal selves. We will now examine
this feeling self, starting with perhaps its most heavily researched aspect, self-esteem.
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem refers to the positive (high self-esteem) or negative (low self-esteem) feelings that we have about
ourselves. We experience the positive feelings of high self-esteem when we believe that we are good and worthy
and that others view us positively. We experience the negative feelings of low self-esteem when we believe that
we are inadequate and less worthy than others.
Our self-esteem is determined by many factors, including how well we view our own performance
and appearance, and how satisfied we are with our relationships with other people (Tafarodi & Swann,
1995). Self-esteem is in part a trait that is stable over time, with some people having relatively high self-esteem
and others having lower self-esteem. But self-esteem is also a state that varies day to day and even hour to hour.
When we have succeeded at an important task, when we have done something that we think is useful or important,
or when we feel that we are accepted and valued by others, our self-concept will contain many positive thoughts
and we will therefore have high self-esteem. When we have failed, done something harmful, or feel that we have
been ignored or criticized, the negative aspects of the self-concept are more accessible and we experience low
self-esteem.
Self-esteem can be measured using both explicit and implicit measures, and both approaches find that most people
tend to view themselves positively. One common explicit self-report measure of self-esteem is the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (Figure 3.8). Higher scores on the scale indicate higher self-esteem.
Figure 3.8 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Please rate yourself on the following items by writing a number in the blank before each statement, where
you
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Agree 4 = Strongly Agree
1. _____I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on any equal base with others.
2. _____I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. _____All in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure (R).
4. _____I am able to do things as well as other people.
5. _____I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (R)
6. _____I take a positive attitude towards myself.
7. _____On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. _____I wish I could have more respect for myself. (R)
9. _____I certainly feel useless at times. (R)
10. _____At times I think I am no good at all. (R)
Note. (R) denotes an item that should be reverse scored. Subtract your response on these items from
5 before calculating the total. Data are from Rosenberg (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Numerous studies have used the Rosenberg scale to assess people’s self-esteem in many areas of the world. An
interesting finding in many samples from the Western world, particularly in North America, is that the average
score is often significantly higher than the mid-point. Heine and Lehman (1999), for example, reported meta-
analytic data indicating that less than 7% of participants scored below the mid-point! One interesting implication
of this is that participants in such samples classified as having low self-esteem on the basis of a median split will
typically actually have at least moderate self-esteem.
If so many people, particularly in individualistic cultures, report having relatively high self-esteem, an interesting
question is why this might be. Perhaps some cultures place more importance on developing high self-esteem than
others, and people correspondingly feel more pressure to report feeling good about themselves (Held, 2002). A
problem with measures such as the Rosenberg scale is that they can be influenced by the desire to portray the
self positively. The observed scores on the Rosenberg scale may be somewhat inflated because people naturally
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try to make themselves look as if they have very high self-esteem—maybe they lie a bit to the experimenters to
make themselves look better than they really are and perhaps to make themselves feel better. If this the case, then
we might expect to find average levels of reported self-esteem to be lower in cultures where having high self-
worth is less of a priority. This is indeed what has generally been found. Heine and Lehman (1999) reported that
Japanese participants living in Japan showed, on average, moderate levels of self-esteem, normally distributed
around the scale mid-point. Many other studies have shown that people in Eastern, collectivistic cultures report
significantly lower self-esteem than those from more Western, individualistic ones (Campbell et al., 1996). Do,
then, such differences reflect these different cultural priorities and pressures, or could it be that they reflect
genuine differences in actual self-esteem levels? There are no easy answers here, of course, but there are some
findings from studies, using different methods of measuring self-esteem, that may shed some light on this issue.
Indirect measures of self-esteem have been created—measures that may provide a more accurate picture of the
self-concept because they are less influenced by the desire to make a positive impression. Anthony Greenwald and
Shelly Farnham (2000) used the Implicit Association Test to study the self-concept indirectly. Participants worked
at a computer and were presented with a series of words, each of which they were to categorize in one of two
ways. One categorization decision involved whether the words were related to the self (e.g., me, myself, mine) or
to another person (e.g., other, them, their). A second categorization decision involved determining whether words
were pleasant (e.g., joy, smile, pleasant) or unpleasant (e.g., pain, death, tragedy). On some trials, the self words
were paired with the pleasant items, and the other words with the unpleasant items. On other trials, the self words
were paired with the unpleasant items, and the other words with the pleasant items. Greenwald and Farnham found
that on average, participants were significantly faster at categorizing positive words that were presented with self
words than they were at categorizing negative words that were presented with self words, suggesting, again, that
people did have positive self-esteem. Furthermore, there were also meaningful differences among people in the
speed of responding, suggesting that the measure captured some individual variation in implicit self-esteem.
A number of studies have since explored cross-cultural differences in implicit self-esteem and have not found the
same differences observed on explicit measures like the Rosenberg scale (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Does this mean
that we can conclude that the lower scores on self-report measures observed in members of collectivistic cultures
are more apparent than real? Maybe not just yet, especially given that the correlations between explicit and
implicit measures of self-esteem are often quite small (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Nevertheless,
values such as modesty may be less prioritized in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic ones, which may
in turn reflect differences in reported self-esteem levels. Indeed, Cai and colleagues (2007) found that differences
in explicit self-esteem between Chinese and American participants were explained by cultural differences in
modesty.
Another interesting aspect of diversity and self-esteem is the average difference observed between men and
women. Across many countries, women have been found to report lower self-esteem than men (Sprecher, Brooks,
& Avogo, 2013). However, these differences have generally been found to be small, particularly in nations where
gender equality in law and opportunity is higher (Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999). These findings are
consistent with Mead’s (1934) suggestion that self-esteem in part relates to the view that others have of our
importance in the wider world. As women’s opportunities to participate in careers outside of the home have
increased in many nations, so the differences between their self-esteem and that of men have decreased.
There are also some interesting age differences in self-esteem that have been uncovered. In a large Internet survey,
Robins, Trzesniewski, Tracy, Gosling, & Potter (2002) found that self-esteem tends to decrease from childhood to
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early adolescence, and then rises steadily from adolescence into adulthood, usually until people are well into their
sixties, after which point it begins to decline. One interesting implication of this is that we often will have higher
self-esteem later in life than in our early adulthood years, which would appear to run against ageist stereotypes that
older adults have lower self-worth. What factors might help to explain these age-related increases in self-esteem?
One possibility relates back to our discussion of self-discrepancy theory in the previous section on the cognitive
self. Recall that this theory states that when our perceived self-discrepancy between our current and ideal selves
is small, we tend to feel more positive about ourselves than when we see the gap as being large. Could it be that
older adults have a current view of self that is closer to their ideal than younger adults, and that this is why their
self-esteem is often higher? Evidence from Ryff (1991) suggests that this may well be the case. In this study,
elderly adults rated their current and ideal selves as more similar than either middle-aged or young adults. In part,
older adults are able to more closely align these two selves because they are better able to realistically adjust their
ideal standards as they age (Rothermund & Brandstadter, 2003) and because they engage in more favorable and
age-appropriate social comparisons than do younger adults (Helgeson & Mickelson, 2000).
Maintaining and Enhancing Self-Esteem
As we saw in our earlier discussion of cultural differences in self-esteem, in at least some cultures, individuals
appear motivated to report high self-esteem. As we shall now see, they also often actively seek out higher self-
worth. The extent to which this is a universal cultural pursuit continues to be debated, with some researchers
arguing that it is found everywhere (Brown, 2010), while others question whether the need for positive self-regard
is equally valued in all cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999).
For those of us who are actively seeking higher self-esteem, one way is to be successful at what we do. When
we get a good grade on a test, perform well in a sports match, or get a date with someone we really like, our
self-esteem naturally rises. One reason that many of us have positive self-esteem is because we are generally
successful at creating positive lives. When we fail in one domain, we tend to move on until we find something
that we are good at. We don’t always expect to get the best grade on every test or to be the best player on the
team. Therefore, we are often not surprised or hurt when those things don’t happen. In short, we feel good about
ourselves because we do a pretty good job at creating decent lives.
Another way we can boost our self-esteem is through building connections with others. Forming and maintaining
satisfying relationships helps us to feel good about ourselves. A common way of doing this for many people
around the world is through social networking sites. There are a growing number of studies exploring how we
do this online and the effects that it has on our self-worth. One common way on Facebook is to share status
updates, which we hope that our friends will then “like” or comment on. When our friends do not respond to our
updates, however, this can negatively impact how we feel about ourselves. One study found that when regular
Facebook users were assigned to an experimental condition where they were banned from sharing information
on Facebook for 48 hours, they reported significantly lower levels of belonging and meaningful existence.
In a second experiment, participants were allowed to post material to Facebook, but half of the participants’
profiles were set up by the researchers not to receive any responses, whether “likes” or comments, to their status
updates. In line with predictions, that group reported lower self-esteem, level of belonging, level of control, and
meaningful existence than the control group who did receive feedback (Tobin, Vanman, Verreynne, & Saeri,
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2014). Whether online or offline, then, feeling ignored by our friends can dent our self-worth. We will explore
other social influences on our self-esteem later in this chapter.
Research Focus
Processing Information to Enhance the Self
Although we can all be quite good at creating positive self-esteem by doing positive things, it turns out
that we often do not stop there. The desire to see ourselves positively is sometimes strong enough that it
leads us to seek out, process, and remember information in a way that allows us to see ourselves even more
positively.
Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) had students read about a study that they were told had been conducted
by psychologists at Stanford University (the study was actually fictitious). The students were randomly
assigned to two groups: one group read that the results of the research had showed that extroverts did better
than introverts in academic or professional settings after graduating from college; the other group read that
introverts did better than extroverts on the same dimensions. The students then wrote explanations for why
this might be true.
The experimenter then thanked the participants and led them to another room, where a second study
was to be conducted (you will have guessed already that although the participants did not think so, the
two experiments were really part of the same experiment). In the second experiment, participants were
given a questionnaire that supposedly was investigating what different personality dimensions meant to
people in terms of their own experience and behavior. The students were asked to list behaviors that they
had performed in the past that related to the dimension of “shy” versus “outgoing”—a dimension that
is very close in meaning to the introversion-extroversion dimension that they had read about in the first
experiment.
Figure 3.9, “Enhancing the Self,” shows the number of students in each condition who listed an extroverted
behavior first, and the number who listed an introverted behavior first. You can see that the first memory
listed by participants in both conditions tended to reflect the dimension that they had read was related to
success according to the research presented in the first experiment. In fact, 62% of the students who had
just learned that extroversion was related to success listed a memory about an extroverted behavior first,
whereas only 38% of the students who had just learned that introversion was related to success listed an
extroverted behavior first.
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Figure 3.9 Enhancing the Self
Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) found that students who had learned that extroverts did better than
introverts after graduating from college tended to list extroverted memories about themselves, whereas
those who learned that introverts did better than extroverts tended to list introverted memories.
It appears that the participants drew from their memories those instances of their own behavior that
reflected the trait that had the most positive implications for their self-esteem—either introversion or
extroversion, depending on experimental condition. The desire for positive self-esteem made events that
were consistent with a positive self-perception more accessible, and thus they were listed first on the
questionnaire.
Other research has confirmed this general principle—people often attempt to create positive self-esteem
whenever possible, even it if involves distorting reality. We tend to take credit for our successes, and to
blame our failures on others. We remember more of our positive experiences and fewer of our negative
ones. As we saw in the discussion of the optimistic bias in the previous chapter about social cognition, we
judge our likelihood of success and happiness as greater than our likelihood of failure and unhappiness.
We think that our sense of humor and our honesty are above average, and that we are better drivers and
less prejudiced than others. We also distort (in a positive way, of course) our memories of our grades, our
performances on exams, and our romantic experiences. And we believe that we can control the events that
we will experience to a greater extent than we really can (Crocker & Park, 2004).
Once again, though, there are some important cultural differences to note with people in individualistic
cultures pursuing these self-enhancing strategies more vigorously and more often than those from more
collectivistic backgrounds. Indeed, in a large-scale review of studies on self-enhancement, Heine (2004)
concluded that these tactics are not typically used in cultures that value interdependence over dependence.
In cultures where high self-esteem is not as socially valued, people presumably do not feel the same need
to distort their social realities to serve their self-worth.
There is also considerable personal diversity in the tendency to use self-enhancement. Stable differences
between individuals have been uncovered in many studies across a range of self-enhancing strategies
(Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; John & Robins, 1994; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins,
2004).
138 • PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY - 1ST INTERNATIONAL EDITION
Narcissism and the Limits of Self-Enhancement
Our discussion to this point suggests that many people will generally try to view themselves in a positive
light. We emphasize our positive characteristics, and we may even in some cases distort information—all to
help us maintain positive self-esteem. There can be negative aspects to having too much self-esteem, however,
particularly if that esteem is unrealistic and undeserved. Narcissism is a personality trait characterized by overly
high self-esteem, self-admiration, and self-centeredness. Narcissists tend to agree with statements such as the
following:
• “I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.”
• “I can usually talk my way out of anything.”
• “I like to be the center of attention.”
• “I have a natural talent for influencing people.”
Narcissists can be perceived as charming at first, but often alienate others in the long run (Baumeister, Campbell,
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). They can also make bad romantic partners as they often behave selfishly and are
always ready to look for someone else who they think will be a better mate, and they are more likely to be
unfaithful than non-narcissists (Campbell & Foster, 2002; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). Narcissists are
also more likely to bully others, and they may respond very negatively to criticism (Baumeister et al., 2003).
People who have narcissistic tendencies more often pursue self-serving behaviors, to the detriment of the people
and communities surrounding them (Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2005). Perhaps surprisingly, narcissists
seem to understand these things about themselves, although they engage in the behaviors anyway (Carlson, Vazire,
& Oltmanns, 2011).
Interestingly, scores on measures of narcissistic personality traits have been creeping steadily upward in recent
decades in some cultures (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008). Given the social costs of these
traits, this is troubling news. What reasons might there be for these trends? Twenge and Campbell (2009) argue
that several interlocking factors are at work here, namely increasingly child-centered parenting styles, the cult of
celebrity, the role of social media in promoting self-enhancement, and the wider availability of easy credit, which,
they argue, has lead to more people being able to acquire status-related goods, in turn further fueling a sense of
entitlement. As narcissism is partly about having an excess of self-esteem, it should by now come as no surprise
that narcissistic traits are higher, on average, in people from individualistic versus collectivistic cultures (Twenge
et al., 2008).
The negative outcomes of narcissism raise the interesting possibility that high self-esteem in general may not
always be advantageous to us or to the people around us. One complication to the issue is that explicit self-
report measures of self-esteem, like the Rosenberg scale, are not able to distinguish between people whose
high self-esteem is realistic and appropriate and those whose self-esteem may be more inflated, even narcissistic
(Baumeister et al., 2003). Implicit measures also do not provide a clear picture, but indications are that more
narcissistic people score higher on implicit self-esteem in relation to some traits, including those relating to social
status, and lower on others relating to relationships (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007). A key
point is that it can be difficult to disentangle what the effects of realistic versus unrealistic high self-esteem may
be. Nevertheless, it is to this thorny issue that we will now turn.
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Social Psychology in the Public Interest
Does High Self-Esteem Cause Happiness or Other Positive Outcomes?
Teachers, parents, school counselors, and people in many cultures frequently assume that high self-esteem causes
many positive outcomes for people who have it and therefore that we should try to increase it in ourselves and
others. Perhaps you agree with the idea that if you could increase your self-esteem, you would feel better about
yourself and therefore be able to work at a higher level, or attract a more desirable mate. If you do believe that,
you would not be alone. Baumeister and colleagues (2003) describe the origins and momentum of what they call
the self-esteem movement, which has grown in influence in various countries since the 1970s. For example, in
1986, the state of California funded a task force under the premise that raising self-esteem would help solve many
of the state’s problems, including crime, teen pregnancy, drug abuse, school underachievement, and pollution.
Baumeister and colleagues (2003) conducted an extensive review of the research literature to determine whether
having high self-esteem was as helpful as many people seem to think it is. They began by assessing which
variables were correlated with high self-esteem and then considered the extent to which high self-esteem caused
these outcomes. They found that high self-esteem does correlate with many positive outcomes. People with high
self-esteem get better grades, are less depressed, feel less stress, and may even live longer than those who view
themselves more negatively. The researchers also found that high self-esteem is correlated with greater initiative
and activity; people with high self-esteem just do more things. They are also more more likely to defend victims
against bullies compared with people with low self-esteem, and they are more likely to initiate relationships and
to speak up in groups. High self-esteem people also work harder in response to initial failure and are more willing
to switch to a new line of endeavor if the present one seems unpromising. Thus, having high self-esteem seems to
be a valuable resource—people with high self-esteem are happier, more active, and in many ways better able to
deal with their environment.
On the other hand, Baumeister and his colleagues also found that people with high self-esteem sometimes delude
themselves. They tend to believe that they are more likable and attractive, have better relationships, and make
better impressions on others than people with low self-esteem. But objective measures show that these beliefs
are often distortions rather than facts. Furthermore, people with overly high self-esteem, particularly when it
is accompanied by narcissism, defensiveness, conceit, and the unwillingness to critically assess one’s potential
negative qualities, have been found to engage in a variety of negative behaviors (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden,
1996). For example, people with high self-esteem are more likely to be bullies (despite also being more likely to
defend victims) and to experiment with alcohol, drugs, and sex.
Todd Heatherton and Kathleen Vohs (2000) found that when people with extremely high self-esteem were forced
to fail on a difficult task in front of a partner, they responded by acting more unfriendly, rudely, and arrogantly than
did those with lower self-esteem. And research has found that children who inflate their social self-worth—those
who think that they are more popular than they really are and who thus have unrealistically high self-esteem—are
also more aggressive than children who do not show such narcissistic tendencies (Sandstrom & Herlan, 2007;
Thomaes, Bushman, Stegge, & Olthof, 2008). Such findings raise the interesting possibility that programs that
increase the self-esteem of children who bully and are aggressive, based on the notion that these behaviors stem
from low self-esteem, may do more harm than good (Emler, 2001). If you are thinking like a social psychologist,
these findings may not surprise you—narcissists tend to focus on their self-concerns, with little concern for others,
and we have seen many times that other-concern is a necessity for satisfactory social relations.
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Furthermore, despite the many positive variables that relate to high self-esteem, when Baumeister and his
colleagues looked at the causal role of self-esteem they found little evidence that high self-esteem caused these
positive outcomes. For instance, although high self-esteem is correlated with academic achievement, it is more
the result than the cause of this achievement. Programs designed to boost the self-esteem of pupils have not been
shown to improve academic performance, and laboratory studies have generally failed to find that manipulations
of self-esteem cause better task performance.
Baumeister and his colleagues concluded that programs designed to boost self-esteem should be used only in a
limited way and should not be the only approach taken. Raising self-esteem will not make young people do better
in school, obey the law, stay out of trouble, get along better with other people, or respect the rights of others. And
these programs may even backfire if the increased self-esteem creates narcissism or conceit. Baumeister and his
colleagues suggested that attempts to boost self-esteem should only be carried out as a reward for good behavior
and worthy achievements, and not simply to try to make children feel better about themselves.
Although we naturally desire to have social status and high self-esteem, we cannot always promote ourselves
without any regard to the accuracy of our self-characterizations. If we consistently distort our capabilities, and
particularly if we do this over a long period of time, we will just end up fooling ourselves and perhaps engaging
in behaviors that are not actually beneficial to us. Most of us probably know someone who is convinced that he
or she has a particular talent at a professional level, but we, and others, can see that this person is deluded (but
perhaps we are too kind to say this). Some individuals who audition on television talent shows spring to mind.
Such self-delusion can become problematic because although this high self-esteem might propel people to work
harder, and although they may enjoy thinking positively about themselves, they may be setting themselves up for
long-term disappointment and failure. Their pursuit of unrealistic goals may also take valuable time away from
finding areas they have more chance to succeed in.
When we self-enhance too much, although we may feel good about it in the short term, in the longer term
the outcomes for the self may not be positive. The goal of creating and maintaining positive self-esteem (an
affective goal) must be tempered by the cognitive goal of having an accurate self-view (Kirkpatrick & Ellis,
2001; Swann, Chang-Schneider, & Angulo, 2007). In some cases, the cognitive goal of obtaining an accurate
picture of ourselves and our social world and the affective goal of gaining positive self-esteem work hand in
hand. Getting the best grade in an important exam produces accurate knowledge about our skills in the domain as
well as giving us some positive self-esteem. In other cases, the two goals are incompatible. Doing more poorly
on an exam than we had hoped produces conflicting, contradictory outcomes. The poor score provides accurate
information about the self—namely, that we have not mastered the subject—but at the same time makes us feel
bad. Self-verification theory states that people often seek confirmation of their self-concept, whether it is positive
or negative (Swann, 1983). This sets up a fascinating clash between our need to self-enhance against our need to
be realistic in our views of ourselves. Delusion versus truth: which one wins out? The answer, of course, as with
pretty much everything to do with human social behavior, is that it depends. But on what does it depend?
One factor is who the source is of the feedback about us: when we are seeking out close relationships, we more
often form them with others who verify our self-views. We also tend to feel more satisfied with interactions with
self-verifying partners than those who are always positive toward us (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994;
Swann & Pelham, 2002). Self-verification seems to be less important to us in more distant relationships, as in
those cases we often tend to prefer self-enhancing feedback.
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Another related factor is the part of our self-concept we are seeking feedback about, coupled with who is providing
this evaluation. Let’s say you are in a romantic relationship and you ask your partner and your close friend
about how physically attractive they think you are. Who would you want to give you self-enhancing feedback?
Who would you want more honesty from? The evidence suggests that most of us would prefer self-enhancing
feedback from our partner, and accuracy from our friend (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002), as perceived physical
attractiveness is more central to romance than friendship.
Under certain conditions, verification prevails over enhancement. However, we should not underestimate the
power of self-enhancement to often cloud our ability to be more realistic about ourselves. For example, self-
verification of negative aspects of our self-concept is more likely in situations where we are pretty sure of our
faults (Swann & Pelham, 1988). If there is room for doubt, then enhancement tends to rule. Also, if we are
confident that the consequences of getting innaccurate, self-enhancing feedback about negative aspects ourselves
are minimal, then we tend to welcome self-enhancement with open arms (Aronson, 1992).
Therefore, in those situations where the needs to enhance and to verify are in conflict, we must learn to reconcile
our self-concept with our self-esteem. We must be able to accept our negative aspects and to work to overcome
them. The ability to balance the cognitive and the affective features of the self helps us create realistic views of
ourselves and to translate these into more efficient and effective behaviors.
There is one final cautionary note about focusing too much on self-enhancement, to the detriment of self-
verification, and other-concern. Jennifer Crocker and Lora Park (2004) have identified another cost of our
attempts to inflate our self-esteem: we may spend so much time trying to enhance our self-esteem in the eyes of
others—by focusing on the clothes we are wearing, impressing others, and so forth—that we have little time left to
really improve ourselves in more meaningful ways. In some extreme cases, people experience such strong needs
to improve their self-esteem and social status that they act in assertive or dominant ways in order to gain it. As in
many other domains, then, having positive self-esteem is a good thing, but we must be careful to temper it with a
healthy realism and a concern for others. The real irony here is that those people who do show more other- than
self-concern, those who engage in more prosocial behavior at personal costs to themselves, for example, often
tend to have higher self-esteem anyway (Leak & Leak, 2003).
Key Takeaways
• Self-esteem refers to the positive (high self-esteem) or negative (low self-esteem) feelings
that we have about ourselves.
• Self-esteem is determined both by our own achievements and accomplishments and by how
we think others are judging us.
• Self-esteem can be measured using both direct and indirect measures, and both approaches
find that people tend to view themselves positively.
• Self-esteem shows important variations across different cultural, gender, and age groups.
• Because it is so important to have self-esteem, we may seek out, process, and remember
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information in a way that allows us to see ourselves even more positively.
• High self-esteem is correlated with, but does not cause, a variety of positive outcomes.
• Although high self-esteem does correlate with many positive outcomes in life, overly high
self-esteem creates narcissism, which can lead to unfriendly, rude, and ultimately
dysfunctional behaviors.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. In what ways do you attempt to boost your own self-esteem? Which strategies do you feel
have been particularly effective and ineffective and why?
2. Do you know people who have appropriately high self-esteem? What about people who are
narcissists? How do these individual differences influence their social behavior in positive
and negative ways?
3. “It is relatively easy to succeed in life with low self-esteem, but very difficult to succeed
without self-control, self-discipline, or emotional resilience in the face of setbacks” (Twenge
& Campbell, 2009, p. 295). To what extent do you agree with this quote and why?
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The Social Self: The Role of the Social Situation
Learning Objectives
1. Describe the concept of the looking-glass self and how it affects our self-concept.
2. Explore the impact of the labeling bias, self-labeling, and internalized prejudice on people’s
self-concepts, particularly in those from marginalized social groups.
3. Define social comparison, and summarize how people use it to define their self-concepts and
self-esteem.
4. Give examples of the use of upward and downward social comparison and their influences on
social cognition and affect.
5. Explain the concept of social identity and why it is important to human behavior.
6. Describe how self-evaluation maintenance theory helps to explain how we react when other
people’s behaviors threaten our sense of self.
7. Describe the concept of self-presentation and the various strategies we use to portray
ourselves to others.
8. Outline the concept of reputation management and how it relates to self-presentation.
9. Discuss the individual-difference variable of self-monitoring and how it relates to the ability
and desire to self-present.
To this point, we have seen, among other things, that human beings have complex and well-developed self-
concepts and that they generally attempt to view themselves positively. These more cognitive and affective aspects
of ourselves do not, of course, occur in a vacuum. They are heavily influenced by the social forces that surround
us. We have alluded to some of these forces already; for example, in our review of self-verification theory, we saw
how feedback from others can affect our self-concept and esteem. We also looked at ways that our sociocultural
backgrounds can affect the content of our self-concept.
In this section, we will consider in more detail these and other social aspects of the self by exploring the many
ways that the social situation influences our self-concept and esteem. The self is not created in isolation; we are
not born with perceptions of ourselves as shy, interested in jazz, or charitable to others, for example. Rather,
such beliefs are determined by our observations of and interactions with others. Are you rich or poor? Beautiful
or ugly? Smart or not? Good or bad at playing video games? And how do you know? These questions can be
answered only by looking at those around us. The self has meaning only within the social context, and it is not
wrong to say that the social situation defines our self-concept and our self-esteem. We rely on others to provide a
“social reality”—to help us determine what to think, feel, and do (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). But what forms do
these social influences take? It is to this question that we will now turn.
The Looking-Glass Self: Our Sense of Self is Influenced by Others’ Views of Us
The concept of the looking-glass self states that part of how we see ourselves comes from our perception of how
others see us (Cooley, 1902). We might feel that we have a great sense of humor, for example, because others
have told us, and often laugh (apparently sincerely) at our jokes. Many studies have supported a basic prediction
derived from the notion of the looking-glass self, namely that our self-concepts are often quite similar to the views
that others have of us (Beer, Watson, & McDade-Montez, 2013). This may be particularly so with people from
our own families and culture. Perkins, Wiley, and Deaux (2014), for example, found that, in the United States,
how members of ethnic minority groups believed other members of the same culture perceived them significantly
correlated with their self-esteem scores. In contrast, their perceived appraisal of European Americans toward them
was only weakly related to their self-esteem.
This evidence is merely correlational, though, so we cannot be sure which way the influence is working. Maybe
we develop our self-concept quite independently of others, and they then base their views of us on how we see
ourselves. The work of Mark Baldwin and colleagues has been particularly important in demonstrating that how
we think we are being perceived by others really can affect how we see ourselves.
For example, Baldwin and Holmes (1987) conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that our self-concepts
derive partly from the way we imagine that we would be perceived by significant others. In the first study, 40
women were instructed to visualize the faces of either two acquaintances or two older members of their own
family. Later they were asked to rate their perceived enjoyableness of a piece of fiction with sexual content, and
they typically responded in keeping with the responses they perceived the people they had visualized would have
had. This effect was more pronounced when they sat in front of a mirror (remember the earlier discussion of
self-awareness theory). In the second study, 60 men were exposed to a situation involving failure, and their self-
evaluations to this setback were then measured. As with the women’s study, the men’s self-evaluations matched
those they perceived that the people they were asked to visualize would have made, particularly when they were
more self-aware. At least some of the time, then, we end up evaluating ourselves as we imagine others would. Of
course, it can work both ways, too. Over time, the people around us may come to accept the self-concept that we
present to others (Yeung & Martin, 2003).
Sometimes, the influence of other people’s appraisals of ourselves on our self-concept may be so strong that we
end up internalizing them. For example, we are often labeled in particular ways by others, perhaps informally
in terms of our ethnic background, or more formally in terms of a physical or psychological diagnosis. The
labeling bias occurs when we are labeled, and others’ views and expectations of us are affected by that labeling
(Fox & Stinnett, 1996). For example, if a teacher knows that a child has been diagnosed with a particular
psychological disorder, that teacher may have different expectations and explanations of the child’s behavior than
he or she would if not aware of that label. Where things get really interesting for our present discussion is when
those expectations start to become self-fulfilling prophecies, and our self-concept and even our behavior start
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to align with them. For example, when children are labeled in special education contexts, these labels can then
impact their self-esteem (Taylor, Hume, & Welsh, 2010).
If we are repeatedly labeled and evaluated by others, then self-labeling may occur, which happens when we adopt
others’ labels explicitly into our self-concept. The effects of this self-labeling on our self-esteem appear to
depend very much on the nature of the labels. Labels used in relation to diagnosis of psychological disorders can
be detrimental to people whom then internalize them. For example, Moses (2009) found that adolescents who
self-labeled according to diagnoses they had received were found to have higher levels of self-stigma in their
self-concepts compared with those who described their challenges in non-pathological terms. In these types of
situation, those who self-label may come to experience internalized prejudice, which occurs when individuals
turn prejudice directed toward them by others onto themselves. Internalized prejudice has been found to predict
more negative self-concept and poorer psychological adjustment in members of various groups, including sexual
minorities (Carter, 2012) and racial minorities (Szymanski & Obiri, 2011).
In other cases, labels used by wider society to describe people negatively can be positively reclaimed by
those being labeled. Galinsky and colleagues (2013) explored this use of self-labeling by members of oppressed
groups to reclaim derogatory terms, including “queer” and “bitch,” used by dominant groups. After self-labeling,
minority group members evaluated these terms less negatively, reported feeling more powerful, and were also
perceived by observers as more powerful. Overall, these results indicate that individuals who incorporate a
formerly negative label into their self-concept in order to reclaim it can sometimes undermine the stigma attached
to the label.
Social Comparison Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by Comparisons with Others
Self-concept and self-esteem are also heavily influenced by the process of social comparison (Buunk & Gibbons,
2007; Van Lange, 2008). Social comparison occurs when we learn about our abilities and skills, about the
appropriateness and validity of our opinions, and about our relative social status by comparing our own attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors with those of others. These comparisons can be with people who we know and interact
with, with those whom we read about or see on TV, or with anyone else we view as important. However, the most
meaningful comparisons we make tend to be with those we see as similar to ourselves (Festinger, 1954).
Social comparison occurs primarily on dimensions on which there are no correct answers or objective benchmarks
and thus on which we can rely only on the beliefs of others for information. Answers to questions such as “What
should I wear to the interview?” or “What kind of music should I have at my wedding?” are frequently determined
at least in part by using the behavior of others as a basis of comparison. We also use social comparison to help
us determine our skills or abilities—how good we are at performing a task or doing a job, for example. When
students ask their teacher for the class average on an exam, they are also seeking to use social comparison to
evaluate their performance.
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Research Focus
Affiliation and Social Comparison
The extent to which individuals use social comparison to determine their evaluations of events was
demonstrated in a set of classic research studies conducted by Stanley Schachter (1959). Schachter’s
experiments tested the hypothesis that people who were feeling anxious would prefer to affiliate with
others rather than be alone because having others around would reduce their anxiety. Female college
students at the University of Minnesota volunteered to participate in one of his experiments for extra credit
in their introductory psychology class. They arrived at the experimental room to find a scientist dressed in
a white lab coat, standing in front of a large array of electrical machinery. The scientist introduced himself
as Dr. Zilstein of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, and he told the women that they would
be serving as participants in an experiment concerning the effects of electrical shock. Dr. Zilstein stressed
how important it was to learn about the effects of shocks, since electroshock therapy was being used more
and more commonly and because the number of accidents due to electricity was also increasing!
At this point, the experimental manipulation occurred. One half of the participants (those in the high-
anxiety condition) were told that the shocks would be “painful” and “intense,” although they were
assured that they could do no permanent damage. The other half of the participants (those in the low-
anxiety condition) were also told that they would be receiving shocks but that they would in no way be
painful—rather, the shocks were said to be mild and to resemble a “tickle” or a “tingle.” Of course, the
respondents were randomly assigned to conditions to assure that the women in the two conditions were, on
average, equivalent except for the experimental manipulation.
Each of the women was then told that before the experiment could continue the experimenter would have
to prepare the equipment and that they would have to wait until he was finished. He asked them if they
would prefer to wait alone or with others. The outcome of Schachter’s research was clear: while only
33% of the women who were expecting mild shocks preferred to wait with others, 63% of the women
expecting to get painful shocks wanted to wait with others. This was a statistically significant difference,
and Schachter concluded that the women chose to affiliate with each other in order to reduce their anxiety
about the upcoming shocks.
In further studies, Schachter found that the research participants who were under stress did not want to wait
with just any other people. They preferred to wait with other people who were expecting to undergo the
same severe shocks that they were rather than with people who were supposedly just waiting to see their
professor. Schachter concluded that this was not just because being around other people might reduce our
anxiety but because we also use others who are in the same situation as we are to help us determine how
to feel about things. As Schachter (1959) put it, “Misery doesn’t just love any kind of company, it loves
only miserable company” (p. 24). In this case, the participants were expecting to determine from the other
participants how afraid they should be of the upcoming shocks.
In short, and as predicted by the idea of social comparison, the women in Schachter’s studies relied on
each other to help them understand what was happening to them and to find out how they should feel and
respond to their social situations. Again, the power of the social situation—in this case, in determining our
beliefs and attitudes—is apparent.
Although Schachter’s studies were conducted in relatively artificial lab settings, similar effects have
been found in field studies in more naturally occurring settings. For instance, Kulik, Mahler, and Moore
(1996) found that hospital patients who were awaiting surgery preferred to talk to other individuals who
were expecting to have similar procedures rather than to patients who were having different procedures, so
that they could share information about what they might expect to experience. Furthermore, Kulik and his
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colleagues found that sharing information was helpful: people who were able to share more information
had shorter hospital stays.
Upward and Downward Comparisons Influence Our Self-Esteem
Although we use social comparison in part to develop our self-concept—that is, to form accurate conclusions
about our attitudes, abilities, and opinions—social comparison has perhaps an even bigger impact on our self-
esteem. When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others, we feel good about ourselves, but when
the outcome of comparison suggests that others are better or better off than we are, then our self-esteem is likely
to suffer. This is one reason why good students who attend high schools in which the other students are only
average may suddenly find their self-esteem threatened when they move on to colleges and universities in which
they are no longer better than the other students (Marsh, Kong, & Hau, 2000). Perhaps you’ve had the experience
yourself of the changes in self-esteem that occur when you have moved into a new year in school, got a new job,
or changed your circle of friends. In these cases, you may have felt much better about yourself or much worse,
depending on the nature of the change. You can see that in these cases the actual characteristics of the individual
person have not changed at all; only the social situation and the comparison with others have changed.
Because many people naturally want to have positive self-esteem, they frequently attempt to compare themselves
positively with others. Downward social comparison occurs when we attempt to create a positive image of
ourselves through favorable comparisons with others who are worse off than we are. In one study Morse and
Gergen (1970) had students apply for a job, and they also presented the students with another individual who
was supposedly applying for the same job. When the other candidate was made to appear to be less qualified
for the job, the downward comparison with the less-qualified applicant made the students feel better about their
own qualifications. As a result, the students reported higher self-esteem than they did when the other applicant
was seen as a highly competent job candidate. Research has also found that people who are suffering from
serious diseases prefer to compare their condition with other individuals whose current condition and likely
prognosis is worse than their own (Buunk, Gibbons, & Visser, 2002). These comparisons make them feel more
hopeful about their own possible outcomes. More frequent use of downward than upward social comparison with
similar others has been been shown to be a commonly used coping strategy for preserving self-esteem in the face
of a wide variety of challenging life situations, including experiences of physical decline, rheumatoid arthritis,
AIDS, occupational burnout, eating disorders, unemployment, educational difficulties, and intellectual disabilities
(Buunk, Gibbons, & Buunk, 1997).
Although downward comparison provides us with positive feelings, upward social comparison, which occurs
when we compare ourselves with others who are better off than we are, is also common (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons,
& Kuyper, 1999; Vrugt & Koenis, 2002). Upward comparison may lower our self-esteem by reminding us that we
are not as well off as others. The power of upward social comparison to decrease self-esteem has been documented
in many domains (Buunk, Gibbons, & Buunk, 1997). Thinking back to our case study at the beginning of this
chapter, this power can sometimes be strongly felt when looking at social networking sites. Imagine someone who
has had a bad day, or is generally unhappy with how life is going, then logs onto Facebook to see that most of
his or her friends have posted very positive status updates about how happy they are, how well they are doing,
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or the wonderful vacations they are having. What would your prediction be about how that person would feel?
Would that person take pleasure from knowing that the friends were happy, or would the friends’ happiness make
the person feel worse? The research on upward social comparisons to similar others would suggest the latter, and
this has been demonstrated empirically. Feinstein and colleagues (2013) investigated whether a tendency to make
upward social comparisons on Facebook led to increased symptoms of depression over a three-week period. Sure
enough, making more upward comparisons predicted increased rumination, which in turn was linked to increased
depressive symptoms.
Despite these negative effects of upward comparisons, they can sometimes be useful because they provide
information that can help us do better, help us imagine ourselves as part of the group of successful people that we
want to be like (Collins, 2000), and give us hope (Snyder, Cheavens, & Sympson, 1997). The power of upward
social comparison can also be harnessed for social good. When people are made aware that others are already
engaging in particular prosocial behaviors, they often follow suit, partly because an upward social comparison is
triggered. This has been shown in relation to sustainable environmental practices, for example, with upward social
comparisons helping to facilitate energy-saving behaviors in factory workers (Siero, Bakker, Dekker, & van den
Berg, 1996) and hotel guests (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). As with downward comparisons, the
effects of looking upward on our self-esteem tend to be more pronounced when we are comparing ourselves to
similar others. If, for example, you have ever performed badly at a sport, the chances are that your esteem was
more threatened when you compared yourselves to your teammates as opposed to the top professional athletes in
that sport.
The outcomes of upward and downward social comparisons can have a substantial impact on our feelings, on our
attempts to do better, and even on whether or not we want to continue performing an activity. When we compare
positively with others and we feel that we are meeting our goals and living up to the expectations set by ourselves
and others, we feel good about ourselves, enjoy the activity, and work harder at it. When we compare negatively
with others, however, we are more likely to feel poorly about ourselves and enjoy the activity less, and we may
even stop performing it entirely. When social comparisons come up poorly for us, we may experience depression
or anxiety, and these discrepancies are important determinants of our self-esteem (Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995;
Strauman & Higgins, 1988).
Although everyone makes social comparisons, both upward and downward, there are some sources of differences
in how often we do so and which type we tend to favor. As downward social comparisons generally increase
and upward ones generally decrease self-esteem, and the pursuit of high self-esteem, as we have seen, is more
prominent in Western as opposed to Eastern cultures, then it should come as no surprise that there are cultural
differences here. White and Lehman (2005), for example, found that Asian Canadians made more upward social
comparisons than did European Canadians, particularly following failures and when the opportunity to self-
improve was made salient. These findings, the authors suggest, indicate that the Asian Canadians were using
social comparisons more as a vehicle for self-improvement than self-enhancement.
There are also some age-related trends in social comparison. In general, older adults tend to make more
downward comparisons than do younger adults, which is part of the reason why their self-esteem is typically
higher (Helgeson & Mickelson, 2000). Older adults also use more downward social comparisons to cope with
feelings of regret than do younger adults, and these comparisons are often more effective for them (Bauer, Wrosch,
& Jobin, 2008). In addition to these cultural and age differences in social comparison processes, there are also
individual differences. People who score higher on a measure of social comparison orientation have been found
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to experience more positive affect following downward social comparisons and more negative affect following
upward ones (Buunk, Zurriaga, Peiró, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005).
Social Identity Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Groups We Belong To
In our discussion of social comparisons, we have seen that who we compare ourselves to can affect how we
feel about ourselves, for better or worse. Another social influence on our self-esteem is through our group
memberships. For example, we can gain self-esteem by perceiving ourselves as members of important and valued
groups that make us feel good about ourselves. Social identity theory asserts that we draw part of our sense of
identity and self-esteem from the social groups that we belong to (Hogg, 2003; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994;
Tajfel, 1981).
Normally, group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we perceive our own groups and
thus ourselves in a positive light. If you are an Arsenal F.C. fan, or if you are an Australian, or if you are a Muslim,
for example, then your membership in the group becomes part of what you are, and the membership often makes
you feel good about yourself. The list that follows presents a measure of the strength of social identity with a
group of university students. If you complete the measure for your own school, university, or college, the research
evidence would suggest that you would agree mostly with the statements that indicate that you identify with the
group.
Figure 3.10 A Measure of Social Identity
This 10-item scale is used to measure identification with students at the University of Maryland, but it
could be modified to assess identification with any group. The items marked with an R are reversed (so that
low numbers become high numbers and vice versa) before the average of the scale is computed. The scale
was originally reported by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992).
For each of the following items, please indicate your response on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree) by writing a number in the blank next to the question.
1. ___ I identify with the group of University of Maryland students.
2. ___ I am glad to belong to the group of University of Maryland students.
3. ___ I make excuses for belonging to the group of University of Maryland students.
4. ___ I consider the group of University of Maryland students to be important.
5. ___ I feel held back by the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
6. ___ I criticize the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
7. ___ I see myself as belonging to the group of University of Maryland students.
8. ___ I try to hide belonging to the group of University of Maryland students. (R)
9. ___ I feel strong ties with the group of University of Maryland students.
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10. ___ I am annoyed to say that I am a member of the group of University of Maryland students.
(R)
Kay Deaux and her colleagues (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995) asked U.S. college students to list the
groups that they identified with. As you can see in Table 3.1 ,”Varieties of Social Identities,” the students reported
belonging to a wide variety of groups and claimed that many of these groups provided them with social identities.
The categories that they listed included ethnic and religious groups (e.g., Asian, Jewish), political affiliations (e.g.,
conservative, Democrat), occupations and hobbies (e.g., gardener, tennis player), personal relationships (e.g.,
husband, girlfriend), and marginalized groups (e.g., gay, homeless). You can see that these identities were likely
to provide a lot of positive feelings for the individuals.
Table 3.1 Varieties of Social Identities
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Relationships Vocation/avocation Political affiliation Stigma Ethnicity/religion
Widow Intellectual Feminist Welfare recipient Jewish
Divorced person Bookworm Political independent Unemployed person Christian
Woman Military veteran Democrat Homeless person Catholic
Man Student Republican Retired person Southerner
Lover Collector Old person New Yorker
Friend Musician Fat person American
Girlfriend Gardener Deaf person Hispanic
Boyfriend Teacher Person with AIDS Asian American
Homemaker Supervisor Lesbian African American
Head of household Secretary Gay
Teenager Scientist Smoker
Child Psychologist Alcoholic
Wife Salesperson
Husband Business person
Son Athlete
Daughter
Sister
Brother
Grandmother
Grandfather
Uncle
Aunt
Mother/Father
This table represents some of the many social identities reported by a sample of college students. Data are from
Deaux and colleagues (1995).
Which of our many identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a function of the particular
situation we are in (Yakushko, Davidson, & Williams, 2009). Seeing our national flag outside a government office
may remind of us our national identity, whereas walking past our local soccer stadium may remind us of our
identification with our team. Identity can also be heightened when it is threatened by conflict with another
group—such as during an important sports game with a rival team. We each have multiple social identities, and
which of our identities we draw our self-esteem from at a given time will depend on the situation we are in, as
well as the social goals we have.
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Figure 3.11 Social identity refers to the positive emotions we experience as a member of an important social group.
Students rushing renovated Kinnick Stadium by Foxhunt king (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSCN0602.JPG) used under CC
BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)
In particular, we use occasions when our social groups are successful in meeting their goals to fuel our self-worth.
Robert Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1976) studied the idea that we can sometimes enhance our self-
esteem by basking in the reflected glory of our ingroups, which occurs when we use and advertise our ingroups’
positive achievements to boost our self-esteem. To test this idea, they observed the clothes and clothing accessories
that students at different U.S. universities wore to classes on Mondays. They found that when the university’s
football team had won its game on Saturday, students were likely to emphasize their university membership by
wearing clothing, such as sweatshirts and hats with the symbols of the university on them. However, they were
significantly less likely to wear university clothing on the Mondays that followed a football loss. Furthermore,
in a study in which students from a university were asked to describe a victory by their university team, they
frequently used the term “we,” whereas when asked to describe a game in which their school lost, they used the
term “we” significantly less frequently. Emphasizing that “we’re a good school” and “we beat them” evidently
provided a social identity for these students, allowing them to feel good about themselves.
When people in our ingroups perform well, social identity theory suggests that we tend to make intergroup
social comparisons, and by seeing our group as doing better than other groups, we come to feel better about
ourselves. However, this is not generally what happens when we make intragroup comparisons—those between
ourselves and other ingroup members. In this case it is often not advantageous to bask in the glory of others in
our ingroups, because in some cases the other person’s successes may create an upward comparison and thus
more negative emotions. Self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988) asserts that our self-esteem can be
threatened when someone else outperforms us, particularly if that person is close to us and the performance
domain is central to our self-concept. This theory leads to the interesting implication that these threats will often
occur in the context of our family relationships, and they have been shown to be an integral part of both family
functioning in general (Tesser, 1980) and marital relationships in particular (Beach et al., 1996).
When threats occur, the theory states that we will typically try to rebuild our self-esteem using one of three main
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strategies. The first is distancing, where we redefine ourselves as less close to the person in question. For example,
if a close friend keeps beating you at tennis, you may, over time, seek out another playing partner to protect your
bruised ego. Interestingly, people who are more narcissistic are more likely to use this tactic than people who are
lower in these characteristics (Nicholls & Stukas, 2011). The second option is to redefine how important the trait
or skill really is to your self-concept. For instance, you may decide that tennis ability just isn’t that important a part
of who you are, and choose to take up another hobby instead. The third strategy is try to improve on the ability
in question. In the current example, this would mean practicing more often or hiring a coach to improve your
tennis game. Notice the clear parallels between these strategies that occur in response to threats to our self-esteem
posed by the behavior of others, and those that are triggered by feelings of self-discrepancy, discussed earlier in
this chapter. In both cases, we seek to rebuild our self-esteem by redefining the aspect of ourself that has been
diminished.
Self-Presentation: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Audiences We Have
It is interesting to note that each of the social influences on our sense of self that we have discussed can be
harnessed as a way of protecting our self-esteem. The final influence we will explore can also be used strategically
to elevate not only our own esteem, but the esteem we have in the eyes of others. Positive self-esteem occurs not
only when we do well in our own eyes but also when we feel that we are positively perceived by the other people
we care about.
Figure 3.12 Being seen positively by others helps us to feel positive about ourselves. Source: Ralph Lauren getting in his orange 997 GT3 RS
by Damian Morys (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ralph_Lauren_getting_in_his_orange_997_GT3_RS.jpg) used uncer CC BY 2.0 license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en); Helping the homeless by Ed Yourdon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Helping_the_homeless.jpg) used under CC BY SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en)
Because it is so important to be seen as competent and productive members of society, people naturally attempt to
present themselves to others in a positive light. We attempt to convince others that we are good and worthy people
by appearing attractive, strong, intelligent, and likable and by saying positive things to others (Jones & Pittman,
1982; Schlenker, 2003). The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our
social status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life.
A big question in relation to self-presentation is the extent to which it is an honest versus more strategic,
potentially dishonest enterprise. The sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) developed an influential theory of self-
presentation and described it as a mainly honest process, where people need to present the parts of themselves
required by the social role that they are playing in a given situation. If everyone plays their part according to
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accepted social scripts and conventions, then the social situation will run smoothly and the participants will avoid
embarrassment. Seen in this way, self-presentation is a transparent process, where we are trying to play the part
required of us, and we trust that others are doing the same. Other theorists, though, have viewed self-presentation
as a more strategic endeavor, which may involve not always portraying ourselves in genuine ways (e.g., Jones &
Pittman, 1982). As is often the case with two seemingly opposing perspectives, it is quite likely that both are true
in certain situations, depending on the social goals of the actors.
Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people, and the use of these
strategies may be evolutionarily selected because they are successful (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008). Edward
Jones and Thane Pittman (1982) described five self-presentation strategies, each of which is expected to create a
resulting emotion in the other person:
1. The goal of ingratiation is to create liking by using flattery or charm.
2. The goal of intimidation is to create fear by showing that you can be aggressive.
3. The goal of exemplification is to create guilt by showing that you are a better person than the other.
4. The goal of supplication is to create pity by indicating to others that you are helpless and needy.
5. The goal of self-promotion is to create respect by persuading others that you are competent.
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Figure 3.13 Attempts to impress and intimidate others to gain status are not unique to humans.
Angry Old Lion by Koorosh D (https://www.flickr.com/photos/50823081@N08/5551283305/) used under CC BY 2.0 license
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/). Brazilian Federal Highway Police by Fabio Pozzebom (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Brazilian_Federal_Highway_Police.jpg) used under CC BY 3.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/br/deed.en). Mad
Dog by Josh Plueger (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mad_dog.jpg) is in the public domain (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Public_domain). Angry Man by Chris Gallager (http://www.flickr.com/photos/61081643@N05/5564664701/) used under CC BY-ND 2.0
license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/).
No matter who is using it, self-presentation can easily be overdone, and when it is, it backfires. People who
overuse the ingratiation technique and who are seen as obviously and strategically trying to get others to like
them are often disliked because of this. Have you ever had a slick salesperson obviously try to ingratiate him-
or herself with you just so you will buy a particular product, and you end up not liking the person and making
a hasty retreat from the premises? People who overuse the exemplification or self-promotion strategies by
boasting or bragging, particularly if that boasting does not appear to reflect their true characteristics, may end up
being perceived as arrogant and even self-deluded (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Using
intimidation can also often backfire; acting more modestly may be more effective. Again, the point is clear: we
may want to self-promote with the goal of getting others to like us, but we must also be careful to consider the
point of view of the other person. Being aware of these strategies is not only useful for better understanding how
to use them responsibly ourselves, it can also help us to understand that other people’s behaviors may often reflect
their self-presentational concerns. This can, in turn, facilitate better empathy for others, particularly when they
are exhibiting challenging behaviors (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). For instance, perhaps someone’s verbally
aggressive behavior toward you is more about that person being afraid rather than about his or her desire to do
you harm.
—Now that we have explored some of the commonly used self-presentation tactics, let’s look at how they
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manifest in specific social behaviors. One concrete way to self-promote is to display our positive physical
characteristics. A reason that many of us spend money on improving our physical appearance is the desire to look
good to others so that they will like us. We can also earn status by collecting expensive possessions such as fancy
cars and big houses and by trying to associate with high-status others. Additionally, we may attempt to dominate
or intimidate others in social interactions. People who talk more and louder and those who initiate more social
interactions are afforded higher status. A businessman who greets others with a strong handshake and a smile,
and people who speak out strongly for their opinions in group discussions may be attempting to do so as well. In
some cases, people may even resort to aggressive behavior, such as bullying, in attempts to improve their status
(Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).
Self-promotion can also be pursued in our online social behaviors. For example, a study in Taiwan conducted by
Wang and Stefanone (2013) used survey methodology to investigate the relationship between personality traits,
self-presentation and the use of check-ins on Facebook. Interestingly, narcissism was found to predict scores on
a measure of exhibitionistic, self-promoting use of Facebook check-ins, which included items like “I check in so
people know that I am with friends,” and “I expect friends to like or leave comments on my check-in status on
Facebook.”
Other studies have also found associations between narcissistic traits and self-promotional activity on Facebook.
Mehdizadeh (2010), for example, found that narcissistic personality scores were positively correlated with the
amount of daily logins on Facebook and the duration of each login. Furthermore, narcissistic traits were related
to increased use of self-promotional material in the main photo, view photos, status updates, and notes sections of
people’s Facebook pages.
Analysis of the content and language used in Facebook postings has also revealed that they are sometimes used by
individuals to self-promote. Bazarova, Taft, Choi, and Cosley (2013) explored self-presentation through language
styles used in status updates, wall posts, and private messages from 79 participants. The use of positive emotion
words was correlated with self-reported self-presentation concern in status updates. This is consistent with the
idea that people share positive experiences with Facebook friends partly as a self-enhancement strategy.
Online self-presentation doesn’t seem to be limited to Facebook usage. There is also evidence that self-
promotional concerns are often a part of blogging behaviors, too. Mazur and Kozarian (2010), for example,
analyzed the content of adolescents’ blog entries and concluded that a careful concern for self-presentation was
more central to their blogging behavior than direct interaction with others. This often seems to apply to micro-
blogging sites like Twitter. Marwick and Boyd (2011) found that self-presentational strategies were a consistent
part of celebrity tweeting, often deployed by celebrities to maintain their popularity and image.
You might not be surprised to hear that men and women use different approaches to self-presentation. Men are
more likely to present themselves in an assertive way, by speaking and interrupting others, by visually focusing
on the other person when they are speaking, and by leaning their bodies into the conversation. Women, on the
other hand, are more likely to be modest; they tend to create status by laughing and smiling, and by reacting more
positively to the statements of others (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keation, 1988).
These gender differences are probably in large part socially determined as a result of the different reinforcements
that men and women receive for using particular self-presentational strategies. For example, self-promoting by
speaking out and acting assertively can be more effective for men than it is for women, in part because cross-
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culturally consistent stereotypes tend to depict assertiveness as more desirable in men than in women. These
stereotypes can have very important consequences in the real world. For instance, one of the reasons for the
“glass ceiling” existing in some occupations (where women experience discrimination in reaching top positions
in organizations) may be attributable to the more negative reactions that their assertive behaviors, necessary for
career advancement, receive than those of their male colleagues (Eagly & Carli, 2007).
There are also some cultural differences in the extent to which people use self-presentation strategies in social
contexts. For instance, when considering job interviews, Konig, Haftseinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann (2011) found
that individuals from Iceland and Switzerland used less self-presentational behavior than people from the United
States. Differences in self-presentation have also been found in job interviews involving individuals from Ghana,
Turkey, Norway, and Germany, with the former two groups showing higher impression management scores than
the latter two (Bye et al., 2011).
So far we have been talking about self-presentation as it operates in particular situations in the short-term.
However, we also engage in longer-term self-presentational projects, where we seek to build particular reputations
with particular audiences. —Emler & Reicher (1995) describe the unique capacity humans have to know one
another by repute and argue that, accordingly, we are often engaged in a process of reputation management,
which is a form of long-term self-presentation, where individuals seek to build and sustain specific reputations
with important audiences. According to this perspective, our behaviors in current social situations may not only
be to serve our self-presentational goals in that moment, but also be based on a consideration of their longer-term
repercussions for our reputations. As many politicians, for example, know only too well, a poor decision from
their past can come back to haunt them when their reputation is being assessed during a campaign.
The concept of reputation management can be used to help explain a wide variety of social and antisocial
behaviors, including corporate branding (Smith, Smith, & Wang, 2010), sociomoral debate (Emler, Tarry, &
St. James, 2007), and teenage criminal activity (Lopez-Romero & Romero, 2011). In the last example, it is
argued that a lot of teenage antisocial behavior results from a desire to build a reputation for toughness and
rebelliousness with like-minded peer audiences (Emler & Reicher, 1995). Similarly, antisocial and self-destructive
online actions, like people posting to Facebook their involvement in illegal acts during riots, or individuals
engaging in life-threatening activities in Internet crazes like Neknominate, may make more sense if they are
considered partly as stemming from a desire to project a particular reputation to specific audiences. Perhaps the
perceived social kudos from doing these things outweighs the obvious personal risks in the individuals’ minds at
the time.
People often project distinct reputations to different social audiences. For example, adolescents who engage in
antisocial activity to build reputations for rebelliousness among their peers will often seek to construct very
different reputations when their parents are the audience (Emler & Reicher, 1995). The desire to compartmentalize
our reputations and audiences can even spill over into our online behaviors. Wiederhold (2012) found that, with
some adolescents’ Facebook friends numbering in the hundreds or thousands, increasing numbers are moving
to Twitter in order to reach a more selective audience. One critical trigger for this has been that their parents are
now often friends with them on Facebook, creating a need for young people to find a new space where they can
build reputations that may not always be parent-friendly (Wiederhold, 2012).
Although the desire to present the self favorably is a natural part of everyday life, both person and situation factors
influence the extent to which we do it. For one, we are more likely to self-present in some situations than in others.
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When we are applying for a job or meeting with others whom we need to impress, we naturally become more
attuned to the social aspects of the self, and our self-presentation increases.
There are also individual differences. Some people are naturally better at self-presentation—they enjoy doing it
and are good at it—whereas others find self-presentation less desirable or more difficult. An important individual-
difference variable known as self-monitoring has been shown in many studies to have a major impact on self-
presentation. Self-monitoring refers to the tendency to be both motivated and capable of regulating our behavior
to meet the demands of social situations (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). High self-monitors are particularly good at
reading the emotions of others and therefore are better at fitting into social situations—they agree with statements
such as “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons,” and “I guess I
put on a show to impress or entertain people.” Low self-monitors, on the other hand, generally act on their own
attitudes, even when the social situation suggests that they should behave otherwise. Low self-monitors are more
likely to agree with statements such as “At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like,” and “I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.” In short, high self-monitors use self-
presentation to try to get other people to like them by behaving in ways that the others find desirable, whereas low
self-monitors tend to follow their internal convictions more than the demands of the social situation.
In one experiment that showed the importance of self-monitoring, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) had college
students interact individually with another student (actually an experimental confederate) whom they thought they
would be working with on an upcoming task. While they were interacting, the confederate subtly touched her
own face several times, and the researchers recorded the extent to which the student participant mimicked the
confederate by also touching his or her own face.
The situational variable was the status of the confederate. Before the meeting began, and according to random
assignment to conditions, the students were told either that they would be the leader and that the other person
would be the worker on the upcoming task, or vice versa. The person variable was self-monitoring, and each
participant was classified as either high or low on self-monitoring on the basis of his or her responses to the self-
monitoring scale.
As you can see in Figure 3.14, “Self-Monitoring and Behavioral Mimicry,” Cheng and Chartrand found an
interaction effect: the students who had been classified as high self-monitors were more likely to mimic the
behavior of the confederate when she was described as being the leader than when she was described as being
the worker, indicating that they were “tuned in” to the social situation and modified their behavior to appear
more positively. Although the low self-monitors did mimic the other person, they did not mimic her more when
the other was high, versus low, status. This finding is consistent with the idea that the high self-monitors were
particularly aware of the other person’s status and attempted to self-present more positively to the high-status
leader. The low self-monitors, on the other hand—because they feel less need to impress overall—did not pay
much attention to the other person’s status.
162 • PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY - 1ST INTERNATIONAL EDITION
Figure 3.14: Self-Monitoring and Behavioral Mimicry
High self-monitors imitated more when the person they were interacting with was of higher (versus lower) status.
Low self-monitors were not sensitive to the status of the other. Data are from Cheng and Chartrand (2003).
This differential sensitivity to social dynamics between high and low self-monitors suggests that their self-
esteem will be affected by different factors. For people who are high in self-monitoring, their self-esteem may
be positively impacted when they perceive that their behavior matches the social demands of the situation, and
negatively affected when they feel that it does not. In contrast, low self-monitors may experience self-esteem
boosts when they see themselves behaving consistently with their internal standards, and feel less self-worth when
they feel they are not living up to them (Ickes, Holloway, Stinson, & Hoodenpyle, 2006).
Key Takeaways
• Our self-concepts are affected by others’ appraisals, as demonstrated by concepts including
the looking-glass self and self-labeling.
• The self-concept and self-esteem are also often strongly influenced by social comparison. For
example, we use social comparison to determine the accuracy and appropriateness of our
thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
• When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others through downward social
comparison, we feel good about ourselves. Upward social comparison with others who are
better off than we are leads to negative emotions.
• Social identity refers to the positive emotions that we experience as a member of an important
social group.
• Normally, our group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we
perceive our own groups, and thus ourselves, in a positive light.
• Which of our many category identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a
function of the particular situation we are in.
• In the face of others’ behaviors, we may enhance our self-esteem by “basking in
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the reflected glory” of our ingroups or of other people we know.
• If other people’s actions threaten our sense of self according to self-evaluation maintenance
theory, we may engage in a variety of strategies aimed at redefining our self-concept and
rebuilding our self-esteem.
• The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social
status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life.
Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people.
• We often use self-presentation in the longer term, seeking to build and sustain particular
reputations with specific social audiences.
• The individual-difference variable of self-monitoring relates to the ability and desire to self-
present.
Exercises and Critical Thinking
1. Describe some aspects of your self-concept that have been created through social comparison.
2. Describe times when you have engaged in downward and upward social comparison and the
effects these comparisons have had on your self-esteem. To what extent do your experiences
fit with the research evidence here?
3. What are your most salient social identities? How do they create positive feelings for you?
4. Outline a situation where someone else’s behavior has threatened your self-concept. Which of
the strategies outlined in relation to self-evaluation maintenance theory did you engage in to
rebuild your self-concept?
5. Identify a situation where you basked in the reflected glory of your ingroup’s behavior or
peformance. What effect did this have on your self-esteem and why?
6. Describe some situations where people you know have used each of the self-presentation
strategies that were listed in this section. Which strategies seem to be more and less effective
in helping them to achieve their social goals, and why?
7. Consider your own level of self-monitoring. Do you think that you are more of a high or a
low self-monitor, and why? What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages for you of
the level of self-monitoring that you have?
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Thinking Like a Social Psychologist about the Self
Social psychologists think about the self in the same way that they think about any other social phenomenon—in
terms of affect, behavior, and cognition, and in terms of the person-situation interaction. Our focus in this chapter
has been on the cognitive, affective, and social aspects of the self and on the remarkable extent to which the self
is created by the social situation in which we find ourselves.
Take a moment and use this new knowledge about how social psychologists think about the self to consider your
own self. Think carefully (and as fairly as you can) about how you think and feel about yourself. What constructs
did you list when you tried the Twenty Statements Test in section 10, “The Cognitive Self: The Self-Concept”?
Which of your physical characteristics were most accessible for you? And what about your social identities and
your traits? Do you now have a better insight into the characteristics that are most important to you?
Now consider the complexity and consistency of your self-concept. Do you think it would be better if it was more
complex or consistent? Do you think you should seek out more dimensions to round it out? Or perhaps you feel
that you already have a healthy and complex self-concept. In any case, you might want to keep this concept in
mind as you think about yourself in the future.
Self-esteem is one of the most important aspects of the self. Do you feel that you have relatively high or low self-
esteem? What about other people you know? Does their level of self-esteem influence how you relate to them?
And how do the aspects of your own self help (or potentially harm) your relations with others?
And what about your relations with the social groups you belong to? Do you derive a lot of your self-esteem from
your group memberships? Which groups provide you with social identities, and are there group memberships
that may potentially not provide you with high social identity? When and how do you use self-presentation and
reputation management in your daily life?
Finally, take a moment and consider your online behavior. How do you think it both reflects, and influences how
you see yourself?
In sum, the self is the fundamental part of human psychology and will form the basis of all our analyses of social
behavior. We have already seen this in previous topics, and will continue to see it going forward.
Chapter Summary
The many and varied thoughts that we have about ourselves are stored in the variety of self-schemas that make up
the cognitive part of the self—the self-concept. The self-concept is the most complex of all our schemas because
it includes all of the images, desires, beliefs, feelings, and hopes that we have for and about ourselves.
The self-concept can be measured by simply asking people to list the things that come to mind when they think
about themselves or by using other techniques such as asking people to remember information related to the self.
Research has found that some people have more complex and consistent selves than others do, and that having
a variety of self-schemas is useful because the various aspects of the self help to improve our responses to the
events that we experience.
The self-concept can vary in its current accessibility. When the self-concept is highly accessible and therefore
becomes the focus of our attention, the outcome is known as self-awareness or self-consciousness. Private self-
consciousness occurs when we are introspective about our inner thoughts and feelings, whereas public self-
consciousness occurs when we focus on our public image. It is important to be aware of variation in the
accessibility of the aspects of the self-concept because the changes in our thoughts about the self have an
important influence on our behavior. Increased self-awareness, for instance, can lead to increased perceptions of
self-discrepancy, which occurs when we see our current self as not matching our ideal self.
Self-esteem refers to the positive (high self-esteem) or negative (low self-esteem) evaluations that we make of
ourselves. When we feel that we are viewed positively and held in esteem by others, we say that we have high
social status. Having high social status creates positive self-esteem.
The desire to see ourselves positively leads us to seek out, process, and remember information in a way that allows
us to see ourselves even more positively. However, although the desire to self-enhance is a powerful motive, it
is not the same in all cultures, and increases in self-esteem do not necessarily make us better or more effective
people. An effective life involves an appropriate balance between the feeling and the cognitive parts of the self: we
must always consider not only the positivity of our self-views but also the accuracy of our self-characterizations
and the strength of our relationships with others.
Although we learn about ourselves in part by examining our own behaviors, the self-concept and self-esteem are
also determined through our interactions with others. The looking-glass self reflects how others’ views of us feed
into the way we see ourselves. Social comparison occurs when we learn about our abilities and skills, about the
appropriateness and validity of our opinions, and about our relative social status by comparing our own attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors with those of others.
We use downward social comparison to create a positive image of ourselves through favorable comparisons with
others who are worse off than we are. Through upward social comparison, we compare ourselves with others who
are better off than we are. In some cases, we can bask in the reflected glory of others that we care about, but in
other cases, upward comparison makes us feel inadequate. An important aspect of the self-concept that is derived
from our social experiences is our social identity, which is turn is derived from our membership in social groups
and our attachments to those groups.
The tendency to attempt to present a positive image to others and thereby attempt to increase our social status
is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life. In the longer term, our concern
to present ourselves in particular ways can become a more ongoing reputation management project, and we may
end up building different reputations with different audiences. Some people are high self-monitors, more able and
willing to self-present than are other people, and will shift their behavior across situations and audiences more
often than low self-monitors, who try to act more consistently with their internal values.
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4. Attitudes, Behavior, and Persuasion
Chapter Learning Objectives
1. Exploring Attitudes
• Define the concept of an attitude and explain why it is of such interest to social psychologists.
• Review the variables that determine attitude strength.
• Outline the factors that affect the strength of the attitude-behavior relationship.
2. Changing Attitudes through Persuasion
• Outline how persuasion is determined by the choice of effective communicators and effective
messages.
• Review the conditions under which attitudes are best changed using spontaneous versus
thoughtful strategies.
• Summarize the variables that make us more or less resistant to persuasive appeals.
3. Changing Attitudes by Changing Behavior
• Outline the principles of self-perception and explain how they can account for the influences
of behavior on attitude.
• Outline the principles of cognitive dissonance and explain how they can account for the
influences of behavior on attitude.
The Effective Use of Persuasion by Apple to Drive Sales
On January 9, 2007, Steve Jobs, the enigmatic co-founder and CEO of Apple, Inc., introduced the first
iPhone to the world. The device quickly revolutionized the smartphone industry and changed what
consumers came to expect from their phones. In the years since, smartphones have changed from being
regarded as status symbols (Apple sold close to 1.4 million iPhones during their first year on the market)
to fairly commonplace and essential tools. One out of every five people in the world now owns a
smartphone, there are more smartphones in use in the world than PCs, and it is difficult for many young
people to imagine how anyone ever managed to function without them. If you consider the relatively high
cost of these devices, this transformation has been truly remarkable.
Figure 4.1 Steve Jobs introduces the iPhone 4
Much of this shift in attitude can be credited to the impressive use of tactics of persuasion employed by
smartphone manufacturers like Apple and Samsung. The typical marketing campaign for a new model of
an iPhone delivers a carefully crafted message that cleverly weaves together stories, visuals, and music to
create an emotional experience for the viewing public. These messages are often designed to showcase the
range of uses of the device and to evoke a sense of need. Apple also strives to form relationships with its
customers, something that is illustrated by the fact that 86 percent of those who purchased the iPhone 5S
were upgrading from a previous model. This strategy has benefited Apple tremendously as it has sold over
400 million iPhones since 2007, making it one of the wealthiest companies in the world.
Sources: Borchers, T. A. (2013). Persuasion in the media age (3rd ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Global Apple iPhone sales in the fiscal years 2007 to 2013 (in million units). (2014). In Statista. Retrieved
from http://www.statista.com/statistics/276306/global-apple-iphone-sales-since-fiscal-year-2007/
Heggestuen, J. (2013). One in every 5 people in the world own a smartphone, one in every 17 own
a tablet. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/smartphone-and-tablet-
penetration-2013-10
iPhone 5S sales statistics. (2013). In Statistic Brain. Retrieved from http://www.statisticbrain.com/
iphone-5s-sales-statistics/
One of the most central concepts in social psychology is that of attitudes (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010). In this
chapter, we will focus on attitude formation, attitude change, and the influence of attitudes on behavior. We will
see that attitudes are an essential component of our lives because they play a vital role in helping us effectively
interact with our environment. Our attitudes allow us to make judgments about events (e.g., “I don’t mind waiting
in a queue for these concert tickets”), individuals (e.g., “I really admire the Dalai Lama”), social groups (e.g., “I
love my university”), and many other things.
We will begin our discussion by looking at how attitudes are defined by the ABCs of social psychology—affect,
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behavior, and cognition—noting that some attitudes are more affective in nature, some more cognitive in nature,
and some more behavioral in nature. We will see that attitudes vary in terms of their strength such that some
attitudes are stronger and some are weaker. And we will see that the strength of our attitudes is one of the
determinants of when our attitudes successfully predict our behaviors.
Then we will explore how attitudes can be created and changed—the basic stuff of persuasion, advertising, and
marketing. We will look at which types of communicators can deliver the most effective messages to which
types of message recipients. And we will see that the same message can be more effective for different people in
different social situations. We will see that persuasive messages may be processed either automatically (i.e., in a
rather cursory or superficial way) or thoughtfully (with a greater focus on the argument presented) and that the
amount and persistence of persuasion will vary on the processing route that we use. Most generally, we will see
that persuasion is effective when the communication resonates with the message recipient’s motivations, desires,
and goals (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005).
Because the ABCs of social psychology tend to be consistent, persuasive appeals that change our thoughts and
feelings will be effective in changing our behavior as well. This attitude consistency means that if a company
can make you think and feel more positively about its product, then you will be more likely to buy it.
But attitude consistency works in the other direction too, such that when our behaviors change, our thoughts
and beliefs about the attitude object may also change. Once we buy a product, we will find even more things
to like about it, and our attitudes toward the company behind the product will become even more positive.
Although this possibility is less intuitive and therefore may seem more surprising, it also follows from the basic
consistencies among affect, cognition, and behavior. We will discuss two theories—self-perception theory and
cognitive dissonance theory—each of which makes this prediction but for different reasons.
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